On behalf of the majority opinion, st stated the reasons for the judgment:
(1) The preface of Missouri ActNo. 1596 states: "The life of every member of human beings begins with conception"; "The life, health and property interests of unborn babies should be protected"; "The spirit of equal rights between unborn children and others should run through all laws in Missouri." The plaintiff thinks that the government adopts some kind of life start theory to restrict abortion, which violates Roy's precedent; The preface of the law is an operational norm to guide the interpretation of the law, so the plaintiff has the legal status to question the preface.
Most people think that Roy's judgment does not restrict the state government from expressing its own value judgment, and the preface of Decree 1596 is only a value judgment. In this case, there is no evidence to prove that the explanation of the preamble of 1596 restricts the appellant's specific behavior, so the court does not have to answer the question of whether the preamble is constitutional.
(2) Section 188.25438+00 of Decree-Law 1596 stipulates: "Unless it is necessary to have an abortion to save the mother's life, it is illegal for any public official to engage in or assist in an abortion within the scope of employment"; Article 188.2 15 stipulates: "It is illegal to use any public equipment to perform abortion or help abortion, unless it is to save the mother's life." The plaintiff believes that the closure of public facilities for abortion obviously goes far beyond the necessary scope for the government to encourage fertility, which is a restriction, and even cuts off the abortion route to some extent, pushing those women who have no money to go to private hospitals to a difficult position.
Most people think that the government has no obligation to provide any help for abortion, and the government's use of public facilities and public employees to encourage fertility does not constitute a restriction on abortion. Missouri law prohibits public officials from helping abortion in public hospitals, but only allows pregnant women to choose if the government does not build any public hospitals. The Supreme Court's earlier judgment confirmed: "Amendment 14 does not recognize the individual's right to receive any preferential help from the government, even if such help is essential to protect life, freedom and property that have not been deprived by the government." The constitution does not require the government to engage in or help the abortion business, and doctors in private hospitals and their patients have no constitutional right to use public facilities for abortion. Therefore, the provisions of Articles 188.5438+00 and 188.438+05 are not unconstitutional.
(3) 1596, Articles 188.205, 188.2 10, 188.2 15 stipulate that it is forbidden to use public funds to provide consultation for abortion, and it is forbidden for public officials to provide consultation for abortion. However, the plaintiff admitted that he did not suffer any direct losses, so whether the provisions of 188.205 are constitutional is not a controversial issue in this case, and there is no need for the court to review it.
(4) Article 188.029 of Law 1596 stipulates that if doctors have reason to believe that the pregnancy has reached 20 weeks or more, they must first check whether the fetus is alive with the care, skills and proficiency that professionals should have in the same or similar situations-through necessary medical examination, determine the perinatal period, fetal weight and vital capacity, and make a judgment on whether the fetus is alive or not. The plaintiff believes that according to Roy's precedent, the viability of the fetus should be after 24 weeks of pregnancy, while the law requires doctors to check the viability of the fetus at 20 weeks of pregnancy, which increases the difficulty and risk of abortion.
Most people think that the division of three stages of fetal viability in Roy's case is a mistake and should be corrected.
First of all, the three stages of fetal viability are a rigid division, which makes American physique become the Proch bed in Greek mythology. "Following precedent is the cornerstone of our legal system, but in the constitutional field, precedent is not as binding as other fields. Apart from the constitutional amendment, the court is the only institution that can make changes. When the case was proved to be "unreliable in principle and infeasible in practice", the court never forced itself to review the precedent. The three stages identified in the Roy case belong to the situation that should be retried. " Constitutional interpretation usually expounds general concepts and establishes general rules, but Roy case runs counter to this: the three-stage structure as the core of Roy case can not be found in the constitutional text or other fields where constitutional principles can be found. These three stages lack clear boundaries. If we follow this precedent, the result will inevitably lead to an intricate and expanding network of legal rules, which is not a collection of constitutional principles, but a compilation of written rules.
Secondly, the Roy case limits the time for the state to supervise abortion after the fetus is viable. "We can't understand: Why does the national interest of protecting potential life only appear after the fetus can survive? Why is there a hard border that prohibits the state from intervening before the fetus can survive, but allows the state to intervene after the fetus can survive? " Article 188.209 of Missouri Act requires doctors to check the viability of the fetus before performing abortion, which is based on the viability to realize the national interest of protecting potential life and does not conflict with Roy's precedent. Although the implementation of this law increases the cost of abortion and limits the scope of doctors' free decision, it is not unconstitutional.
