First, the total strength of both sides.
Wei Jun: About 70,000 people; The main arms are cavalry, supplemented by archers and infantry, for reasons described later.
Shu army: about 6.5438+10,000 people; The arms are mainly infantry, supplemented by mountain special forces, crossbowmen and cavalry, for reasons described later.
Second, the relevant place names
Jieting: Jieting Spring Town near Tianshui, Gansu;
Ji Gu: near Baoji, Shaanxi;
Third, the road from Han to Shaanxi
Qishan road: the longest distance, bypassing Gansu, the road is wide and gentle;
Thank you Road: Yangpingguan to Baoji, the same as baoji-chengdu railway, the road is narrow and needs plank road assistance;
Woods Valley: Although the distance from Yangxian County in Hanzhong to Shaanxi Wugong is short, the road is rugged, it is difficult to March, it is difficult to carry heavy weapons, and logistics cannot be guaranteed;
There are few other roads to choose from, so I won't go into details.
First, the operational intention of the Shu army.
Judging from the battlefield situation, marching time, terrain selection and general selection, the operational intentions of the Shu army are as follows:
The first stage: Zhao Yun and Deng Zhi led 1 10,000 people from Hanzhong to Baoji along the ramp as suspected soldiers to attract the main force of Wei Jun;
The second stage: Zhuge Liang led his army from Hanzhong, along Qishan Avenue to Tianshui, and captured the states, counties and counties from Qishan to Qingshui with Qishan as the backing;
The third stage: after occupying the counties, take this as the base and logistics support base, expand the sphere of influence to Qingshui River near Jieting, and maintain a favorable strategic posture of advancing, attacking and retreating after guarding the customs.
The reasons for judging the combat intention of the Shu army are as follows:
First, the Shu army entered the street pavilion to block aid, which was a hasty battle without prior planning.
Zhao Yun and Deng Zhi sent troops to Baoji to lure the enemy. Wei Jun was really in chaos and the main force was attracted to Baoji. Zhuge Liang led 90,000 troops out of Qishan. Due to lack of preparation, Wei Jun in Tianshui and other three counties quickly collapsed, but Shangsi and Wudu counties refused to surrender and loyally opposed it. According to the idea in advance, Zhuge Liang's intention is that the main force of China's army will be stationed in Qishan as the general reserve, and the main force will attack the states, counties and counties near Tianshui one after another, thus hitting the main force of Wei Jun.
But I didn't expect the campaign to go smoothly, far beyond the pre-war concept. Therefore, adjustments must be made. So Zhuge Liang called the generals to discuss and the meeting was very warm. He analyzed the location of the battle, the selection of generals and the equipment of arms. Otherwise, there will be no record of the Three Kingdoms "openly violating the public".
But there are a few pieces of information that must be judged, because spies at that time could only pass horses, and there might be flying pigeons passing books, but they could not fly over the steep Qinling Mountains. The distance from Baoji to Qishan should be more than 600 kilometers. Run with horses at a speed of 50 kilometers per hour and run back and forth for 24 hours without eating or drinking. Therefore, if you run for six hours a day, you have to run for four days, which is still calculated on the flat ground. Considering the terrain, it will take at least 6 days for the reconnaissance cavalry to return. This was not in line with the urgent military situation at that time.
1. How many people will Wei Jun send to Qishan?
2. What is the marching speed of Wei Jun?
3. Who is the general of Wei Jun?
4. What are Wei Jun's arms?
5. Where is the best place to block aid? What's the terrain like there
Second, the terrain of street kiosks is not suitable for blocking wars.
As far as I know, the terrain of the street pavilion is roughly as follows:
1, Jieting is really the entrance of Qishan boundary, which runs east-west, with mountains on both sides and a Qingshui River in the middle;
2. The slope of Nanshan guarded by Masu is relatively slow, the top is flat, and the elevation angle is large when climbing, which is beneficial to defense;
3. The road between the two mountains is about 1500m wide and 7800m long.
4. The linear distance from the top of the mountain to the bottom of the mountain is more than 300 meters, which is beyond the effective range of any weapon at that time;
5. After crossing the street pavilion, it is a Ma Pingchuan. There is no danger to defend, which is very suitable for field troops such as cavalry;
So why is this terrain not suitable for stopping wars?
