I conflicts of interest between shareholders and other stakeholders:
1. Conflicts of interest between controlling shareholders and other shareholders. The conflict of interest between shareholders is mainly reflected in the conflict of interest between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders, that is, it occurs in companies with relatively concentrated equity and obvious contrast between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders.
2. Conflicts of interests between shareholders and operators. In modern enterprises where ownership and management rights are separated, the conflict between shareholders and operators is almost inevitable.
Shareholders expect operators to engage in business management activities from the goal of maximizing shareholders' interests, but operators often sacrifice shareholders' interests from their own interests, alienating shareholders' expectations from established financial goals, and shareholders will have to bear part of the costs arising from operators' selfish behavior, that is, agency costs.
3. Conflicts of interest between shareholders and creditors. As two kinds of fund providers, shareholders and creditors have the same interests and conflicts of interest.
Second, the conflict of interest between enterprises and employees.
Based on the understanding of capital-employed labor, it is emphasized that shareholders are the owners of the company, employees are the tools for capital to make money, and they are the objects employed by the company.
Under the guidance of this idea, the severity of the conflict of interests between shareholders and employees can be imagined. The conflict of interests between shareholders and employees mainly lies in the unequal relationship between employers and employees, and employees are in a weak position.
Extended data:
The main conflicts of interest between operators and owners lie in: operators hope to increase the enjoyment cost while improving the enterprise value and shareholders' wealth; Owners or shareholders hope that operators can bring higher enterprise value or shareholder wealth with less enjoyment cost.
In order to coordinate this contradiction, measures such as dismissal, acceptance and encouragement can usually be taken.
1. dismissal: the owner supervises the operators by mastering their employment and dismissal. If the operator fails to achieve the owner's goal of maximizing enterprise value, he can fire the operator.
2. Acceptance: If the operator makes mistakes in business decisions and fails to improve the enterprise value, the company may be forcibly accepted or annexed by other companies, and the corresponding operator will be dismissed. Therefore, in order to avoid this acceptance, operators must take all measures to raise the stock market price.
3. Incentive: link the remuneration with the performance of the operators, so that they can consciously take measures to maximize the enterprise value.
People's Network-Shanghai to Prevent Conflicts of Interests of State-owned Enterprise Leaders