What challenges will my country face due to the technological revolution triggered by Industry 4.0?
The value chain is one of the most critical chains in the global economic cycle. Whoever occupies the core link of the value chain will control it. The flow of wealth throughout the value chain. In the future, global competition will be value chain competition, and the strategy of building China's own global value chain should be elevated to a national strategy. This is the key to China's transformation from an economic power to an economic power.
In the increasingly fierce global innovation competition, China is facing multiple risks and challenges such as generally low innovation intensity, the "catch-up window" is converging, the "latecomer advantage" of innovation is not prominent, and the serious loss of innovative talents. .
In the era of big data, data security faces more severe challenges. Data sovereignty will become the basis for countries to govern and administer data and related technologies and infrastructure.
New challenges for China’s economy based on the global value chain
The value chain is one of the most critical chains in the global economic cycle. Whoever occupies the core link of the value chain controls it. The flow of wealth throughout the value chain. In the future, global competition will be value chain competition. Building China's own global value chain strategy should be elevated to a national strategy. This is the key to China's transformation from an economic power to an economic power.
Global value chains lead profound changes in the global trade pattern. In the past decade or so, the international division of labor has increasingly manifested itself as a multi-level division of labor between different products in the same industry and between different processes and different value-added links within the same product. The scope and field of international division of labor continue to expand, gradually developing from inter-industry division of labor to intra-industry division of labor, and then evolving into an international division of labor system dominated by intra-product division of labor.
Intermediate input trade based on intra-product division of labor is called intra-product trade, thus forming a "global value chain division of labor" system. The "global value chain division of labor" has three distinctive features: first, the final product undergoes two or more consecutive stages of production; second, two or more countries participate in the production process and realize value addition at different stages; third, At least one country uses imported inputs in its production process.
According to statistics, the average growth rate of world exports of goods was only 0.7% from 1913 to 1938, more than 6% from 1948 to 1990, and 6.7% from 1990 to 1997; world export value The proportion of world GDP was only 5% in the early 1950s, 10% in the early 1970s, 15% in the early 1990s, and 20% in 1995. From 1980 to 2011, the world trade in goods increased by an average of 7%, reaching 18.78 trillion US dollars in 2013. The global value chain, industrial chain and supply chain have had a profound impact on international production, international trade and international investment, making the global market The degree of dependence is deepening, but at the same time, global value chains also bring new challenges to national economic security:
First, global value chains strengthen the coordination of the global economy, amplifying and accelerating the impact of shocks. International transmission amplifies the risk of fluctuations in global trade growth or decline. The reason is that different production links of the products in the chain are located in different countries, resulting in frequent cross-border trade of intermediate trade goods, thus amplifying the impact on trade volume; at the same time, the global supply chain is highly complex, and various links are closely connected. Problems will soon be transmitted to the entire trade production chain through structural effects and supply chain effects.
Structural effects target specific industries and regions in the global value chain that are more sensitive to changes in external income, such as the durable goods sector and East Asia. When a crisis strikes, consumers typically cut back on durable goods consumption sharply first, with consumption of necessities falling less. In 2008, durable goods accounted for nearly 40% of global trade. The sharp decline in durable goods trade was an important reason why the shrinkage of global trade volume exceeded the shrinkage of GDP during the financial crisis. East Asia has become more vulnerable to the economic cycles of the United States and the European Union due to its deeper integration into global value chains.
The supply chain effect refers to the internal characteristics of the global value chain that will accelerate or amplify the impact of the business cycle. For example, the sensitivity of cross-border trade of intermediate goods in the chain to systemic trade shocks has increased significantly; inventory adjustments at any node in the supply chain due to business cycle shocks will be rapidly transmitted along the supply chain, and the status of inventory in the production of the corresponding enterprise It is likely to amplify the impact of the business cycle.
Second, the global value chain amplifies the risks of tariffs for companies with a high proportion of intermediate product imports.