The reason for this is the following：
1, if the upper South Mountain is based on favorable terrain, the blocking effect cannot be achieved;
The reason is:
The terrain of Nanshan is very conducive to defense. Due to the limitation of terrain, Wei Jun can deploy troops in the front, up to 50 people, plus an elevation angle of more than 30 degrees. As long as the Shu army exerts the power of long-range offensive weapons such as bows and arrows, even crossbows and giant crossbows, it can easily repel Wei Jun without fighting with the enemy.
But the key problem is that the road in the valley is 1500m wide, and you can't shoot Wei Jun from Nanshan, unless he has a Grenade launcher or mortar.
As far as I know, in the Pingxingguan campaign, the road width in the valley was less than 20 meters.
In other words, Ma Su can't control Wei Jun in the middle of the valley on Nanshan Mountain. If Wei Jun doesn't attack, it will have to rush down the mountain, and the impact distance is too long. Wei Jun, with cavalry as the forerunner, will soon be able to disrupt the attack of the Shu army.
2, if the army is stationed in the middle of the road, it is difficult to achieve the effect of blocking.
Road width in the valley exceeds 1500m. So under the conditions at that time, what methods must be relied on to stop the impact of Wei Jun cavalry brigade?
(1), set up roadblocks.
The basic instruments are thistles, antlers and stakes. How much does it cost to lay tribulus at 1500m?
If they are three meters apart, 500 will be laid continuously. I think at least ten rows need to be laid, so it is 5000. If each tribulus weighs half a catty, it will weigh 2,500 jins, which is 2.5 tons. I wonder if the horse brought so many thistles under the traffic conditions and the urgent March at that time. As for antlers, it is roughly the same as above.
If the Shu army marched lightly without the trench, it would only be possible to complete the defensive arrangement by logging and piling on the spot.
1500m distance, calculated according to the distance between two piles 1m, one row needs 1500m, at least five rows. The total is 7500 pounds.
Followed by traps, ditches, camps and so on.
Even if the troops are sufficient, this is no different from the field battle in the plain. The Shu army has no geographical advantage. Wei Jun can use fire, bow and arrow to clear the obstacles first, and then send the main cavalry to attack.
This is a bloody battle. If the Shu army wants to be unbeaten, its strength should be at least twice that of Wei Jun. Because of its numerous infantry, crossbowmen and archers, the Shu army does not have any advantage in the field.
(2) Arranging Bagua Array
This is Zhuge Liang's proud housekeeping skill, and I think Xue's "Dragon Gate Array" may be his true biography.
The specific array method is that the spearmen form a phalanx in front to stop the Wei Jun cavalry, the crossbowmen put arrows behind the array, and the shield soldiers attack the cavalry footwall from both sides, cut off the horse's legs and kill the enemy.
But to do this, there is an important premise, that is, the strength must be at least equal to that of the other party. Otherwise, the front defense may still be effective. When the consumption of troops is almost the same, the other side only needs one cavalry to charge, followed by archers and infantry, so it is difficult to gather disorderly troops on the chaotic battlefield.
But in fact, due to military emergency, Masu didn't have time to set up effective roadblocks and didn't have enough troops to defend the 1500m wide front.
So, he divided the troops into three parts, one led by himself to defend Nanshan, Wang Ping stood in the middle of the road, and the other was mobile as a commando.
What does this mean? His troops are seriously inadequate.
He not only wants to hit Wei Jun hard with the advantage of Nanshan, but also wants to have a bloody battle with Wei Jun on the road, and he also wants to take advantage of Wei Jun's shaky footing to catch him off guard.
This is a plan to kill two birds with one stone. But it backfired.
To sum up, it is obvious that the progress of the battle of the Shu army greatly exceeded the operational intention of the Northern Expedition:
That is, Zhao Yun and Deng Zhi led 10,000 military forces as suspected soldiers to attack Ji Gu, and Kong Ming led 90,000 troops to attack Qishan counties, and then based on this, they slowly and steadily attacked Guanzhong.
The general of Shu army headed by Zhuge Liang needs to adjust the original campaign deployment according to the change of battlefield form.
