Suntech, Yingli and Saiwei are weak.
20 1 1 is a special year for photovoltaic industry in China. This year, Europe and the United States kicked off the "double opposition" to China's photovoltaic industry.
201101010/8, SolarWorld USA, together with six other manufacturers, formally applied to the US Department of Commerce for a "double-reverse" investigation on photovoltaic products in China.
20 12 on July 24th, the European photovoltaic manufacturers' union (EUProSun), led by SolarWorld, filed a lawsuit against the European Commission on "dumping behavior of photovoltaic manufacturers in China".
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After all, the double-reverse stick fell down. From time to time, China's photovoltaic industry has been evaluated as sorrowful. According to the tracking data of Enfu Business Consulting 20 12, more than 350 domestic photovoltaic enterprises went bankrupt or stopped production in that year, and all enterprises suffered losses. The total liabilities of American 1 1 listed companies are nearly150 billion yuan, and more than half of them have stopped production or semi-stopped production.
In the past two years, Chinese legendary photovoltaic companies Suntech, Yingli and Saiwei are also on the list. 20 1 1, Suntech ranked second in the list, second only to First Solar, Yingli ranked third, Saiwei ranked ninth, Trina Solar, Artes and Jingke ranked fifth, sixth and eighth.
First Solar topped the list this year, and some media commented that it is one of the oldest existing photovoltaic panel manufacturers. First Solar was founded in 1999, formerly known as solar cells, and was later acquired by Walton family related companies. The Waltons are the owners of the Wal-Mart Group.
But just one year later, FirstSolar was replaced by Yingli. However, in the past ten years, FirstSolar did not enter the top ten list only at 20 18, and its strength can be seen.
Yingli 20 12 and 20 13 ranked first.
2013,6543810.8, Yingli announced that it would become the world's largest photovoltaic enterprise in 20 12, with annual shipments exceeding 2.2GW. Yingli's "high light" performance in 20 12 is closely related to the development of the domestic market. The data shows that in 20 12, Yingli's domestic component shipments exceeded 500MW, up 27% year-on-year. In addition, some orders have been received in emerging markets such as America and Southeast Asia.
At that time, Miao Liansheng predicted that Yingli's domestic market share was expected to reach 40% in 20 13 years.
In fact, in the second half of 20 1 1, Yingli's market share dropped to 45. 17% in Europe, to 10.3 1% in the United States and to 36.7 1% in China.
After 20 12, Yingli remained at the top of the list in the following year, and its component shipments reached 3.2GW, twice as much as those of 201.6 GW.
However, Yingli's performance in 20 1 1 -20 13 is not good. 20 1 1, 20 12, 20 13, with a total loss of nearly 8 billion.
Yingli didn't "fall" as fast as Saiwei and Suntech.
In 20 14, Yingli retired to the second place on the list. Yingli lost $209 million this year and shipped 3.3GW of spare parts.
20 14 seems to be the prelude to Yingli's "retreat". From 20 15 to 20 17, Yingli ranked eighth in the list for three consecutive years. I haven't been on the list since 20 18. But the news about Yingli never stopped. In 2020, Yingli's right to speak in the market has gradually increased, and it has achieved good results. Maybe there will still be a place in the future. It is impossible to talk nonsense.
On 20 14, Miao Liansheng "let" out of the top position in the face of Trina Solar's catch-up. It is said that Laomiao is more "reliable". Trina has shipped 3.7GW this year, with a gap of 400MW.
Apart from Miao Liansheng, Yingli is remembered for sponsoring the 20 10 and 20 14 World Cups. In the history of photovoltaic development in China, it left a deep impression.
Compared with Yingli's glory, Suntech seems a little down and out at this time, although no one has a good life in this big environment.
20 12 may be regarded as the "one last dance" of Suntech's highlight performance, and Suntech ranks third in the list this year.
20 12 At the beginning of September, Suntech began to cut production and lay off employees, and the solar panel production capacity decreased from 2.4GW to 1.8GW, with a reduction rate of 25%. Incomplete statistics, or 1500 employees will be laid off.
However, Suntech still failed to hold on.
20 13 On March 20th, Wuxi Intermediate People's Court announced that Wuxi Suntech had ruled bankruptcy and reorganization according to law because it could not repay its debts due. Suntech went bankrupt. Although there are multiple reasons for Suntech's failure, the impact and lethality of "double opposition" on Suntech is enormous.