Most opinions criticized Roy's view that freedom of abortion is private. Most opinions pointed out that the Roy case tried to form a constitutional framework by virtue of the right to privacy, tried to judge the laws regulating abortion in various States, tried to bring the medical business that has been regulated by state laws into the scope of unconstitutional review by the court, and tried to balance the interests of state governments in protecting potential lives and women's right to decide whether to terminate pregnancy once and for all through a calendar.
Regarding the proposition that the Missouri government and the federal government ask the Supreme Court to completely overturn Roy's case, the answers of most opinions are: the facts involved in this case are obviously different from Roy's case-in this case, the Missouri government emphasizes that viability is the starting point for the state to protect potential lives; In Roy's case, all abortions except those that save the mother's life are regarded as criminal offences. In view of the fact that this case and the dispute have not provided the court with an opportunity to completely overturn Roy's precedent, what the court can do is to modify and limit Roy's precedent.
3. Southern Pennsylvania Family Planning Clinic v. Cather (1992) [12]
In Kaiser's case, the constitutionality of Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act, which was promulgated by 1982 and amended by 1988 and 1989, was questioned. The plaintiffs in this case are five clinics providing abortion services in Pennsylvania and a doctor who filed a class action lawsuit on his own behalf and others. The plaintiff believed that the Pennsylvania abortion law was obviously in conflict with Roy's judgment, and asked the court to declare the law unconstitutional and issue an injunction to prohibit its implementation. The defendant in this case is the government of Pennsylvania, and the federal government of the United States participates in the lawsuit as an "amicus curiae" supporting the government of Pennsylvania. The circuit court declared all controversial legal provisions unconstitutional and issued a permanent injunction; The court of appeal overturned the main part of the judgment of the circuit court; The Supreme Court made a judgment of 5: 4, which basically upheld the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
In Kaiser's case, Judge O 'Connor formed a joint opinion on behalf of three judges. Two justices, Blackmun and Stevens, partially agreed and partially opposed the joint opinion, while four justices, headed by Chief Justice rehnquist, objected. Therefore, only part of the joint opinion becomes the majority opinion.
On the one hand, the joint submission reiterated the legality and validity of Roy's judgment; On the other hand, the Roy rule is restricted by defining the main text of Roy's judgment.
The formation rules of Kaiser's joint opinion are as follows:
(1) Before the fetus can survive, women have the freedom to choose abortion. However, in order to protect potential lives, the state can restrict abortion, but not by banning abortion. After the fetus can survive, the state can use methods including prohibiting abortion to restrict abortion, unless the continuation of pregnancy will endanger the mother's life and health under special circumstances. The Joint Submission does not refer to the freedom of abortion as a "basic right" or "privacy right" protected by the Constitution, as in the judgment of Roy case, so it does not adopt the "strict review" rule of restrictive abortion law.
(2) The three-stage division of Roy's judgment is not in line with the national interests of protecting potential lives recognized in the text of the judgment, nor is it a necessary measure to ensure that women's choices are not interfered by the government. Therefore, the three-stage standard of Roy's judgment is abolished. The government's laws aimed at protecting potential life or encouraging women to have children can cover the whole pregnancy process, as long as the legal measures do not cause a significant undue burden on women's rights. After Roy's judgment, the Supreme Court's judgment based on the three-stage division should be partially overturned.
(3) After the abolition of the three-stage standard, the standard for the court to examine whether the abortion restriction law is constitutional is "inappropriate burden": if the legal purpose or effect causes substantial obstacles to abortion before the fetus can survive, it is an inappropriate burden clause and can be abolished. However, the "improper burden standard" itself has not become a rule accepted by most judges-seven judges (three judges hold a joint opinion and four judges hold an objection) advocate overturning the three-stage standard, six judges (four judges hold an objection and two judges hold an approval opinion) oppose Cather's improper burden standard, and only three judges hold a joint opinion to support it. As a result, Kaiser's judgment reiterated Webster's decision to overturn the three-stage standard, but no standard replaced the three-stage standard.
