However, just as people are not optimistic about the future of commercial banks, people in the industry also believe that the profits of asset management companies are unsustainable. The main profit source of asset management companies is the financing hunger of enterprises caused by China's 4 trillion yuan stimulus policy. With the cessation of large-scale infrastructure investment and the further decline of China's macro-economy, the business of the four major asset management companies is likely to encounter bottlenecks.
After the commercial transformation of asset management companies, under the policy protection of mixed operation, the radical management style has buried hidden dangers. Once the macro-economy continues to decline and liquidity continues to tighten, the financial holding company model will undergo greater risk tests.
A financial industry veteran commented on the transformation of asset management companies in recent years. He said that the fundamental reason for asset management companies to double their profits is only to use the special status of central enterprises and monopoly financial resources licenses, and their actual market operation ability cannot match their profitability.
Xinda real estate predicament
On the evening of July 29th, the central enterprise Xinda Real Estate (600657) announced that on July 27th, the company won a residential plot in Songjiang District, Shanghai with a premium rate of 40%, equivalent to a floor price of 7022 yuan/square meter. According to the announcement, Shanghai Xinda Yintai Real Estate Co., Ltd., a wholly-owned subsidiary of Xinda Real Estate, and Shanghai Xinda Liren Investment Management Co., Ltd. formed a consortium and won the "International Eco-business District" 15-2 plot in Songjiang District of Shanghai through on-site bidding, with the final transaction price of 893 million yuan.
The International Eco-business District 15-2 plot is the first homestead launched in Songjiang District of Shanghai this year. * * * Twenty-seven enterprises received bidding applications, 9 of which submitted bidding applications and finally participated in on-site bidding, including Vanke, Gemdale, Shi Lang, agriculture, industry and commerce and other well-known housing enterprises.
While acquiring land at a high price, Cinda Real Estate's performance is falling sharply. In the first quarter of 20 12, the net profit of Cinda Real Estate was 8.72 million yuan, and that of 201/kloc-0 was 560 million yuan, with a net profit growth rate of-90%. The return on net assets was 0. 14%, compared with 9. 14% at the end of last year. The cash content of net profit was-52.8 million yuan, while the figure at the end of 2009 was 2.99 million yuan.
In the cold winter of the real estate industry as a whole, the above performance is not unexpected, but the most worrying thing about Cinda Real Estate is its internal management.
Not long ago, Mr. Wang of Cinda Real Estate Investor Relations Department resigned.
Before leaving his post, he analyzed to reporters that Cinda Real Estate is currently facing three major difficulties: First, Cinda Real Estate appears in the project company; Second, the project company is deeply rooted in the local area and is fighting in its own way; Third, this is an enterprise with strong local strength and weak headquarters. "Because most of Cinda Real Estate's assets belong to bad real estate assets inherited from CCB, its project layout is messy, rather than orderly layout and accumulation like ordinary professional developers. The project scales are different and it feels like a chaotic development."
Due to the state's regulation of real estate, the Ministry of Finance has no hope of injecting capital, and the head office is too conservative and steady, which leads to Cinda Real Estate's inactive land acquisition. "From June 20 10 to June 20 1 1 year, only one piece of land was added. As of 20111231,the planned construction area of the company's land reserve is about 3,405,500 square meters, which is not a big advantage in the second-tier housing enterprise camp. " Mr. Wang said.
Another problem is that the sequela of Cinda real estate reorganization reappears frequently. After digesting and clearing assets in 2009, Cinda Real Estate entered the year of internal adjustment on 20 10. The company actively learns from Vanke, Gemdale and other companies about standardization and information construction, strengthens group management and control, and at the same time vigorously strengthens cost control and research on cities and products. "But our own background is more complicated. The transformation will face heavy and insurmountable tasks such as institutional transformation, business transformation, personnel transformation and ideological transformation, as well as the disposal of legacy assets. In addition, our own lack of commercialization experience can be said to be difficult. " Mr. Wang said that these remaining problems have slowed down Cinda Real Estate.
"The market awareness is not strong, the strategy is too conservative, and the land reserve is not sufficient, so I pay little attention to Cinda Real Estate." On July 16, an analyst of China Merchants Securities said in an interview with New Finance magazine.
"Cinda Real Estate is not only a sample, but also a microcosm of the difficulties faced by the four major asset management companies, including talents and mechanisms. It can be said that the four major asset management companies are looking for their own future destiny. " These problems revealed by a director of Cinda Yintai to New Finance are not apparent on the surface, but they are potential crises.
Huarong Trust "Bonfire"
The debt crisis of LDK Company in Jiangxi Saiwei, which began in April this year, pushed Huarong International Trust Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as "Huarong Trust") to the crater.
On July 12, the website of the Standing Committee of Xinyu Municipal People's Congress in Jiangxi Province revealed that the seventh meeting of the Standing Committee of the Eighth Municipal People's Congress deliberated and passed the proposal of the Municipal People's Government on including the gap funds for Jiangxi LDK Company to repay the trust loan to Huarong Trust into the fiscal budget of the Municipal People's Government that year.
The loss of private enterprises is paid by the government, which has set off a big discussion in the national public opinion circle. Opponents believe that it is unfair for all taxpayers to pay for the losses of a private enterprise, and the government has no right to use taxpayers' money at will. Moreover, due to the sharp decline in land sales revenue, the macroeconomic downturn and the slowdown in fiscal revenue growth, the local government's capital chain has been very tight.
But in the end, the government paid Saiwei to return the trust funds of Huarong Trust. Huarong Trust's loan of 500 million yuan expired on June 28 this year, and this repayment is still Saiwei's borrowing the new and returning the old. Huarong Trust's condition is that Xinyu Municipal People's Government issues relevant documents reviewed and approved by the Standing Committee of the Municipal People's Congress, and the loan repayment plan is included in the fiscal budget. In the case that there is a funding gap in the repayment of this trust loan by Saiwei Company, the funding gap will be included in the annual budget, and the Municipal People's Government will arrange funds to be returned on its behalf in the budget.
Since then, Huarong Trust has escaped a robbery, but the risks of the trust company's operation have been exposed in this incident.
Trust industry has made great progress in this round of 4 trillion yuan stimulus policy, especially the strict control policy on real estate makes it difficult for real estate to obtain funds from banks, so financing for real estate companies has become the biggest business source of trust companies. In addition, in order to expand intermediary business and obtain funds, commercial banks issue wealth management products through trust companies on a large scale, which is also a source of funds for trust companies in recent years. From 350 billion yuan in 2006 to 5.3 trillion yuan in the first quarter of 20 12, in just over five years, the scale of assets managed by the trust industry has increased by more than 10 times. As if overnight, the trust industry has become the envy of everyone.
However, with the rapid expansion of the trust industry, the risks brewing in it have also begun to be exposed.
In June this year, China Chengxin Trust's 3 billion yuan mineral trust "Chengzhi Jinkai 1 Collective Trust Plan" was exposed to redemption risk. The trust plan was established on February 1 last year. The scale of raised funds reached 3.03 billion yuan, the subscription starting point was 3 million yuan, and the duration was 3 years. The expected annualized rate of return is 9.5% ~ 1 1%. The purpose of the raised funds is to invest in Shanxi Energy Group Co., Ltd., and the risk of this trust product lies not only in the huge personal liabilities of the energy group Wang, but also in the controversial mining rights of the corresponding assets of the trust product. Therefore, Midtown Trust has fallen into the whirlpool of redemption.