20 13, Suntech's name has disappeared from the list. After a series of "tossing", from 2065438 to 2005, Suntech appeared on the list intermittently, but it was no longer the glory of that year.
Saiwei's name disappeared from the list of 20 12. The late annual report of 20 1 1 shows that the total annual loss of Saiwei 20 1 1 * * is 5.45 billion yuan, including asset impairment loss of 2.82 billion yuan and investment loss of/kloc-0.25 billion yuan. After deducting the above losses, the actual operating loss is/.
In 20 12 years, the net loss of Saiwei was $65,438 +0.05 billion yuan. This year, Saiwei was besieged by many negative information, and Peng Xiaofeng also stepped down as CEO of LDK.
On August 30th, 20 14, Saiwei announced that the company accepted Peng Xiaofeng's resignation as chairman and director of the company, with immediate effect.
2015165438+1October 17, LDK announcement Xinyu Intermediate People's Court accepted the reorganization application of Xinyu Chengdong Construction Investment Company and Jiangxi Power Supply Branch of State Grid Jiangxi Electric Power Company, and requested LDK- Jiangxi LDK High-tech Co., Ltd., LDK High-tech (Xinyu) Co., Ltd. and four subsidiaries.
But in any case, the wonderful of Saiwei is remembered by many photovoltaic people.
In 20 12, the media reprinted the research report released by Maxim's Group: the accumulated liabilities of the largest 10 solar energy companies in China reached17.5 billion US dollars. According to media statistics, this 10 enterprise includes Yingli, Suntech, Trina, Jingao, Artes, Daquan, Yu Hui Sunshine, Saiwei and CLP Photovoltaic.
Another related data shows that after the financial crisis in 2008, more people participated in the photovoltaic industry in the face of opportunities. In just 20 1 1 year, the number of manufacturers of silicon rods, wafers, batteries and components in China photovoltaic industry has increased from 807 to 90 1 year. By 20 12, more than 350 enterprises in China went bankrupt or stopped production.
During this period, Miao Liansheng, Shi, Gao and Qu Xiaohua got together in a freeze-frame manner, keeping this topic in the circle.
After SolarWorld at the beginning of Hot Blood Jianghu ranked 10th at 20 1 1, the list of the top ten disappeared. As a German company, there are many interpretations of why there are frequent troubles.
The ups and downs of Yu Hui, Trina and Artest.
The "double opposition" in Europe and America forced stronger domestic photovoltaic enterprises, and then the domestic photovoltaic market began to develop under the impetus of a series of positive policies.
20 13 is called the "policy year" of photovoltaic industry. According to incomplete statistics, there are more than ten "big" policies related to photovoltaic industry. The most representative is the Opinions of the State Council on Promoting the Healthy Development of Photovoltaic Industry released on July 4th, 20th13rd.
The Opinions further refined the "Six Articles of the State". It is also pointed out that from 20 13 to 20 15, the annual installed capacity of photovoltaic power generation will increase by about 10 million kilowatts, and the total installed capacity will reach more than 35 million kilowatts by 20 15. In the "Twelfth Five-Year Plan" of solar power generation released on 20 12, the installed photovoltaic capacity in 20 15 years is more than 2 1 10,000 kilowatts.
In addition, the Opinions clarified the electricity price, subsidy mechanism and photovoltaic access threshold for the first time.
Subsequently, the supporting policies and related rules of various departments were introduced one after another, and the environment for the development of domestic photovoltaic industry was formed. Accompanied by it, there is the end of the "double opposition" stage.
After 20 13 brewing, 20 14 China photovoltaic industry entered a period of rapid development.
In 20 14, the cumulative installed capacity of grid-connected photovoltaics in China was 28.05GW, up 60% year-on-year, including 23.38GW of photovoltaic power plants and 4.67GW of distributed photovoltaic power plants. The national grid-connected 10.6GW (8.55 million kilowatts for photovoltaic power plants and 2.05 million kilowatts for distributed photovoltaic power plants) has been added, accounting for about a quarter of the world's new capacity, and the components used account for one-third of China's component production, achieving the goal of average annual growth 1 10,000 kilowatts proposed in the Opinions;
Trina Solar's rise is not sudden, and it has already ranked second in the list on 20 13. The appearance of high energy in the four big games has proved the strength of Tianhe. Tianhe also "pushed" Yingli off the throne in this year.
