It seems easy to understand the reform of state-owned enterprises, which can not only shrink the front line, change the situation of excessive distribution of state-owned economy, improve the economic efficiency and benefit of enterprises, but also help alleviate social shocks and promote gradual reform. Because, after all, the organic composition of general capital of state-owned small and medium-sized enterprises is not high, and most of them are concentrated in the labor-intensive textile industry. Supply, production and marketing in the process of production and operation are all regional, the degree of socialization of production is relatively low, the impact of reform is relatively small, and local governments have greater management autonomy, so it is easier to change. Moreover, supporting the small in the process of releasing the small, forming a pattern of small but specialized, small but refined, small but special, small and new, will undoubtedly help improve the overall allocation efficiency of resources. Practice has proved that the reform of state-owned small and medium-sized enterprises is generally successful, although there are some problems in practical work, such as irregular operation, the loss of some state-owned assets, the increase of unemployment of enterprise employees, and even some social contradictions and conflicts. Some scholars compared the profit, output, debt ratio and productivity of 634 state-owned enterprises before and after privatization in 2002, and found that the income, actual sales and productivity of these enterprises did improve after privatization. In response to the discussion on the loss of state-owned assets in 2004, sasac director and Li Rongrong made it clear that the number of state-owned enterprises is decreasing, but the quality of assets is improving, the competitiveness is enhancing, and the economic benefits are improving rapidly. This can be said that we have worked hard for many years and want to pursue the situation. According to a set of data provided by Li Rongrong, the number of state-owned and state-holding enterprises in China was 238,000 in198, and it was150,000 in 2003, a decrease of 40%; 1998 and 43 1 10000, the number of employees was 78.04 million, down by 40%. Realized profit1.9821.400 million yuan, compared with 495 1 100 million yuan in 2003, an increase of 22 times; The total assets of enterprises were 14.9 trillion yuan in 1998 and 19.7 trillion yuan in 2003, an increase of 35%; The net assets of state-owned enterprises 1998 was 5.2 trillion yuan, and in 2003 it was 8.4 trillion yuan, an increase of 60%; In 2003, the rate of return on state-owned assets was 5.9%. In the view of economist Zhang, the success of "small scale" is because it not only solves the problem of incentive mechanism in enterprise system, but also solves the problem of operator selection mechanism in enterprise system. The above analysis shows that the reform of state-owned enterprises is good and easy, which releases the real market economy subject, the situation of market competition, and the improvement of efficiency and effect. We must fully affirm the reform of state-owned enterprises. The next question is how to evaluate the reform of state-owned enterprises.
To sum up, the reasons for the reform of state-owned enterprises are as follows: first, we must maintain the leading position of the state-owned economy and continue to let the state-owned economy play a leading role in important industries and key fields that are related to the lifeline of the national economy. This is the so-called consideration from the height of the socialist basic economic system. Second, from the perspective of improving industrial concentration and then improving industrial competitiveness. Industrial concentration refers to the market share occupied by a few largest manufacturers (usually the top four, top five and top eight) in a particular market, and it is an index reflecting the degree of oligopoly in the market. Many experts and scholars have studied the industrial concentration in China, and the conclusion seems to be that the low industrial concentration in China has affected the industrial competitiveness. In this way, it seems to be an inevitable choice to "grasp the big" and focus on cultivating large enterprises and large enterprise groups with strong strength and competitiveness. Third, for the sake of reform strategy, it seems more conducive to the promotion of reform to focus on the big and put the small first. According to Zheng Lu, an economist, large state-owned enterprises have a high organic capital composition and a high degree of socialization in their production and operation activities, which has a great impact on the whole national economy. There are many employees in large enterprises, and the relationship between creditor's rights and debts is complex, so it is difficult to change. Grasping the big first and letting go of the small can avoid a large loss of assets in the process of restructuring of large state-owned enterprises, and the national tax sources dominated by large state-owned enterprises can maintain steady growth, so that the government can pay the necessary reform costs. There may be some reasons for the reform of state-owned enterprises, but as far as I know, I am afraid it is mainly the above three aspects. How to treat these reasons and evaluate the effect of state-owned enterprise reform needs further thinking.
Let's talk about the third reason first. From the point of view of reducing social shocks and promoting the smooth progress of reform, it is appropriate and feasible to first grasp the big and let go of the small, create conditions for the overall reform, and then change the big and enlarge it. In other words, grasping the big is not clinging to it, but temporary, but creating conditions for changing the big and letting go of the small. Grasping the big ones can only be a stopgap measure. Grasping the big and letting the small go can only be regarded as a policy to be adhered to in the process of state-owned enterprise reform for a period of time, not a long-term policy.