The first is the judgment of the enemy.
The first question:
How many troops will Wei Jun send to rescue five counties?
Zhuge Liang should be very clear about Wei Jun's overall strength before the war. If he can't do this, he won't get the evaluation of "being cautious all his life", which also shows that he is an incompetent senior commander.
This is a multiple choice question. After careful analysis, the answer should not be difficult.
Less than 1 and 1 ten thousand people;
2, 30 thousand people or less;
Below 30,000;
Over 40,000 people.
These choices should be based on a premise, that is, Wei Jun's judgment on the main position of the Shu army.
So, what information can be provided to Cao Zhen?
1, Zhao Yun's troops;
2, Tianshui and other three counties emergency military newspaper;
3. The emergency military report of Wudu and other five counties attacked;
4. Spy information;
Let's analyze one by one:
In modern warfare, the quickest way to know each other's strength is fire reconnaissance. The era of cold weapons is actually the same.
First, send a certain number of troops to carry out a tentative attack, and each observation post and commander will observe and calculate the number and arms of the enemy.
If there is some confusion in the era of hot weapons, the enemy can conceal some firepower and wait until you formally attack before firing, then there is a premise for Wei Jun to judge the movement of the Shu army during the first northern expedition of Kongming, and that is time.
We know that in June 228, Kong Ming and Zhao Yun sent troops at the same time, and they didn't arrive in Qishan until February. Wei Jun can completely exchange fire with Zhao Yun in this time difference to test his strength. I think, no matter how stupid the coach is, he can know how many troops Zhao Yun has brought. However, where is the main force of the Shu army? This was impossible for Zhuge Liang to know before he attacked the three counties. Even if I guess right, I can only send troops to places where it is easy to send troops and March fast, so as to rescue at any time.
The first problem is solved. Because Wei Jun and Zhao Yunjun have been fighting face to face and have been in contact for a long time, Cao Zhen's judgment of Zhao Yunjun's power should be accurate.
The second question: where is the main force of the Shu army? How many troops are there?
When the Shu army captured three counties and five counties, the answer was immediately revealed. Because the lost three counties must have telegrams or beaten soldiers want to report to Cao Zhen, and the prefects of the five counties will also send fast horses to send letters for help. Even if these governors are ignorant, it is impossible to count and calculate the strength and arms of the Shu army. Judging from the military forces needed to attack these eight counties alone, if it is not the main force of the Shu army, how can it be completed in a short time by relying on one or twenty thousand military forces?
Therefore, it should not be difficult for Wei Jun to judge the main force of the Shu army, and there is a definite intelligence basis.
The third question: How many troops should Wei Jun send to save five counties and recapture three counties?
Now that the strength and position of the enemy's main force are clear, there is nothing to say. Wei Jun always has only seventy thousand troops, leaving twenty thousand people to deal with Zhao Yun. Stall him.
The main force of 50 thousand people, mainly cavalry, rushed to help, echoed with the five counties, looking for favorable fighters and trying to defeat the Shu army. Fight in the right place.
Because of its small number, Wei Jun has advantages in combat experience and arms and equipment. It is important to choose an experienced commander, who has full authority to deal with this situation.
So, since it is easy for Wei Jun to know the strength and direction of the main force of the Shu army, we will return to the first question. What is the Shu Army's judgment on Wei Jun's main rescue of Qishan? Let's start with intelligence.
The Shu army can get information from Wei Jun in the following ways:
1, Zhao Yun's Junbao;
2, the spy's flying pigeons pass books;
3. The reconnaissance cavalry flies fast;
4. Ask the local people.
Zhao Yun is in Baoji and Zhuge Liang is in Qishan. In the absence of a plane crossing the Qinling Mountains, anyone must bypass Xiexie Road and go to Qishan via Yangpingguan along the Han River, which is more than 600 kilometers away. It takes at least ten days for one way, let alone a round trip.
It is conceivable that even if Zhao Yun sent information, it was ten days ago. It is impossible to know the latest changes in military intelligence in this way.
The same is true of reconnaissance cavalry.
As for the common people, they may get nothing. One is at the border of Wei, the other is limited transportation, and the third is that it is impossible to come to the war zone even if you visit relatives.