There are at least three differences between the joint opinion of Kaiser's judgment and the majority opinion of Roy's judgment: First, the scope of legal intervention in abortion has been greatly expanded, and the time for legal intervention in abortion has been greatly advanced. According to Roy's judgment, in the process of pregnancy, the two national interests of protecting pregnant women's health and potential life exist separately in content and formed successively in time. Before a national interest is formed, it is totally unreasonable to restrict abortion in order to realize this interest. According to Kaiser's case, the national interests of protecting potential life and pregnant women's health always coexist with women's right to abortion, and the government's measures to restrict abortion can cover all pregnancies; Secondly, a big difference between Roy's judgment and Kaiser's judgment in value judgment is the understanding of potential life. According to Roy's judgment, potential life appears with the viability of the fetus; According to Cather's judgment, potential life appears with pregnancy, and after the fetus can survive, potential life is transformed into "a second life that can exist independently (from the mother)"; Third, the standards of unconstitutional review are different. According to Roy's judgment, women's choice of abortion is the right of privacy protected by the Constitution and belongs to the category of "basic rights" of individuals. Unless there is an "irresistible national interest", it is unconstitutional for the law to restrict basic rights. According to Kaiser's case, women's choice of abortion is "freedom" limited by potential life, and the standard of unconstitutional review is "undue burden", which is a relatively loose judicial review standard.
On the specific issues disputed by the parties, the joint opinions formed a judgment that basically supported the laws of Pennsylvania:
(1) Review of exemption clauses. "Critical illness" is the only reason that can be exempted from legal restrictions under Pennsylvania law. The Circuit Court held that "critical illness" at least did not include pregnancy syndrome, inevitable abortion and endometrial displacement, while the Court of Appeal held that "critical illness" obviously included these three situations. The common opinion is that the tradition of the Supreme Court is to respect the interpretation of state laws by lower courts, because they are closer to the areas where laws are implemented. Therefore, the Court of Appeal held that the "major illness" clause was constitutional and should be retained.
(2) Review of notice clause and waiting clause. According to Pennsylvania law, doctors must inform pregnant women about the danger of abortion, the perinatal period of the fetus, the government's medical assistance for childbirth, the man's obligation to raise children and the information of adopting children before abortion. Abortion is not allowed within 24 hours after being informed of relevant information. The Circuit Court held that this clause increased women's psychological pressure and persuaded women to give up abortion instead of providing neutral information, so it conflicted with the earlier case of Akron I of the Supreme Court. The joint opinion holds that the three-stage rule applied by Roy in Akron I I case has been overturned, so the government can persuade women to give up abortion. The Circuit Court also held that the 24-hour waiting makes it more difficult for women to have an abortion-they have to go back and forth to the clinic at least twice, they may be harassed by demonstrators outside the clinic, they may expose their intention to have an abortion by going out twice within 24 hours, and they may be inconvenient because of the long distance. In the joint opinion, although these regulations have brought troubles to women, they do not constitute substantive obstacles, so they are not an undue burden.
(3) the review of the terms of spouse notice. According to Pennsylvania law, a married woman must submit a written statement to a doctor that she has informed her husband of the decision to have an abortion, or sign another written statement stating one of the following facts: a. Her husband is not the person who caused her pregnancy; B. The husband's whereabouts are unknown; C. The pregnancy is due to her own reported marital rape; The notice will cause her husband or other men to hurt her body.
The Circuit Court considered this clause unconstitutional, and the Court of Appeal overturned the ruling of the Circuit Court.
According to the joint opinion, the notification obligation of the spouse has created a huge obstacle to abortion and is an inappropriate burden. Some research reports show that: in the United States, there are 2 million families with domestic violence; Other research reports show that domestic violence is more common, and about half of married women are beaten during their marriage; In a family where the relationship between husband and wife is not harmonious, the wife reveals her pregnancy to her husband, which often leads to domestic violence. Zhang often uses his wife's extramarital pregnancy as an excuse to commit violence. If a wife lives in a women's shelter to escape domestic violence, the notice will expose her residence and put her in an unsafe position. Considering the prevalence of domestic violence, the obligation of spousal notification will make women give up abortion for fear of the safety of themselves and their children.