This is because the extension of the global production chain has caused intermediate imports to cross national borders multiple times, and the accumulation of small tariffs each time will eventually increase the actual tariff burden borne by export enterprises. The OECD's trade policy report on global value chains shows that China's total manufacturing export tariffs in 2009 were only 4%, but when converted into tariffs borne by exported domestic added value (i.e., the effective tariffs actually borne by Chinese exporters), they rose to 17%, higher than the United States, the European Union, Japan, Vietnam and other countries.
Third, following companies participating in the global value chain may face the risk of "low-end lock-in", which will cause many problems such as social, environmental, labor conditions, occupational safety and health, and employment security. Faced with the irrationality of the globalized division of labor system, it is necessary to fundamentally reverse my country's disadvantageous position in the vertical division of labor system of the global value chain to improve my country's utilization of foreign capital.
In recent decades, the market around the world has become increasingly fragmented, forming a vertical division of labor system in the global value chain. Buyers and brands at the upper end of the global value chain, relying on their control of core technologies, key technologies, technical standards and brands, arrange the supply chain globally and transfer the production of intermediate products at the lower end of the value chain to other countries, which not only alleviates The country's resources and environment are under pressure, and it has obtained high monopoly profits from it, and firmly controls global suppliers through contractual relationships.
In short, the sources of risks that global value chains bring to international trade include: economic risks (such as demand shocks, violent fluctuations in commodity prices, global energy shortages, tariff fluctuations, labor shortages, border delays, ownership or Investment restrictions, exchange rate fluctuations); environmental risks (such as natural disasters, extreme weather and disease transmission); geopolitical risks (such as conflicts and political tensions, import and export restrictions, terrorism, corruption, illegal trade and organized crime, piracy); Technical risks (such as information and communication interruption, transportation infrastructure failure), etc.
The challenges of the new round of technological revolution to China’s economy
1. After the financial crisis, countries around the world launched manufacturing power strategies
After the 2008 international financial crisis, countries around the world began to re-emphasize manufacturing in order to find new ways to promote economic growth. The United States, the European Union, Germany, the United Kingdom, etc. have launched National Strategy for Manufacturing. Developed countries such as the United States, Germany, and Japan have focused on the seven strategic emerging industries represented by the new generation of Internet, biotechnology, new energy, and high-end preparation, and launched a new round of growth competition, trying to seize the new round of growth. The strategic commanding heights of economic growth.
Since then, the United States, Germany, Japan, South Korea, etc. have launched various policies and measures to encourage and support the development of their country's strategic emerging industries. For example, the U.S. government has issued many bills such as the National Strategic Plan for Advanced Manufacturing, the U.S. Innovation Strategy: Promoting Sustainable Growth and High-Quality Employment, and the Export Doubling Plan, proposing to give priority to supporting high-tech clean energy industries and vigorously develop them. The biological industry and the new generation of Internet industry are revitalizing the automobile industry; the German government is actively promoting the Industry 4.0 strategy with "smart factories" as the core and supporting the research, development and innovation of a new generation of revolutionary technologies in the industrial field; Japan launched a new The growth strategy proposed to focus on the development of environmentally friendly vehicles, electric vehicles, solar power generation and other industries; South Korea proposed in the "New Growth Drivers Planning and Development Strategy": focus on the development of six major industries such as energy and environment, emerging information technology, and bio-industry. , as well as 22 key directions such as solar cells, marine biofuels, and green cars.
As early as 2010, the European Union proposed the "Europe 2020 Strategy". Among its three major development priorities, "smart growth" covers the main content of "re-industrialization". "A Stronger European Industry Pointed to Growth and Economic Recovery" more clearly sets the goal of the "re-industrialization" strategy, which is to increase the proportion of industry in the EU's GDP by 2020 from 15.6% at the time. 20%. At the member state level, many countries, including France, the United Kingdom, and Spain, have formulated corresponding "re-industrialization" strategies. For example, the United Kingdom's 2011 report "The Path to Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth" proposed six major Prioritizing the development of industries, France established a new Ministry of Production and Promotion in 2012 to revitalize French industry. In Spain, in 2011, the government invested approximately 460 million euros in funding domestic reindustrialization projects through the "Reindustrialization Assistance Plan".