Then, only one flying pigeon can pass books, but it depends on the training level of the homing pigeon and whether it meets natural enemies such as eagles and poisonous snakes on the way.
To sum up, due to the lack of effective information sources, the commander-in-chief of the Shu army can only make judgments based on the information and battlefield conditions ten days ago, and this judgment is likely to be unreliable or inaccurate.
In the case of incomplete information, how to judge the strength, time and arms of Wei Jun's aid?
Analysis can only be based on existing information.
First of all, it should be clear that because the Shu army occupied three counties and attacked five counties, which was very noisy, Wei Jun easily determined the main position and approximate number of the Shu army. Many details are under control because of sufficient information sources.
Then, no matter how stupid the commander-in-chief of the Shu army is, we should think that Wei Jun will spare no effort to save him.
This has the following judgment on the strength of Wei Jun to save five counties:
Less than 1 and 1 ten thousand people;
2, less than thirty thousand people;
3, less than fifty thousand people;
4, more than fifty thousand people.
If Wei Jun has found out the main position and strength of the Shu army, sending 65,438+ten thousand people is tantamount to death, which is impossible for war-torn Cao Zhen and Zhang Jaw.
Sending 30 thousand people to save 90 thousand people may not win. According to the terrain of Qishan, the Shu army can put 30,000 Wei Jun in, have a trick of closing the door and beating dogs, and slowly torture Wei Jun, who is three times the enemy. Don't fight everywhere until Wei Jun runs out of ammunition and food.
If this is the case, the battle of Jieting is just a trick to lure the enemy, not a war to stop aid.
So, is it possible for Wei Jun to send 50,000 people to help?
The answer is yes.
Although the total strength of Wei Jun is not as good as that of Shu Army, its arms are mainly cavalry, supplemented by archers and infantry. There are also local defenders in various places.
What's more, this campaign is in Wei's territory, and it is very emboldened from many factors such as troop supplement, logistics support and popular support.
The Shu army, on the other hand, has no manpower supplement, logistical support and local support. There are many inconveniences in fighting in different places.
Judging from the specific deployment of the campaign, it should not be a problem for the five counties to persist for a month or two by relying on a solid city and the determination of one heart and one mind.
Of course, if Zhuge Liang had the help of siege vehicles, trebuchets, ladders, watchtowers and other siege tools specially built by Genghis Khan, it would soon be possible to capture the city. But it costs money to buy patents from Temujin.
In this situation, even if the Shu army has 90 thousand troops, it will be divided. If split in two, Wei Jun's field capability will be enough to compete with the Shu army.
Is it possible for Wei Jun to send more than 50,000 troops to help?
The answer is of course no.
The total strength of Wei Jun War Zone is only 70,000, so at least we should leave two times as many troops as Zhao Yun to deal with it. Otherwise, after being destroyed.
To sum up, the Shu army should reasonably judge that the strength of Wei Jun's reinforcements is between 30,000 and 50,000.
Whether Mr. Zhuge misjudged the specific number of people in this judgment.
I think this is more likely.
This can be verified by the troops sent by Masu.
At present, there are two statements about Ma Su's troops:
1, 1 ten thousand people;
Twenty-five thousand.
However, there is no evidence for either statement. But I didn't say it was higher than this figure.
If 10000 people is a fact, then it is certain that Kong Ming misjudged Wei Jun's assistance.
Because, according to military common sense, even with the help of favorable terrain, we can calculate the approximate range of five times the duration of stopping the enemy. If the sniper is not at the expense of total annihilation, then the reserve team must be prepared.
The most famous blocking war in modern China War was Tashan blocking war in Liaoshen Campaign, and the input timing of the reserve team played a key role.
If the second statement holds, Zhuge Liang's judgment on Wei Jun's strength is correct. What he wants is time. I think his orders are: stop the enemy at all costs until Wei Yan captured five counties and fought a decisive battle with Wei Jun's main forces in Jieting.
The Shu side has disrupted the overall deployment, which is bound to form an unfavorable situation between Scylla and Charybdis.