The state government argues that social surveys show that only 20% of women who have abortions are married, and 95% of married women who seek abortions are willing to inform their husbands in advance; Therefore, only 65,438+0% of women who have abortions feel inconvenienced by their spouses' notification obligation. The joint opinion holds that the number of people restricted is not important, because the law itself restricts those who may commit certain acts, not others. Another defense of the state government is that husbands have the right to pay attention to potential lives; The joint opinion replied that the pregnancy of a wife is a physiological fact, not a husband, and the abortion law restricts the freedom of the wife, not the freedom of the husband.
(4) Review of the minor's parental consent clause. The joint opinion holds that it is necessary for minors to consult their parents before making an abortion decision. In addition, the law allows minors who do not want to consult their parents to obtain judicial immunity, so it does not constitute an undue burden.
(5) Review of reporting terms. Pennsylvania law requires hospitals and clinics to report every abortion case to the government, including: the name of the medical institution; The method, time and place of abortion; Fetal perinatal period and weight; Pregnant woman's age, birth history and abortion record. According to the law on the disclosure of government information, the public has the right to know the medical reports obtained by the government. However, the joint opinion believes that this information is not enough to expose the identity of women, so it does not constitute an undue burden.
Therefore, except for the spouse notice clause, other controversial Pennsylvania laws are constitutional.
Second, one of the dividing lines between democratic politics and judicial decisions: can the court find its legal role from Roy's case?
(a) about the court's violation of democratic politics.
Roy's court illegally invaded a political issue outside the jurisdiction of the court, which is one of the main criticisms of Roy's precedent.
Among the different opinions on Roy's case, Justice White held that the controversial issue of Roy's case "should have been left to the public and the political procedures designed by the public to solve their own affairs": "Roy's judgment unnecessarily and excessively exercised the right of unconstitutional review"; As a result, "the public and legislatures in 50 States have lost the right to weigh two opposing interests because of the constitutional interpretation of the Supreme Court-on the one hand, the right of the fetus to grow and continue to survive, on the other hand, the right of the mother who may be affected by the continued pregnancy."
In the majority opinion of Webster's case, Chief Justice rehnquist pointed out: Our judgment today will allow the state government to supervise abortion, which may be prohibited according to Roy's case. However, the trial of Wei Xian is by no means an intervention, nor is it to solve political differences that are not mutually exclusive in the legislative process. Political problems should be solved by elected representatives. "The Constitution places some matters within the democratic process and others outside it. The trial of the constitution is to maintain a balance between the two. "
In the Webster case, Justice scalia emphasized that the Roy case is a political issue that the Supreme Court should not have intervened in, and it is unnecessary for judges to try to solve political problems as state activists. "Once caught in a political problem, the court will face the pressure of public opinion and fall into a dilemma: on the one hand, solving political problems must conform to the majority public opinion; On the other hand, the judges of the Supreme Court are appointed, not elected by the people, and their terms of office are lifelong, so whether they can get the support of the majority has nothing to do with whether they can continue to serve; The role of a judge is to obey the law, not public opinion. The court should never go beyond the facts of the case to answer any constitutional question-as long as it doesn't have to involve constitutional issues, there is no need for the court to involve constitutional issues; As long as the current dispute can be resolved according to precedent, there is no need for the court to create new constitutional rules. In any case, the court should not create a constitutional rule whose width exceeds the needs of the facts of the case. " The mistake of Roy's case lies in the formulation of constitutional rules broader than the facts of the case, which led to the political dispute of the Supreme Court. In Cather's case, Justice scalia reiterated that whether to allow or prohibit abortion should be resolved through democratic means, just like other important issues-the public should persuade each other and then vote. In other words, whether to restrict abortion, whether to restrict it completely or from a specific time, and how to restrict it should be decided by the state governments through laws that reflect the opinions of the local majority, rather than the Supreme Court replacing the state governments to legislate.
In scalia's view, since the court can't respond to the public's reaction, it is extremely unwise to get involved in political issues. Scalia's query repeats an old question: Does the court answer a political question by interpreting the law, is it a cross-border invasion? If this is not a question of legal interpretation at all, why should the court make a judgment on this?