Let's look at the second reason, that is, from the perspective of improving industrial concentration and industrial competitiveness, we must grasp the big ones. First of all, it should be pointed out that there are at least two ways to achieve greatness based on this consideration. First, encourage and support non-state-owned small and medium-sized enterprises to become bigger through market competition and organizational innovation. Since the reform and opening up, the development of electronic communications, computers, home appliances and other industries in China has largely benefited from these enterprises, such as Lenovo, TCL, Haier and Huawei. Their appearance not only improves the market concentration of their industries, but also enhances China's competitiveness in these industries. The second is to expand state-owned enterprises. In this regard, our long-term practice is to engage in "matchmaking" by administrative means. As a result, some large-scale and inefficient "mud giants" were formed, and even the original good enterprises were dragged down. Practice has repeatedly proved that expanding state-owned enterprises through government-led and administrative means cannot achieve the goal of optimizing the structure. On the contrary, it is possible that strengthening administrative control will worsen the overall situation of enterprises and hinder the process of economic reform. Therefore, we can say that it is unsuccessful to catch large state-owned enterprises by administrative means. Since the mid-1990s, the state has also begun to try to seize large enterprises by market means, that is, relying on enterprises that have undergone initial reforms and established a modern enterprise system, and realizing the strategic reorganization of state-owned enterprises through equity transfer or mergers and acquisitions in the capital market. In this way, some good examples have appeared, such as Konka and Huayuan. Practice has proved that the efficiency and benefit of large companies and enterprises formed by the market mechanism with enterprises as the main body and capital as the link have improved and have strong vitality. This is worthy of recognition. Because it not only improves the efficiency and benefit of the enterprise itself, but also promotes the industrial concentration and competitiveness. It should be pointed out that the capture of large state-owned enterprises by market means has only achieved initial results in China. At present, large companies and enterprises, such as PetroChina, Sinopec, State Power Grid, China Telecom, etc., all show a high rate of return, mainly by occupying a monopoly position to obtain monopoly profits, and their competitiveness needs to be tested by the market and time. Moreover, from the experience of all countries in the world and the long-term trend of strategic reorganization of state-owned enterprises, I am afraid that if we want to improve industrial concentration and thus improve industrial competitiveness, we will mainly rely on non-state-owned capital and large non-state-owned companies and enterprises. In this sense, from a dynamic point of view, I am afraid that the reform of state-owned enterprises can only be a transitional measure, not a long-term strategy.
Finally, the first reason is analyzed, that is, to grasp large state-owned enterprises from the perspective of maintaining the dominant position of the state-owned economy. The mainstream view is to let the state-owned economy occupy a dominant position in important industries and fields that are related to the lifeline of the national economy. The industries and fields that need state-owned economy holding mainly include industries involving national security, natural monopoly industries, industries providing important public products and services, and important backbone enterprises in pillar industries and high-tech industries. The "Guiding Opinions on Promoting the Adjustment of State-owned Capital and the Reorganization of State-owned Enterprises" recently issued by the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission further defines the industries controlled by the state as seven major industries: military industry, power grid, petroleum and petrochemical industry, telecommunications, coal, civil aviation and shipping. The selection criteria are "industries involving national security, major infrastructure and important mineral resources, industries providing important public goods and services, pillar industries and important backbone enterprises in high-tech industries". This reason seems impeccable, especially when it rises to the ideological level, which also makes many people flinch and stop asking questions. However, based on the concept of academic freedom, the speaker is innocent and the listener is warned. The author thinks this reason is worth further deliberation. As early as 1996, the author wrote in Economic News and Guizhou Daily. According to the consistent understanding of the unity of quantity and quality, from the practice of developed countries and provinces, the transition of economic system from planned economy to market economy, the rapid economic development in underdeveloped areas and the essence of socialism, the author put forward that the adjustment of ownership structure should be based on public ownership economy and led by private economy. Although this proposition is obviously different from the mainstream view and criticized by many people, the author still believes that according to the standards of efficiency and fairness, the above proposition is still tenable and difficult to overthrow. I recently read an article published by economist Xu Xiaonian in Southern Weekend. This paper analyzes seven industries controlled by the state from both theoretical and empirical aspects, deepening and strengthening the author's understanding. According to Professor Xu Xiaonian, among the above six standards of state holding, only public goods have a strict economic definition, and the others are subjective and arbitrary. The non-exclusiveness and usually existing externalities of public goods make the government intervene in its supply relatively fully. According to this standard, except the power grid in telecommunications, the physical communication network, the airport in civil aviation, the port, wharf and waterway in shipping belong to public goods and externalities, the government can intervene in their supply, or hold shares when the supply efficiency is better than private capital, and there is no sufficient reason for other industries to be controlled by the state. The basis for defining government functions is not the name of the industry, nor the technical attributes of the industry, nor the general "lifeline of the national economy" or "pillar industry", but the characteristics of products and services, which are a supplement to the market. In a market economy, all government operations should be meager profits or losses, and those that make money should be handed over to the market. The management goal of state-owned assets cannot and should not be to preserve and increase value, but to realize the social goal of the government. There is a fundamental conflict between the preservation and appreciation of state-owned assets and government functions. Professor Xu Xiaonian also used the data of A-share listed companies and some H-share listed companies in 2005 to calculate the gross profit margin of seven industries and related industries. The results show that the gross profit margin of other industries except power generation, petroleum processing and aviation is significantly higher than that of the real estate industry, which is generally regarded as profiteering, and the gross profit margin of the latter was 35.3% in 2005. The data show that the government has either entered an industry where the market is still effective, or the impulse to increase assets has surpassed the initial goal of overcoming market failure. It can be inferred from Professor Xu Xiaonian's analysis that an important factor restricting the further development of private capital and non-public economy for many years lies in the monopoly implemented by the government for the first reason mentioned above. This monopoly of government industry is undoubtedly harmful to competition and its efficiency. As far as I know, there are not a few people who agree with the above views. During the local "two sessions" at the beginning of the year, many deputies and Committee members severely criticized the drawbacks of industry monopoly promoted by the government. From this perspective, grasping the big can not be the reason for monopoly. Grasping the big is not to become bigger, and grasping the big is not to enlarge. Breaking monopoly and making it bigger should be the next trend of state-owned enterprise reform.
To sum up, our view is that the policy of grasping the big and letting the small in the reform of state-owned enterprises cannot be solidified and extended. Grasping the big should not be grasping the big and not changing it. Grasping the big at present is to create conditions for future expansion and reform; Putting it down does not mean putting it down. After putting it down, we need to help it develop and grow. In this sense, in the medium and long term, it seems that the reform of state-owned enterprises should change the big and help the small. "