From the perspective of Japan, a traditional manufacturing country, in the three years from December 2009 to October 2012, the Japanese government proposed five rounds of economic revitalization strategies. Strengthening the competitiveness of Japanese industry is the basis of these revitalization strategies. Important content. After the Abe administration came to power, while aggressively expanding monetary and fiscal resources, it also focused on the revival of the manufacturing industry. In the "Japan Revitalization Strategy" proposed in June 2013, the industrial revitalization strategy is regarded as one of the three key strategies in the future, and it proposes urgent structural reform, employment system reform, promoting technological innovation, and realizing the world's highest level IT society , six specific measures to strengthen regional competitiveness and support small and medium-sized enterprises.
2． Industry 4.0 triggers a new round of global manufacturing revolution
The new round of industrial revolution that emerged after the international financial crisis is not only a digital revolution, but also a value chain revolution. Breakthroughs and integration interactions of the Internet, Internet of Things, robotics, artificial intelligence, 3D printing, new materials, etc. will promote the rise of new industries, new formats, and new models. A post-mass production world is coming. This This revolution will not only affect how products are manufactured, but also where products are manufactured, and will reshape the global industrial competition landscape.
At present, intelligent industrial equipment has become the basis for the upgrading and transformation of the global manufacturing industry. Developed countries have unanimously regarded manufacturing upgrading as the primary task of the new round of industrial revolution. The "re-industrialization" trend in the United States, Germany's "Industry 4.0" and "Internet Factory" strategies, and the transformation of manufacturing industries in Japan and South Korea are not simply the return of traditional manufacturing, but are accompanied by improvements in production efficiency and innovation in production models. As well as the development of emerging industries, especially Germany's "Industry 4.0" strategy is regarded as a representative of a new round of industrial revolution.
3. The battle for standards has become a new direction for global manufacturing competition
The way global manufacturing competes has undergone profound changes, technology patents and standard control have become important international competition tools. Developed countries are increasingly aware that standards, especially those related to safety, health and environmental protection, represent the further development of technology and industry control. Taking new energy vehicles as an example, eight car manufacturers from Germany and the United States (Audi, BMW, Chrysler, Daimler, Ford, General Motors, Porsche and Volkswagen) announced that they will adopt a unified charging interface standard in the future. The new standard will be adopted in Europe. and used within the United States.
The European Automobile Manufacturers Association has also stipulated that starting from 2017, all new electric vehicles sold in Europe will use this new interface standard. The purpose of formulating charging standards by the eight major German and American automobile company alliances is not only to focus on their own local markets, but also to use joint strength to promote the standards to the global market, thereby establishing a strong presence in the global electric vehicle industry. occupy a leading position in the electric vehicle market and gain dominance and control in the future electric vehicle market.
4． Facing multiple risks and challenges in a new round of global innovation competition
In the intensifying global innovation competition, China is facing generally low innovation intensity, the "catch-up window" is converging, and the "latecomer advantage" of innovation is no longer Outstanding, as well as serious losses of innovative talents and other multiple risks and challenges.
First, China’s national innovation competitiveness does not match its economic strength.
The evaluation results of the "National Innovation Index Report 2013" released by the China Academy of Science and Technology Development Strategies show that the United States has become the most innovative country with its abundant innovation resources and excellent innovation performance.
Relying on their outstanding corporate innovation performance and knowledge creation capabilities, Japan and South Korea ranked 2nd and 4th respectively, continuing to lead other Asian countries. Although China's national innovation index increased by 1 place compared with the previous year, However, it still ranks 19th in the world.
In addition, according to the "2014 Global Innovation Index Report" jointly released by Cornell University, INSEAD and the World Intellectual Property Organization, high-income economies occupy the top 25 places in this year's rankings. Among them, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Finland, the Netherlands and other European economies rank in the top five of the "most innovative economies". Among middle-income economies, although China and Brazil are leaders in the field of innovation, China It still ranks 29th, which is seriously inconsistent with China’s economic strength ranking.
