What is executive incentive? What is its significance and purpose? Written thanks:)

The top management of the company is of great significance to the operation and development of the company, and the success or failure of the company depends largely on the ability of the top management and its degree of play. It is precisely because of this special orientation of senior managers that executive motivation has become a topic of increasing concern.

The analysis of the current situation of executive motivation will mainly start from three parts: incentive level, incentive structure and incentive foundation.

First, the three major imbalances in the level of incentives

At present, the domestic market economy mechanism is not fully mature, which brings certain constraints to the orientation of executive incentive level, and these constraints have different degrees of influence at different latitudes.

1, the imbalance between the level of executive incentives and the level of macroeconomic development

For a long time, due to policy restrictions, the income level of senior executives in domestic enterprises is not far from that of ordinary employees. Since the end of 1990s, after a long-term deviation from the unbalanced level of economic development, the income level of executives has ushered in the process of rapid growth. According to statistics, from 1998 to 2003, the average annual growth rate of executive income of listed companies was close to 30%, which greatly exceeded the macroeconomic growth rate.

2. The imbalance between executive incentive level and enterprise development.

The incentive level of executives is restricted by policies, markets, enterprises and other factors, which makes the incentive level of executives have no good positive correlation with the development of enterprises, but has a great relationship with the nature and management mechanism of enterprises.

According to the analysis data of executive income of listed companies in 2003, it can be seen that the executive income of state-owned enterprises is obviously lower than that of other enterprises.

At the same time, according to the statistics of 278 listed companies in 2003/kloc-0, there is a positive correlation between the highest annual salary of executives and the after-tax profit of the company, but the correlation coefficient is less than 0.2. The degree of its influence deserves our consideration, that is, the incentive level is not closely related to the operating results and development of enterprises.

3. The imbalance between the incentive level and contribution of executives.

The incentive level and contribution of executives can be divided into two levels, one is the comparison of contributions between enterprises, and the other is the comparison of contributions within enterprises.

The contribution of executives should be positively related to the business performance of enterprises. However, from the information disclosed by more than 1000 listed companies, we can easily find that the executives of some loss-making companies have the biggest increase, while the income of some profit-making companies is very low. Take aerospace information (60027 1), which has the highest earnings per share in the two cities, as an example. The company's performance in 2003 reached 24 1 10,000 yuan, but the total annual income of the top three executives was only 643,200 yuan, and the per capita income exceeded 220,000 yuan. On the contrary, in 2002, Kelon Electric lost money, but the highest annual salary of its executives was as high as 654.38+0.2 million. (The data comes from the analysis of the company's annual report). Therefore, the factors affecting the contribution comparison among enterprises are very complicated, including scale, industry, strategy, culture, mechanism and even human factors.

The internal contribution of the enterprise is mainly aimed at different executives, and three types of personnel are selected: chairman, general manager and supervisor. We can get the ratio of annual salary to income of the following three categories of personnel.

From the analysis of data structure, the contribution within enterprises is more reasonable than that between enterprises in terms of executive incentive level, but if we further study, is the role played by the chairman in current enterprise management equal to its incentive level? This requires a question mark.

Second, the incentive structure of the three contradictions

The incentive structure of executives can be divided into three levels, the first level is material incentive and spiritual incentive, the second level is cash incentive and non-cash incentive, and the third level is short-term incentive and medium-and long-term incentive. But at these three levels, there are obvious shortcomings.

1, lack of mental motivation

The needs of top managers in enterprises are in the upper part of Maslow's demand triangle, and they are a kind of people who are deeply fascinated by identity and self-realization. But at present, the practice of spiritual encouragement for enterprise executives in China is very scarce.

In state-owned enterprises, there has always been a saying that "the leadership of state-owned enterprises is a piece of paper". A letter of appointment can make a person become an executive of a large enterprise in one day, and a paper of transfer can also make an executive leave the enterprise he has struggled for for many years overnight. In private enterprises, the family management style is often the chairman's "centralized statement", and professional managers and senior executives of private enterprises often leave their jobs because of factors such as "disagreement", "conflict of interests" and "outsiders". Among the foreign-funded enterprises with standardized management, domestic professional managers have encountered "glass ceilings", and few of them have reached the level of executives, but they are only a flash in the pan.

2. The cash ratio is out of balance

Because executives have a great influence on the operating results of enterprises, the incentive structure for executives should generally be linked to the operating results of enterprises, which is reflected in the incentive structure, that is, a large part of executives' income is variable, which is reflected in the form of bonuses and linked to the operating results of enterprises. As can be seen from the following figure, in 2004, bonuses accounted for more than 50% ($975,000) of the annual cash income of American CEOs, and the basic salary was less than 50% ($900,000).

On the other hand, in domestic executive income, in private enterprises and some industries with high degree of marketization, the fixed and variable ratio of executive cash income can reach 60: 40 or 70: 30; In most enterprises, the cash income of executives is mainly fixed income, accounting for more than 80%. The management behavior of executives is not responsible for enterprises, and the deviation of their behavior orientation is closely related to this imbalance.

3. Long-term incentive imbalance

From the income structure chart of American CEO on the last page, we can also see that in 2004, the medium and long-term income of American CEO accounted for more than 70% of the total income ($565,438+10,000).

On the other hand, in China, only 56 listed companies in 2003 1200 clearly stated that they had established a medium-and long-term incentive mechanism; In addition, 80 companies explicitly proposed to establish a medium-and long-term incentive mechanism. In other words, about 89.5% of listed companies still focus on short-term incentives, and have not explicitly proposed to establish medium-and long-term incentive plans.

Whether to implement a long-term incentive plan

The imbalance of long-term and medium-term incentives for senior executives directly affects the enterprise's vision of "evergreen foundation". The market laments that "a hundred flowers blossom and a hundred days are red". Where can we find a "century-old shop"? .

Third, the incentive foundation restricts the development of executive incentives.

The level and structure of executive incentives are good. From the above analysis, we can see that the problems and gaps are actually obvious, but why hasn't the development of domestic executive incentives been well solved? In fact, the root cause is not the incentive itself, but the foundation of the incentive! In other words, due to various reasons, the measurement and evaluation of executive performance has not been well solved!

The current market situation can be expressed by the following unbalanced balance, which reflects the realistic gap between the performance and incentives of domestic enterprises at present.

Fourthly, analyze and summarize the current situation of executive motivation.

From the above analysis, we can see that the current orientation of incentive level and the determination of incentive structure are inconsistent with the responsibilities and requirements undertaken by senior executives, the needs of enterprise development and the needs of senior executives themselves. The reason for these problems lies in how to measure the contribution of executives to enterprises, that is, organizational performance appraisal can't keep up. Therefore, to solve the problem of executive motivation, we must first solve the problems of executive motivation model and executive performance evaluation method.