Now it can be concluded that:
1. If Zhuge Liang sent 10,000 people to Ma Su, it can be concluded that he misjudged Wei Jun's reinforcements, and the judgment should be 30,000 people. The purpose is to block Wei Jun in a street pavilion until Wei Yan captured five counties.
Then, Zhuge Liang, not Ma Su, is mainly responsible for the failure of street kiosks.
Because even if Masu camped in Tao, it would be difficult to get away with it, and the result would probably be wiped out. If he has backbone, he can be killed without damaging his reputation.
2. If Zhuge Liang sends 25,000 people to Ma Su, it proves that his judgment on Wei Jun's reinforcements is correct, and there are 50,000 people. Moreover, his designated sniper location is probably not in Jieting, but in Tommy Tam, because the terrain there is very conducive to sniper.
Ma Su couldn't arrive on time, which caused Jieting to rush into battle and didn't make a good plan.
But Ma Su, as a leader, has the right to improvise. He could have made good use of it, but he failed miserably.
In my opinion, under the circumstances at that time, Zhuge Liang's choice of generals to block the war in the street pavilion was the result of heated discussion, hoping to give the generals with unified armies greater initiative.
He believes that Ma Su has Wei Yan's incomparable military wisdom and can lead the Shu army to get away with it in a complicated situation.
I guess his initial idea was:
If Wei Yan is sent to stop the aid, the result may be total annihilation or heavy losses. Another possibility is that Wei Yan has never served him, and he will retreat all the troops and expose the troops attacking the five counties to Wei Jun's attack.
If this happens, it is very likely to lead to a big defeat.
So his consideration is to let Ma Su use his wisdom to deal with Wei Jun, stall the enemy as much as possible, and buy time for Wei Yan to attack the five counties.
Capture five counties at a time, merge the army with Wei Yan, support Ma Su, and fight the exhausted Wei Jun.
This is undoubtedly a good move!
But this seemingly beautiful good chess game has several fatal loopholes.
First, the terrain of the street pavilion is unknown;
In the official records, there is no mention of Zhuge Liang's prior notification of Ma Su's topography. Only Luo Guanzhong embellished that Kongming had told Ma Su to take refuge in Tao, but Ma Su didn't listen, which led to a crushing defeat.
In my opinion, Zhuge Liang may know the general situation of the street pavilion terrain through maps and several scouts. He has no time and can't explore by himself. When the specific terrain data is unknown, he has no choice but to hand over the power of improvisation to the commander.
In his strategic thinking, stability is the first. Therefore, he would rather put 30,000 Zhong Jun in Qishan for a rainy day, and he would never venture to the street pavilion to fight Wei Jun.
A general who leads troops to a street pavilion must meet his requirements, that is, he can use his wisdom to deal with the enemy and try his best to delay the time and kill the enemy.
Although Wei Yan has fought many battles, after all, he can only play conventional warfare, and cheating is not his strong suit.
Masu has a profound knowledge of military theory and has worked with him for many years. He is still a newcomer, which is conducive to cultivating his best friend.
In fact, from the perspective of actual combat, Masu still has some brains.
Second, the follow-up of the reserve team is not enough.
According to the normal military deployment, there should be a plan after the failure. That is, after the defeat of Ma Su, there must be a reserve team to fill the leak at any time, but Kongming put the army in the rear and had no time to rescue it. Maybe he was afraid that after putting all his eggs in one basket, he would be caught between Scylla and Charybdis and could not get away with it.
Third, there is a lack of accurate judgment on Masu's true ability.
We can take a closer look at the successor he chose, and there are few great achievements. One shows that he has great problems in employing people, and the other shows that his charm and influence are not enough to attract outstanding talents to join. If Zhuge Liang has problems in strategy, does Ma Su also have problems in specific command?
The answer is yes.
Masu's situation is:
1, the absolute disadvantage, whether it is 1 10,000 or 25,000, is much less than the 50,000 people in Wei Jun;
2, the terrain advantage is not great. According to my previous analysis, the terrain of the street pavilion is not suitable for blocking. If you camp in the road, it is equivalent to a field battle;
3. The time is short and the preparation period is short. According to the analysis, the Shu army arrived at Jieting only two days earlier than Wei Jun. At this time, it was impossible to build fortifications on the front of 1.5km wide.