Judge Bok and scalia have similar views (only similar, of course). Bok believes that the Roy case is the worst example of judicial invasion of democratic politics in this century. Once the judiciary intervenes in politics, it will inevitably lead to the destruction of the court, and the Roy case should be completely overturned. Both Bok and Scalia believe that justice should be separated from politics, but Bok Biscaglia is more intense. Bok further questioned: Is the unconstitutional review power of the US Supreme Court justified and necessary? The Supreme Court of European countries does not have the constitutional review power similar to that of the Supreme Court of the United States, but the freedom enjoyed by the European people is not necessarily lower than that enjoyed by the American people. [13] Bok believes that if the Supreme Court has the right to decide political issues through constitutional interpretation, then the legislative and administrative authorities should also have the same power; If one party is dissatisfied with the ruling of the Supreme Court, he can ask other authorities to make a ruling on the same issue. 〔 14〕
Professor Yili also strongly criticized Roy's case, but his views are obviously different from those of Bok and scalia. Yili has no objection to the court's involvement in politics. He believes that if judicial intervention can promote democratic politics based on voter participation and representative system, then intervention is justified, and vice versa. The illegality of Roy's case is not because the court intervened in political issues, but because the court deprived the minority interests that have been protected by legislation. Yili believes that women are the majority of the fetus, and compared with countless lives abandoned before birth, women are a minority. [15] Yili's core view is that if a society is at the mercy of a few legal elites, the foundation of democratic politics will be shaken.
(B) checks and balances of rights: the legitimate reason for judicial passive intervention in politics.
In the United States, the judicial invasion of politics is not enough to shake the legitimacy of the precedent of Roy case alone, because the right of unconstitutional review itself is a judicial function that cannot be completely divorced from politics. Accusing the judiciary of interfering in politics is just a question, a question that forces the Supreme Court to defend. Since 1803 [16] Marbury v Madison set a precedent for unconstitutional review, the Supreme Court has repeatedly expounded three legitimate reasons for exercising the right of unconstitutional review:
1. The duty of the court is to apply the law in specific cases. Only by interpreting the law can the law be applied. So what is the law can only be decided by the court through the legal interpretation of specific cases. If the constitution can't be applied to individual cases through judicial interpretation, its existence is meaningless, and the court's interpretation of the constitution can't avoid a basic question-does the law contradict the constitution? 〔 17〕
2. In most democratic countries, the interests of religious, racial and political minorities may be deprived or not equally protected. If a few people are scattered and isolated in a society, they can only be at the mercy of the majority. It is a necessary supplement to democratic politics for the court to examine whether the laws decided by the majority are constitutional. [18] The democratic majority can amend the Constitution, but it cannot deprive or unduly restrict the basic individual rights protected by the Constitution through laws. Opponents of the Roy case also admit that it is a legitimate reason for the court to review the laws decided by the democratic majority for the benefit of the minority. It is based on this understanding that Professor L.Tribe has reason to argue that a country's laws on basic rights should be consistent, rather than being decided by States according to "local knowledge" like prohibition of alcohol and traffic rules; The historical lesson of the demarcation between slave-holding States and abolitionist States tells the American people that the issue of basic rights can only be subject to the federal constitution. It is logical for the court to seek solutions in the name of the constitution when the public has major differences on the basic rights of individuals. 〔 19〕
3. The federalist's function of judicial restriction on legislation and administration is the legitimate reason repeatedly cited by the Supreme Court in its defense. "The imperial court has neither force nor money, and it is the least dangerous department among the three powers." "The court is an intermediary between the people and the legislature, supervising the latter to act within its scope." 〔20〕
Although there is a traditional boundary between justice and democracy, this traditional boundary is not closed and unchangeable. There is a difference between redrawing the border in the border area where the traditional border is blurred and large-scale invasion that ignores the traditional border. The former will be tolerated and the latter will be resisted. Therefore, the question about the legitimacy of Roy's case is not whether the court has crossed the border to intervene in the democratic process, but whether the court has deviated from its traditional role and intervened in a large-scale invasion. Has the court changed its position of judicial restraint and intervened in political conflicts excessively and unnecessarily?
(C) the boundary between judicial restraint and judicial activism: questioning scalia's comparison between Roy case and Scott case [2 1].
