Unless your appointment point is particularly attractive and you suspect that the bargaining range may be small, generally speaking, revealing the appointment point is not a good strategy. If you disclose the reserve price, you should be prepared that the other party will only offer the reserve price, that's all.
As we saw earlier, the most valuable information you can get about your opponent is his reservation information. Knowing this information, you can make your offer almost not much higher than his reservation point, thus keeping the bargaining surplus for yourself. However, you have to assume that your opponent is as smart as you and is unlikely to expose his reservations. Similarly, if you reveal some reserved information in the negotiation, nothing can stop your opponent from pursuing bargaining surplus.
Some negotiators show that they are sincere and trust each other by revealing their reservations. These negotiators rely on each other's credibility and believe that they will not use this information improperly. In fact, you can use some more effective methods to build trust instead of exposing your reserve price. For example, you can sincerely show each other that you care about their needs and interests. The purpose of negotiation is to maximize one's own surplus, so why express "trust" by revealing one's reservations to the other party, thus damaging one's own interests? ◆ Should I lie about the reservation information?
If it is good for negotiators not to disclose the information of reservation points, it may be better for them to lie, misreport or exaggerate reservation points. But lying is not a good idea for three important reasons.
First of all, lying is immoral. Lewicki and Stark identified five behaviors that are considered immoral in negotiation, including traditional bidding methods (such as trying to exaggerate the initial quotation or demand), attacking the opponent's network (such as trying to get your opponent fired or intimidating them to make him look stupid), misreporting or lying (such as the other party has information that will weaken your negotiating position, even if the information is valid, but you deny its validity). For example, even if you know that your customers will not approve of a solution, you can guarantee that they will.
We investigated the situation of self-centeredness and lying in intimate social networks, and the results showed that although 40% people thought that other people in social networks had lied in 10 week, only 22% people admitted that they had lied during this period. The litigation cases that often occur in negotiations may be caused by egocentrism. For example, Textron was accused by the trade union of lying in labor negotiations. Digital Equipment Corporation was accused of lying in the pre-trial negotiation, and Woolworth was accused of falsely reporting the asbestos content in a building during the lease negotiation. We are likely to see others cheat, instead of admitting that we cheat others. From this we can draw a conclusion: don't act rashly!
Secondly, lying is strategically meaningless. Lying about reservation information will narrow the scope of bargaining. This means that negotiations in which negotiators expect to reach an agreement sometimes come to a deadlock. Negotiators who lie about reserved information are often difficult to guarantee completeness. In the negotiation, the most common lie is "This is my final offer." Having said that, it would be embarrassing to continue bargaining. Don't corner yourself.
Finally, lying will ruin your reputation. The world is small, and people's reputation in business society will soon spread through e-mail, telephone and word of mouth. Once you have a reputation as a "tough negotiator", people will be more competitive when negotiating with you, which will make it more difficult for you to obtain resources. Once the "deceptive cheap negotiation" is discovered by the other party, it will have a negative impact on the negotiators' negotiation results. If people find themselves cheated, they will seek revenge, even though they have to pay a high price for it. This is especially bad for experienced negotiators, who could have grabbed more pies for themselves, but not when they are famous for their "distributed" negotiation style. Negotiators who are considered to be bluffing and misinforming in negotiations should be avoided. It is not a good idea to replace preparation and strategy making with false positives. ◆ Should I try to manipulate each other's reservation points?
Assuming that the other party is as smart, enterprising and knowledgeable as you, this increasingly transparent negotiation strategy is unlikely to work for them. Such an attempt may backfire and make the other side stick to its position more firmly. In addition, you have to find ways to use similar influence tactics to stop the other side from turning defeat into victory. If you can't be bothered by it yourself, how can they?
Some negotiators tend to use intimidation tactics, such as "If you don't sell the house to us, there will be no other buyers" or "When I become a billionaire in 10, you will regret not buying the company from me." A financial enterprise alliance plans to buy Sallie Mae. They told Sallie Mae that a law passed by the US House of Representatives in 2007 would harm their business and would lead them to withdraw their $25 billion takeover offer. In this case, the buyer uses warning as a negotiation strategy to win a cheaper purchase price for the company. However, intimidation tactics may not work. These strategies are likely to backfire or stir up hatred. ◆ Should I make a "final offer" or insist on a price?
Generally speaking, expressing such a position is not an effective negotiation strategy because you lose flexibility. This is my final offer. It will be more effective to say it at the last stage of the negotiation. Only when you are really serious and feel comfortable quitting the negotiation can you make such an irrevocable promise as "final offer". Of course, you should only quit the negotiation if your BATNA is better than the conditions offered by the other party. It is a risk to intimidate each other by making a promise. It is difficult to make a "binding" and reliable commitment. Meet the Prime Ministers of Newfoundland and Labrador, Danny? Danny Wilhemlms, his threat to ExxonMobil. Williams claimed that billions of dollars worth of oil transactions in Hepbron waters were either completed on his terms or failed. Williams, on the other hand, believes that it is most important to strive for enough benefits for the residents of Newfoundland. He was committed to this goal, so he questioned the oil company: "Well, all right. Then you can go somewhere else. Oil is still in our hands. " In 2007, ExxonMobil and Chevron made a concession: they agreed to accept Williams' terms. In this case, the threat worked. However, in some cases, threats are useless.