First, the characteristics of management talents in small and medium-sized enterprises
Externally, the competition among small and medium-sized enterprises is mainly reflected in the competition of products, services and prices provided by enterprises, while internally, it focuses on the competition of human resources. Whoever has more management talents will gain a long-term competitive advantage in the fierce market competition. However, the work behavior and attitude of management talents in small and medium-sized enterprises are often different from those in large state-owned enterprises. Due to the influence of salary and welfare, working environment, personal development and many other factors, most management talents in small and medium-sized enterprises have the characteristics of dynamic flow.
Management talents in small and medium-sized enterprises have dynamic mobility, which is mainly manifested in the introduction and loss of management talents. On the one hand, in order to enhance their own competitive strength, small and medium-sized enterprises continue to introduce excellent management talents in the labor market and increase the talent reserve of enterprises; On the other hand, it is influenced by many factors, such as salary and welfare, personal development and so on. Managers' job-hopping happens from time to time, which greatly affects the sustained and stable development of small and medium-sized enterprises.
The dynamic flow of management talents makes the salary decision of management talents particularly important. Small and medium-sized enterprises need to work out practical and reasonable salary schemes to solve the problems of talent acquisition and brain drain. Next, this paper will analyze the acquisition and retention of management talents in small and medium-sized enterprises with the help of game model, so as to provide a basis for enterprise salary decision.
Second, the introduction of management personnel compensation decision-making game model
At present, talent recruitment is the main way for small and medium-sized enterprises to obtain management talents. In the recruitment process, the primary focus of attention between enterprises and between enterprises and management talents is salary. In order not to lose to the other enterprise in the talent competition, the salary level of the enterprise must be competitive with the competitors under the premise of reasonable cost control.
Model assumption: 1. Participants include two similar enterprises i(i= 1, 2); 2. Every enterprise has two strategies to choose from when making salary decisions for management employees, namely, paying "high salary" or "low salary" to management talents; 3. The labor cost of paying "high salary" for management talents in enterprise I is SLi, so there is SH1>; SL 1, SH2 & gtSL2, and the benefits that managers bring to enterprises Ri is the same for all enterprises, Ri = R2 = R；; 4. The most important factor in managing employees' choice of enterprises is salary.
See table 1 for the payment matrix of inter-enterprise compensation game. Obviously, this payment matrix has two Nash equilibria: (high salary, high salary) and (low salary, low salary). It can be seen that when competing for management talents, similar enterprises put forward similar salary levels, and there will be no phenomenon that some enterprises have high salary levels and some enterprises have low salary levels. On the whole, the salary level of the whole industry is consistent. Therefore, when small and medium-sized enterprises make salary decisions, the average salary level of management talents in competitive enterprises will be the main basis for their salary decisions.
Third, management talent retention compensation decision-making game model
In recent years, all kinds of enterprises are facing the problem of higher and higher turnover rate of management talents. In order to retain the existing management talents, the enterprise has taken various measures such as salary increase and promotion, but still helplessly watched some outstanding talents leave the enterprise. Even if some talents don't resign, there will be some bad phenomena in their work, such as not working hard, declining performance and lack of enthusiasm and initiative.
There are many reasons for the brain drain of enterprise management talents, including disagreement with enterprise management values, dissatisfaction with working environment, lack of confidence in enterprise development prospects, and attraction of high-paying positions from external enterprises. Therefore, enterprises should attach great importance to the management of brain drain and take active measures to retain talents. At present, small and medium-sized enterprises mainly retain management talents by improving salary, improving internal management mechanism, establishing excellent corporate culture, establishing corporate image and creating a good working atmosphere.
According to the above contents, the game model of enterprise management brain drain is constructed.
Model assumption: 1. The people in the bureau are enterprises and management talents within the enterprise. The strategy set of middlemen is: enterprise S 1={ retain, not retain}, and management talent S2={ stay, quit}. 2. The expenditure for retaining management talents, improving working environment, perfecting internal management mechanism, establishing excellent corporate culture, establishing corporate image and creating a good working atmosphere is M0, and the additional expenditure for improving salary and treatment is δ S; 3. The re-recruitment cost caused by brain drain is MF, the salary of newly recruited talents is S-, and the income brought by newly recruited talents is R-; 4. The cost of hard work of management talents is Cw, and the salary earned by working in existing enterprises is S; The energy cost of management talents leaving this enterprise to find other jobs is CF, and the salary paid to this talent by other enterprises is S'.
The payment matrix of brain drain game in enterprise management is shown in Table 2: When S & gtS'-CF, that is, when management talents stay in the enterprise and continue to work, the gains are greater than those when they leave the enterprise to continue to seek new jobs, and (not staying, staying) is the only Nash equilibrium of the game. S Through the model, it can be seen that whether the management talents leave the enterprise or not, "not staying" is the best choice for the enterprise. For management talents, when the competition in the talent market is fierce, it is difficult to find a job and the overall wage level of the industry is low, "staying" is the best choice; Only when the professional knowledge of management talents becomes a scarce resource in the talent market can "job-hopping" become its best choice.
In fact, this model is also the best explanation for the real world. With the improvement of science and technology education in China, the overall quality of the whole people has been greatly improved. In recent years, the supply of talents in China's higher education has been increasing, the competition in the talent market has been increasingly encouraged, and the salary level of management talents has declined as a whole. In this situation, small and medium-sized enterprises are not worried about brain drain, because the recruitment cost of enterprises is gradually decreasing. Even if the existing talents are lost, enterprises can acquire new talents at low cost, and enterprises will not spend more energy and cost to retain employees. However, for the scarce professionals, if enterprises do not cherish, attach importance to and increase investment, the cost of obtaining them will be higher, and the lack of a stable talent team will definitely affect the healthy development of enterprises.