According to the data disclosed by Trina Solar itself, in 20 14, Trina Solar shipped 3.66GW, an increase of 4 1.9% compared with the same period in 20 13. The annual net income totaled 2.29 billion US dollars, an increase of 28.8% compared with 20 13. Gross profit was $385.6 million, an increase of 76.7% compared with 20 13; Gross profit margin 16.9%, 4.6% higher than 20 13.
Among them, Trina Solar's Q4 module shipment in 20 14 was close to 1. 1GW, of which the external shipment was 1.07GW, and the shipment of its own downstream power generation project was 28.3MW, a record high. Net income in the fourth quarter was $705 million, up 65,438+04.3% from the previous quarter.
At that time, Tianhe predicted that the Q 1 component shipment in 20 15 years would be 840MW-870MW, of which 60MW-70MW would be used for its own downstream power station project. In 20 15, the component shipment target is 4.4GW-4.6GW, with a year-on-year increase of 20%-26%. In addition, 700MW-750MW projects will be connected to the global power grid, with 30%-40% distributed projects in China.
Trina Solar's 20 15 annual report is really eye-catching. Trina Solar's total annual shipment was 5.74GW, up 56.8% year-on-year. Net revenue was $3 billion, a year-on-year increase of 32.8%.
At the same time, Sany expects the shipment of photovoltaic modules to be 6.3GW to 6.55GW in 20 16, of which the supply of downstream projects is expected to be 450MW to 550MW.
Trina Solar's summit is almost accompanied by Yingli's weakness. Artest followed closely, ranking second on the list with 20 15. In that year, the shipment volume was 4.7 1GW, which was lower than Trina 1GW. But this year is also the year that Artest is closest to the peak position.
For Artest's "lack of initiative", many voices in the market think that Qu Xiaohua's personality determines Artest's position. Qu Xiaohua is a steady person, and being a photovoltaic is also a well-trained person. Insiders' evaluation: Artes is one of several companies with relatively stable financial situation in the industry. There is also a saying that "if there are only a few photovoltaic companies left in the end, there will definitely be Artes".
On 20 14, some media reported that Artest would take over the top position of Trina, but it didn't take shape in the end. Later, with the rise of components such as Jingke, Jingao and Longji, Artest's ranking further declined. Up to now, Artes's component shipments have ranked fifth in the list for three consecutive years.
On 20 15, the list changed obviously, slipping to Yu Hui sunshine, the tenth place, while GCL integration broke into the list, ranking seventh.
20 15 is also the last year of Yu Hui sunshine on this list.
Yu Hui Sunshine was founded by Li Xianshou. Li Xianshou is the eldest brother of the "three brothers of Li" who are well known in the photovoltaic industry. His second brother and third brother are Li He respectively, and they are the first founders of Jingke in 20 16.
In 2005, Li Xianshou and his entrepreneurial partners founded Yu Hui Sunshine; In 2008, NYSE was listed; In 2009, it was officially announced to enter the field of battery chip and component production, with a complete photovoltaic industry chain from primary polysilicon to photovoltaic application system; 20 1 1 year 1 1 month, Yu Hui sunshine integrated 20 photovoltaic enterprises to form a new joint venture company.
On 20 14, Yu Hui announced that it had become the investigation enterprise of the US Department of Commerce's double-reverse investigation on photovoltaic products exported from China, and its share price fell, but Yu Hui was still involved in the double-reverse investigation. This may also pave the way for the delisting warning of 20 16 and the divestiture of solar energy manufacturing business of 20 17.
Although the harm of "double opposition" is not fatal to Hui, it has a far-reaching impact on the performance of Hui Sunshine. During this period, Yu Hui's performance has been in a state of loss.
In 20 15 years, relevant data show that Yu Hui's external PV module shipments 1.6GW, and actual revenue1.28 billion USD, down 18.9% year-on-year. It is estimated that the revenue of 20 16 will be lower than 20 15, which is about $ 10 billion to $1200 million, and the shipments of third-party components will also be reduced.
Li Xianshou once said that "from the second half of 20 15, the business focus will shift from manufacturing to downstream business development", which echoed Yu Hui's subsequent withdrawal from solar manufacturing. This withdrawal is regarded as Hui Yu's "broken wrist to save himself".
In 20 16, Yu Hui received a delisting warning from NYSE because its share price was lower than 1 USD. This situation is only a point in the situation at that time. This year, Hui Yu fell off the list.