1. After all, unconstitutional review is not a legal power. The supreme court's interference in politics through unconstitutional review comes from the tolerance of the democratic majority rather than the strength of the constitution itself. The reason why the Supreme Court can maintain this power in a society that advocates majority democracy is not because it is strong, but because it never forgets to protect its weakness when it takes the initiative to attack. Whenever the Supreme Court intervenes in politics, it always adopts a low posture to convince the Democratic majority: the court upholds the constitution accepted by the Democratic majority, and judges will not involve constitutional issues as long as they can avoid it; The judge respects the choice of the democratic majority, whether he agrees or not; Court intervention is of great value and should be tolerated; The court does not involve political issues, but follows precedents and so on. In the case of Marbury v Madison, the Supreme Court, while opening the door to judicial invasion of politics, reiterated that political issues are not within the jurisdiction of the court, and the court is only exercising the power of constitutional interpretation. From 1905-30, while declaring more than 200 laws regulating the economy unconstitutional, the Supreme Court said modestly that it only followed the precedent and did not oppose the government's economic policy; In Barker's case, the Supreme Court intruded into the issue of the allocation of seats for members of parliament, which had never been asked before. At the same time, it carefully considered the boundary between justice and politics and declared that it had not crossed the line. [22] This is not hypocrisy, but wisdom: the Supreme Court needs to use a modest attitude and a position of respecting the democratic majority in exchange for the tolerance of the democratic majority. If the Supreme Court justifiably declares that it has the right to interfere in politics, it will pose a challenge to majority democracy, which is intolerable and hopeless. Therefore, the tradition of the Supreme Court is to take a position of judicial restraint on political issues.
(1) The criticism of the Roy case is that the Supreme Court abandoned the position of judicial restraint and adopted a positive attitude towards political issues.
Scalia thinks Roy's case is a copy of Scott's case. [23] In Scott's case, the question raised by the parties to the Supreme Court was: Are black "citizens" protected by the Constitution? The Supreme Court coldly replied, "No."
Chief Justice Taney read the verdict on behalf of most judges. Justice Taney thinks: (1) In the intention of the constitutional makers, blacks are not "sovereign" or "citizens" protected by the Constitution. On the contrary, blacks were regarded as "an inferior and inferior existence class" at that time and could not claim the "privileges and immunities" enjoyed by citizens as stipulated in the Constitution. "As for whether the legal policy or implicit policy is fair, it is not a question that the court can decide, but a question that should be decided by the regime, the legislature, the people who created the country and the Constitution ... The court only interprets their instructions according to their intentions and wishes ..."; (2) According to the Constitution of the United States, Congress shall not enact a bill depriving citizens of their property without due process, and Scott is the property of the defendant. The Missouri compromise act enacted by congress infringes on the defendant's property rights and should be invalid; Scott cannot claim any rights under the Act.
This judgment caused an uproar in the United States. As a challenge to Taney's court, Lincoln asked the audience in a speech: "Did the Scott case solve the slave problem? Has it brought us peace? " The audience's answer: "No" Lincoln said: "A judgment can only solve a case, but not a law, let alone the future of the country." 1868, 14 The constitutional amendment overturned Scott's judgment.
In the Kaiser case 14 1 year after Scott's case, scalia ironically compared Blackmun, the representative of the majority opinion in Roy's case, with Chief Justice Tani. [24] scalia claimed that Caesar's judgment reminded him of the portrait of Chief Justice Tani hanging in Harvard Law School. "The 82-year-old Tani, dressed in black, sat in a shady red armchair with his left hand resting on a pile of papers at his waist and his right hand resting on the armrest, looking lifeless. Tani looked directly at the viewer, his expression and deep-set eyes revealed indescribable sadness and gloom. Perhaps, his expression will always be like this, even when he feels the greatest pleasure of thinking. However, if we know that his career as chief justice has been overshadowed by the Scott case, we can't help but think that the Scott case is burning in his mind, and he is thinking about the impact of this case on the court and the short-term impact on the whole country. About two years ago, he thought he was "calling on the opposing sides of ethnic differences to end their disputes and accept the knowledge rooted in the constitution." "Ironically, when comparing Tani and Blackmun, scalia forgot that he had been repeating Tani's core point in the Scott case: the court should not interfere in politics. On the pretext that the court was helpless on political issues, Tani answered the most acute political question at that time: blacks were not citizens who could claim constitutional rights, but private property of slave owners. Scalia's consistent position is that the courts should take a passive attitude towards constitutional issues. The imperial court tried to quell the political disputes in the country, but it always got rid of itself. So, it's not Blackmun who is always on the same side as Tani, but Sca.