Second, generally speaking, China’s national innovation intensity is generally low.
The R&D intensity of the U.S. manufacturing industry is 3.35%.
In 2013, the R&D intensity of China's manufacturing industry was 0.88%, with a large gap. Data show that as the world's largest manufacturing base, China's manufacturing R&D intensity in 2013 was only 0.88%, while Japan had reached 4% in 2009, the United States had reached 3.3% in 2008, and Germany was 2.4%. China's manufacturing industry R&D intensity is far lower than that of developed countries in 2008-2009.
Third, China’s “catch-up window” for technological innovation is converging.
Countries around the world are competing in strategic innovation. After the financial crisis, major economies launched a new round of growth competition around seven strategic emerging industries, including the new generation of Internet, biotechnology, new energy, and high-end manufacturing, and launched their own innovative growth strategies.
Global manufacturing is upgrading rather than returning. Regardless of the developed economies in Europe and the United States or emerging economies such as India, the global manufacturing industry is moving towards a higher level of high-end and high-tech. In particular, as the global intelligent network will continue to develop rapidly, and industries such as supercomputing, virtual reality, network manufacturing, and network value-added services will rise rapidly, China's strategic emerging industries will also see technological gaps and technological gaps similar to those in traditional industries.
Fourth, as a latecomer country, the “latecomer advantage” in innovation is not outstanding.
The latecomer advantage is an important influencing variable for latecomer countries to catch up with advanced countries. Judging from the experience of countries that have successfully achieved technological catch-up, the funding ratio for technology introduction and digestion and absorption has reached about 1:3. In China, it was 1:0.43 in 2009, 1:0.45 in 2011, and dropped to 1:1 in 2012. :0.397. The digestion and absorption of technology in key industries is seriously insufficient. The ratio in the general equipment manufacturing industry is 1:0.39, that in the special equipment manufacturing industry is 1:0.33, that in the computer industry is only 1:0.05, and that in the instrumentation industry is 1:0.26. This is the inevitable result of the past focus on investing in physical and chemical technology and neglect of technical capabilities.
Fifth, there is a serious loss of talent, the core resource of innovation.
Nearly all countries around the world have formulated innovative talent introduction and training plans for the future. The competition for talents, especially high-end technical talents, is fierce. Many countries are focusing on cultivating the next generation of cutting-edge talents. The loss of innovative talents in China is very serious. Relevant authoritative data shows that my country ranks first in the world in the number of top talents it has lost, with the retention rate in the science and engineering fields averaging 87%.
Big data’s new challenges to China’s non-traditional security
With the application of new technologies such as cloud computing, cloud storage, and the Internet of Things, people use social networks, e-commerce platforms and mobile The various data collected and processed by smart terminals, sensors and other means are growing explosively, and the cross-border flow and storage of data have become more routine and convenient. In the era of big data, data security faces more severe challenges. Data sovereignty will become the basis for countries to govern and administer data and related technologies and infrastructure.
According to predictions by professional institutions, global data usage is expected to reach approximately 40ZB (1ZB=1 billion TB) by 2020, which will cover all fields of economic and social development and become a new important driving force. In the era of big data, the focus of competition between countries is shifting from the competition for capital, land, population, resources/energy to the competition for big data. The right to control information (data) has become a new power after control of land, sea, and air. .
Currently, with the help of the big data revolution, the global data monitoring capabilities of developed countries such as the United States have been upgraded, resulting in increased data security and data defense risks in our country. Take the United States as an example. In the past, the United States has been monitoring global data and intelligence with the help of Internet means and information technology. It has successively launched important strategic plans such as the "International Strategy for Cyberspace" and "International Action for Cyberspace" to ensure that it operates in cyberspace and data space. dominant position. The big data revolution is a "sharp tool" for the United States to achieve this strategic goal. It can greatly improve its global data collection capabilities, monitoring capabilities, and analysis capabilities, thereby causing greater damage to my country's big data security and the loss of big data assets. risk.