On June 4th, 20 17, Yu Hui announced that Li Xianshou announced the acquisition of the company's manufacturing industry (including polysilicon, solar chips and solar module manufacturing) and LED distribution business, and assumed the company's related debts. At this point, Yu Hui, a rising solar energy manufacturing industry, is a "hero curtain call".
Kyocera and Sharp also fell out of the list of 20 15. The total shipments of Japanese components in fiscal years 20 15 and 20 15 were 7.96GW, which was 8 1% of fiscal year 20 14, far below the level of 20 13.
The Rise of Jingke, Longji and Dongfang Risheng
In 20 16, Yu Hui dropped out of the list, while Jingke topped the list. The situation of the two brothers' companies was very different. When Jingke was founded, its main purpose was to help Li Xianshou develop Yu Hui better. Things have changed.
Starting from 20 16, Jingke started its own "king" journey. 20 16-20 19, Jingke ranked first for four consecutive years.
In 20 16, according to the statistics of relevant institutions, the shipments of Jingke are 6.6-6.7GW, and Trina is 6.3-6.55GW, which is not much different from Jingke.
After reaching the summit on 20 14 and 20 15, Tianhe lost to Jingke on 20 16. It is believed that Tianhe at this time did not have the strength to fight against Jingke, but Gao took the initiative to "abdicate".
Gao Zeng said on relevant occasions that Trina Solar's goal is to become the world's leading component supplier, first-class system integrator and pioneer in the field of smart energy. From this perspective, Trina aims at integration.
"Sometimes people do a lot of stupid things to stay first." "It is not easy to be a boss. From two aspects: the leader is ahead, and you are always the first to be scratched when there is wind and rain; Second, there are great ups and downs in leadership. For example, the technology is in front and the people behind are staring at you. Intellectual property protection in China is not good. You may have spent 100 million yuan to develop a new product. People spend millions to dig a person and take you away. "
Gao's several statements have become evidence of the saying "Let the sages go". What is the reason? I'm afraid no one can give a definite answer except the parties concerned, so the answer is still a mystery.
It is not surprising that Jingke topped the list.
In this decade, Jingke has been on the list, and it is on the rise. In the first five years of the summit, Jingke ranked eighth, seventh, fifth, fifth and third respectively.
In 20 17, 20 18 and 20 19 years, the shipments of components of Jingke were 9.7GW, 1 1.6GW and 14.3GW respectively. The second places in these three years are Tianhe, Jingao and Jingao. The three-year shipments of the two are 9. 1GW, 8. 1GW, 10GW, 7.5GW, 8.8GW, 10.26GW respectively.
20 18 and 20 19, followed by Beijing Olympics and Trina.
In these four years, Jingke has been ahead of the second place with great advantages, and the latter has not posed enough threat to Jingke. Starting from 20 18, the component industry in China officially entered a blowout situation. At that time, it seemed that no enterprise could shake their position.
In the first year of Jingke's summit, Longji Le Ye broke into the list and ranked ninth. I'm afraid at this time, no one can think that this enterprise has occupied such an important position in the photovoltaic industry in China in just a few years, and snatched the crown from Jingke. Jingke's five consecutive championships failed to be realized. There are also many sayings about the relationship between Jing Ke and Longji. A related staff member once joked that he hates you to death, but he can't kill you.
20 14 10, Longji bought 85% shares of Zhejiang Le Ye Photovoltaic Technology Co., Ltd. at a price of nearly 46 10/00000. Le Ye, Zhejiang Province is mainly engaged in the research, development, manufacture and sales of crystalline silicon solar cells and modules. When it was acquired by Longji, the component production capacity exceeded 200MW. Subsequently, Longji registered leye county as a whole. 2015 65438+1On October 28th, Longji invested 500 million yuan to establish Le Ye Photovoltaic Technology Co., Ltd. in Xi 'an. At this point, Longji officially cut into the component link.
In other words, Longji entered the top ten list only two years after it officially cut into the component link, and the speed of development can be seen. In 20 16, the sales of Longji components reached 5.7 billion.
Longji 20 16 financial report shows that Longji's revenue 1 15.3 1 billion, up 93.89% year-on-year; The annual net profit was 65.438+0.547 billion, a year-on-year increase of 654.38+0.97.36%; The basic earnings per share was 0.86 yuan, up177.42% year-on-year; The weighted average return on equity without deduction is 265,438+0.15%, a year-on-year increase of 9.18%; The comprehensive gross profit margin was 27.48%, up 7. 1 1% year-on-year.
