The analysis of corporate governance reflects the situation of corporate governance from four aspects: the controlling shareholder occupies the funds of listed companies, the nature of controlling shareholders, agency costs and information transparency. The occupation of listed company's funds by controlling shareholders in corporate governance is usually recorded in the subject of "other receivables", so "other receivables/current assets" is used to reflect the situation of controlling shareholders and analyze the capital occupation of listed companies. The more serious the situation that the controlling shareholder occupies the funds of listed companies, the more easily the corporate governance of listed companies is constrained by cash flow, the less likely it is to repay the principal and interest on time, and the higher the risk of default, so the interest rate required by bank loans is increased, or the risk of default can be avoided by shortening the loan term or reducing the loan scale.
The nature of the controlling shareholder is whether it is a state-owned stock or a state-owned stock. The controlling shareholder of corporate governance refers to the actual controller. According to the classification standard of enterprise nature, the actual controller of corporate governance belongs to state-owned enterprises and institutions, which is 1, otherwise it is 0. Due to the history of China's state-controlled banks, the analysis of the status of banks is always biased towards state-controlled or state-controlled listed companies, providing them with preferential interest rates, providing long-term loans for corporate governance or increasing the amount of loans.
As two different investors, shareholders and creditors, what is the status of corporate governance? They have different positions in the corporate governance mechanism, so their dependence on the corporate governance mechanism is also different. In order to overcome the information asymmetry in credit contracts, corporate governance banks attach great importance to the information transparency of companies. After theoretical analysis of the relationship between the degree of information asymmetry and the allocation of bank loans, it is concluded that corporate governance banks will require higher interest rates and provide less loans to borrowers with higher information asymmetry. Taking AIMR rating as an indicator to measure information transparency, this paper further studies the relationship between accounting information transparency and interest rate term structure, and finds that the higher the company transparency, the lower the spread, and the influence of company transparency on short-term debt capital cost is greater than that of long-term debt capital cost.
The information disclosure score of FAF is used as a variable to test the quality of information disclosure. Corporate governance found that the quality of information disclosure was negatively correlated with the cost of bond capital, but nikolayev and Rand did not support this conclusion. They believe that the negative correlation between the quality of information disclosure and the cost of debt deduced in theory is unreliable because of the existence of endogenous bias, and their results are verified by taking 358 observed values of 65,438+000 listed companies in the United States as samples.
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