4. The general of the other side is an experienced veteran.
Most of the other soldiers are veterans with rich combat experience.
6. Most of our soldiers are new recruits who have never fought.
What is the normal reaction in this case?
First, camp on the road.
This method has been analyzed. The Shu army fought against the enemy on the flat ground with less than twice the strength of Wei Jun, and the result can be imagined: heavy losses or total annihilation. Ma Su most likely fled back alone, or committed suicide.
Second, harass and delay Wei Jun in various ways to gain time.
This is exactly what Zhuge Liang wanted and what Ma Su wanted to show.
According to the type of talents, Ma Su has this quality and is a clever general. However, due to the lack of actual combat experience, his scheme is very distinctive as a whole, but there are unforgivable defects in calculation.
I think Masu's analysis is like this:
First, since the terrain is not conducive to blocking, then simply put the main force on Nanshan and put a small amount of troops on the road. He thinks it is clever to do so.
Because if Wei Jun ignores the troops of Nanshan, breaks through the obstacles of Shu army on the road and goes straight to the hinterland of Qishan, Ma will cut off the water source of Wei Jun from Nanshan and block the posterior route of Wei Jun, and Wei Yan and Zhuge Liang can lead 60,000 troops to stop Wei Jun and attack Ma Su on the appropriate battlefield.
At that time, Wei Jun had no water and was under attack between Scylla and Charybdis. Extremely uncomfortable, and there is no new power to rescue.
Even if it is not completely annihilated, it will suffer heavy losses.
Second, Wei Jun was caught off guard in the middle.
This will not only destroy Wei Jun's morale, but also disrupt its deployment, killing two birds with one stone.
3. If the enemy is afraid to cross the street pavilion because he is afraid of the Shu army in Nanshan, he will certainly attack the mountain. According to the topography of Nanshan, it is easy to defend but difficult to attack. The front can only be unfolded for 30 people, with large elevation and long impact distance. The Shu army only needs to stand on the top of the mountain and shoot arrows downward, so it can completely stall Wei Jun and make it unable to move. Buy time for Zhuge Liang's main force.
From the perspective of conception, this is undoubtedly a wonderful move, which can be described as killing three birds with one stone.
But one thing is very fatal, that is, this plan depends entirely on the invincible army in Nanshan.
If Nanshan's army fails and is blown down by the enemy, is there a plan?
There may be, but Masu has neither the ability nor the time to implement it.
This is because Ma Su didn't take these soldiers, and the soldiers have doubts about their command ability. Once defeated, they will lose confidence. What is even more unbearable is that Wei Jun shouted at the foot of the mountain: "Hand over the gun and don't kill it!" .
I think the Shu army didn't carry out the ideological education of recalling bitter experience and thinking sweet, and the soldiers' fighting will was not firm enough.
In other words, he doesn't even have half Zhang's ability. Comrade Lao Zhang was able to persist for four days in the case of lack of water and food and heavy siege.
Moreover, the 74 th Army was almost completely annihilated, with more than 28,000 people, only a few thousand people were captured and most of them were killed.
Masu is not convinced. In other words, his mass base is too poor to convince the public.
This shows that Kong Ming has major defects in employing people.
The correct usage is to let it train in a small army first, and then entrust it with a big task after gradually establishing its prestige.
In fact, Masu is a good prospect, but it's a pity that Kong Ming used it too hard, which made him have no chance to turn over. In a way, it hurt him!
Ma Su's fatal mistake is:
1. Nanshan is dangerous, but it lacks water.
Wei Jun can surround and not attack, but running out of water will demoralize him. As long as the whole army shouts together and points out the way, some people will not be able to hold on. When a leader surrenders down the mountain, there are bound to be imitators, and then they will be regarded as surrender, and it will not take much effort to completely defeat the troops in Nanshan.
As for the 2,000 people blocked by Wang Ping, we just need to send troops to monitor them, and we are not worried.
Second, divide troops to block the enemy, disperse troops and lose local advantages.
Ma Su divided its forces into three parts, which made the already small forces even more stretched.
Third, although Nanshan is good for defense, it is not good for attack.