From 20 16 to 20 19, Longji's component shipments were 2.34GW, 4.4GW, 7.2GW and 8.4GW respectively. According to relevant media statistics, in 2020, the component shipments will be 22.7GW, and Jingke will be 19GW. At this point, Longji squeezed Jing Ke out of the throne.
In the past two years, Longji has developed rapidly. 20 19 on August 28th, the market value exceeded 1000 billion; On July 24, 2020, the market value exceeded 200 billion; On June 9, 2020 10, the market value exceeded 300 billion; 202 1 1 5, the market value exceeded 400 billion. The entry of Gaocheng Capital shows that the capital market is optimistic about Longji. The market value of 500 billion yuan is not out of reach.
20 19 April, Longji released (20 19-202 1) product capacity planning, which planned the production capacity of monocrystalline silicon rods/wafers to be 36GW at the end of 20 19, 50GW and 65GW202 1 9 at the end of 2020. The production capacity of single crystal battery is 201end of 9 10GW, end of 2020 15GW, 20GW202 1 end of the year; The production capacity of single crystal module is 2,065,438+16 GW at the end of 2009, 25GW at the end of 2020 and 30GW at the end of 202/kloc-0.
From 20 19, Longji entered the stage of rapid expansion. Especially in 2020, Longji reached cooperation with state-owned enterprises and central enterprises many times, and other enterprises also continued to cooperate. According to the incomplete statistics of Century New Energy Network, in 2020, the total capacity of the expansion projects involved in Longji will exceed 77GW, and the total investment will exceed 26.9 billion yuan.
Jingao 20 18 and 20 19 ranked second. In 2020, as Longji climbed to the top, it fell by one place and ranked third.
Looking at Jingao, it is ahead in the vertical integration and development of the industry. The industrial chain covers many fields such as silicon wafers, batteries, components and photovoltaic power plants. Therefore, even when the industry of 20 18 was "miserable", Jingao's performance was relatively stable.
After 20 19, Jingao successfully returned to A-shares by backdoor, benefiting from the capital market, and Jingao developed rapidly. In 2020, there will be many actions. According to the rough statistics of Century New Energy Network, there are 16 expansion projects in Beijing and Austria, with the total production capacity exceeding 1.5 1.6 GW and the total investment exceeding 4 1.55 billion yuan.
The third quarterly report of Beijing Olympic Games in 2020 shows that the revenue in the first three quarters was 65.438+0.669 billion yuan, a year-on-year increase of 235.438+0%; Net profit 1.29 1 billion yuan, up 85.29% year-on-year. The net profit in the third quarter was 590 million yuan, up 95. 12% year-on-year. The industry is more optimistic about Jingao's performance in 2020.
With the advent of parity era, reducing costs and increasing efficiency has become an important issue for all enterprises.
In 20 19, "Kuafu" 2 10mm silicon wafer was introduced to Central, which promoted the development of large-scale components. In 2020, the M 10 Alliance was established.
Dongfang Risheng 20 17 entered the list. As of 20 19, the component shipments were 2.8GW, 5.07GW and 7.3GW respectively. Ranked tenth, seventh and seventh on the list. At the same time, according to relevant statistics, Oriental Risheng will still rank seventh in 2020.
With the disclosure of the performance forecast in 2020, the performance of Dongfang Risheng has a far-reaching impact on it, but it has not been greatly affected in terms of talents, technology and market. With a relatively stable development idea, the industry is still optimistic about its 202 1 year.
Although many enterprises have laid out the 2 10 component market in succession, with the advantages of Dongfang Risheng in all aspects, there is also a good room for development in theory.
Zheng Tai broke into eighth place in the ranking in 2020. Outstanding performance in 20 19, with 3.73GW ranked seventh in China's component shipments, and the top six were Jingke, Jingao, Trina, Artes and Longji.
With the rapid development of domestic PV companies and the decline of foreign component companies, it is not surprising that Zheng Tai entered the list. From 20 18, Suntech re-entered the list. Although the ranking is not high, it still shows great strength.
According to the current data, in the top ten list in 2020, China enterprises occupy eight seats, with strong strength.
In the past ten years, although the component market has changed, the strong and the strong are still the main tone. Starting with 202 1, there is a lot of favorable photovoltaic information. How many seats can ten China component companies occupy in the future, whether Longji is still the champion, whether Risheng can turn its face, and how wonderful Trina will perform ... these will be wonderful points to watch.
If you want to wear a crown, you must bear its weight. Who will be the throne of 202 1?