In addition, economic security risks in importing and exporting goods and services are increasing. The sustained and rapid development of China's economy is largely due to the active use of advanced foreign equipment and technology, as well as the mature management and services of developed countries.
For example, American companies' IBM servers, Intel computer equipment, Cisco's communication equipment products, Microsoft's operating systems, etc. These foreign products have almost monopolized China's relevant markets. The "China Economy and Informatization" study stated that China's information security is useless in front of the "Eight King Kong" of the United States (Cisco, IBM, Google, Qualcomm, Intel, Apple, Oracle, Microsoft) represented by Cisco. These companies have direct or indirect contact and cooperation with the U.S. security agencies. When necessary, they can use their products and services to obtain various information from the Chinese government and enterprises, including sensitive economic information, and can even directly conduct operations on relevant Chinese equipment. attack.
We believe that information, data and network security in the future big data era need to pay attention to several key points.
First, global data governance issues.
In the era of big data, there are new changes in data storage and application methods, some of which are cross-regional or even cross-border. The issue of data governance is both very prominent and particularly important. In this regard, policy formulation needs to handle two "rights and interests". First, we must face up to hegemony (the monopoly advantage of foreign capital), that is, we must clearly realize that our country is still restricted by developed countries in terms of network control, key technologies, and high-end equipment. The second is to clarify data sovereignty. As an important strategic resource, data, whether owned by individuals or the state, must be considered within the scope of sovereignty.
Having sovereignty does not necessarily mean you can govern. For example: data is stored abroad and cloud computing crosses national borders, which may not be within the scope of your sovereignty. How is power transferred? The key is to have governance authority, to treat different data differently, and to effectively manage data that really needs to be protected with practical and reliable means. If the data cannot be effectively managed, big data will inevitably face the danger of losing control.
Second, the issue of data responsibility sharing.
This issue involves the dispersion of security risks. Information security risks exist in the entire life cycle of data. From technical ideas, product development, user use, and service management, all links must share corresponding security responsibilities. Big data security issues involve the government, relevant enterprises, network operators, service providers, as well as data producers and users, etc., and their respective security responsibilities must be clearly defined in policies.
Third, new infrastructure issues.
The development of big data is inseparable from key infrastructure such as telecommunications networks, IDCs, and even industrial control systems. Its safety and reliability also depend on these infrastructures. Affected by the globalization of supply chains and industrial privatization, the network Security with critical infrastructure is becoming increasingly complex. One country’s big data may be stored in other countries’ networks, and one country’s infrastructure may serve multiple countries at the same time. The high degree of global interdependence challenges the original national sovereignty. concept. Therefore, the safety supervision system of critical infrastructure is very important. In our country, it is necessary to establish substantive national security reviews of supply chains and normalized safety supervision of basic networks as soon as possible.
Fourth, data conflict management issues.
This issue is related to the interest game of network big data. The resource value of big data is getting higher and higher, and the competition and conflicts surrounding big data are becoming more and more intense. The way big data is generated, processed and utilized will greatly change the manifestation and destructive intensity of various conflicts. The content includes the protection of intellectual property rights, the handling of cyber crimes, the fight against cyber sabotage activities, especially cyber terrorism, and the response to the threat of cyber war.
Fifth, the issue of data power and benefit distribution.
From a global perspective, China’s potential as a data power is extremely prominent. In 2010, China accounted for 10% of the entire digital universe, in 2013 it accounted for 13%, and in 2020 it will account for 18%. By then, China's data scale will exceed that of the United States and rank first in the world.
However, in reality, there are 13 root servers in the world, and 10 of these 13 root servers (including a main root server) are set up in the United States. The world relies heavily on the United States for the Internet.
Therefore, from the perspective of reconstructing the new order of global Internet governance, it is necessary to redistribute the regional weights of ICANN Board members based on international indicators such as the number of Internet users. Multi-center top-level root servers are redistributed in different geographical areas around the world based on usage traffic, forming a "multi-center" rather than a "single-center" top-level root domain name resolution system and a true multi-center interconnected global network.