The height of Nanshan is too high, from the top to the foot of the mountain, which is beyond the range of weapons at that time and is not conducive to attack.
Based on the above considerations, Masu may only think of defense, not attack. So only sniper positions were set up at the top of the mountain.
According to the range of weapons at that time, multi-layered stepped deep sniper positions should be set up from the foot of the mountain to the top of the mountain. One can attract Wei Jun to attack, and the other can attack at any time and delay Wei Jun's action.
Let's sum up the responsibility of the lost street pavilion.
First, the decision to stop the war near the street pavilion is correct. What is wrong is the choice of plugging position.
If, after surveying the terrain, Kongming tells Ma Su to camp in Tao, the main responsibility should be borne by Zhuge Liang.
If Mr Zhuge explicitly told Ma Su that the sniper was going to arrive in Gansu, and Ma Su was forced to choose the street pavilion because he failed to arrive in time, then the responsibility lies with Ma Su. As a general, he has problems with improvisation.
Second, if Kong Ming gave Ma Su 10,000 troops, it means that he misjudged Wei Jun to reinforce, and the responsibility lies with him;
If Kong Ming had given Ma Su 25,000 men, then these troops would have camped in Tao according to his statement. Even if they were completely annihilated, they could have bought time to stop Wei Jun. At that time, Wei Yan had captured five counties, and he could also leave Qishan without any worries and join Wei Yan to fight against Wei Jun, who was exhausted and suffered huge losses, with 60,000 fresh troops. It is estimated that there were at most 40,000 people left in Wei Jun at that time. The Shu army has a high winning rate.
Then, whether Ma Su is killed or defeated, Ma Su is not responsible. Zhuge Liang also has no responsibility, provided that Ma Su leaves enough time for the army.
Third, if Zhuge Liang asked Ma Su to stop fighting in Gansu and give him 25,000 people to camp in Tao, Zhuge Liang basically had no responsibility, but Ma Su's clever choice made the Shu army retreat quickly, leaving no enough time for the army, and Ma Su was responsible.
From the analysis of the battle of Jieting, we can see that:
First, Zhuge Liang's military ability, judgment, adaptability and strategic planning ability are far behind the famous soldiers in history;
In the battle of Jieting, the first mistake was that the soldiers were divided into three ways. They should be divided into two ways, attacking five counties all the way, or only sending a small number of troops to monitor, and the main force of at least 60,000 people should fight Wei Jun near Jieting, so that the odds are better.
Secondly, even if we adopt the strategy of dividing the troops into three ways, we should give Ma Su enough troops, such as 4-5 people. Then even if Masu has three troops, it is enough to achieve his tactical intention. That is, 30,000 people will be camped on the road, 10,000 people will disturb the enemy in Nanshan, and 10,000 people will be mobile, ready to be attacked by Wei Jun halfway.
Finally, he did not survey the battlefield in detail in advance in order to make a reasonable battle plan, which caused him to be passive in the situation. In the end, it's up to the general to improvise. There is still a considerable gap between this and Lin Biao. As far as I know, before each battle, Lin Biao will personally repeatedly survey the terrain and carefully scrutinize the battle plan. As the commander-in-chief of four fields 1 10,000 people, he can even be regarded as a company-level unit.
Every time he fights, he will get the greatest result at the least cost.
Second, Kong Ming's employment is a big problem that puzzles him all his life.
He didn't see Masu's weakness clearly enough. In other words, Masu does not have independent ability. The correct usage should be to send an experienced general, and Ma Su to help advise, so that relying on the prestige of this general, all the troops can persist for a period of time under unfavorable circumstances and not break up quickly.
Third, Kong Ming is under great pressure.
Although Bai Di entrusted an orphan, Jingzhou School and Yizhou Party failed to convince him from the heart. So after the defeat of Jieting, Ma Su had to be beheaded to relieve the pressure.
This is similar to Cao Cao's failure to deal with any general after the defeat in Chibi, but he wept for Guo Jia. There is a big difference.
In fact, Cao Cao has many reasons to blame any subordinate, such as poor medical care, incompetence of generals and helplessness of counselors.
He can kill many people in public.
But he didn't. Zhuge Liang killed Ma Su.