Apply for refusal to pay 1
Applicant (defendant in the original trial): xxx, male, Han nationality, born on May 22nd,
Apply for refusal to pay 1
Applicant (defendant in the original trial): xxx, male, Han nationality, born on May 22nd, 1962, xxx, farmer, now living at No.47-1in Hedi District, Nanbai Village.
Respondent (plaintiff in the original trial): xxx, male, Han nationality,1born on March 26th, 973, a farmer in xxx village, now living at No.38-1in Xitou District, Nanbai Village.
Apply for protest request:
Request the xx People's Procuratorate to lodge a protest against the civil judgment of the xx People's Court (20XX) Yu Min Zi Chu No.53, request the court to cancel the judgment and reject the plaintiff's claim. Facts and reasons:
First, the basic facts of this case:
In 20XX, the applicant purchased 80 mu of barren land suitable for forest in Linangou village with the following ticket, and obtained the contracted management right of Linangou 16.5 mu of land by circulation, accounting for 96.5 mu. With the consent of the village Committee, the forestry department passed the acceptance. In 20XX, the Ministry of Forestry issued a forest right certificate to the applicant, indicating the scope and service life of the four districts. In 20XX, the land contractor adjacent to the applicant, that is, the respondent, changed the land use beyond the scope of business without the consent of the village Committee, turned the original cultivated land into forest land, and planted poplars in a small canal in the middle of the plot adjacent to the applicant. Due to the fast growth speed and well-developed root system of poplar, the normal growth of the applicant's walnut tree was seriously affected, resulting in the delayed fruiting of the tree, which seriously affected the applicant's economic benefits and caused great losses to the applicant. In order to safeguard the interests of the applicant and avoid the losses of the respondent, the applicant shall not hire an excavator to dig a small canal with a width of 80cm and a depth of about 1m in 20XX year1month, so as to cut off part of the root system of poplar and prevent the respondent's poplar from causing greater losses to the applicant.
Second, the court of first instance found the facts wrong.
1. It is wrong for the court of first instance to find that the applicant's canal digging behavior constitutes infringement.
Although the court of first instance raised the controversial focus of this case and whether the respondent's tree planting behavior was legal, it did not identify the key facts of this case when determining the facts of this case. Whether the defendant's tree planting behavior is legal or not is the key to this case.
If the tree planting behavior of the respondent is illegal, then the behavior taken by the applicant belongs to legitimate defense against the illegal behavior, and the applicant does not bear any legal responsibility.
If the respondent's tree planting behavior is legal, the applicant should bear legal responsibilities beyond the necessary limits, so the respondent's tree planting behavior is legal, which is one of the keys to this case, but the court of first instance did not recognize this key fact.
The fact is that when hearing this case, the evidence provided by the plaintiff is the certificate issued by the village Committee. This evidence can neither prove that the respondent has the right to manage the forest land nor prove that the applicant has the ownership of the forest land. Article 64 of the Civil Procedure Law stipulates that "the parties have the responsibility to provide evidence for their own claims." If the parties can't prove their claims, they will bear the risk of losing the case. In this case, the respondent did not provide any evidence to prove that the poplar belongs to his legal property. Naturally, if the tree does not belong to the respondent, the applicant has no right to claim his rights. However, the evidence provided by the applicant during the trial, such as the purchase of the village committee's four wasteland agreement, land use certificate and forest right certificate, can fully prove that the respondent's behavior belongs to infringement, and the photos provided by the applicant prove that the respondent's trees have caused considerable losses to the applicant, and the trenching behavior taken by the applicant belongs to legitimate defense and does not bear any legal responsibility.
3. It is wrong for the court of first instance to order the applicant to compensate the respondent for the loss of trees caused by the infringement of the applicant, which belongs to the error of applicable law. The reason is: in this case, the applicant's behavior belongs to self-defense, and the way he took did not exceed the necessary limit and did not cause losses to the respondent. Therefore, according to the provisions of Article 128 of the General Principles of the Civil Law, the applicant does not bear any legal responsibility.
To sum up, the respondent turned the farmland into farmland without the consent of the village committee, knowing that the farmland could not be turned into woodland casually, and planted trees on the land that he did not have the right to use. Moreover, the trees planted directly harm the interests of others and cause damage to others. The court of first instance found that the facts and judgments were illegal, and drew lessons from Articles 179 and 187 of China's Civil Procedure Law.
I am here to convey
Xxxxxx People's Procuratorate
Applicant: Zhang Jianjun.
February 19th, two thousand xx.
Apply for protest 2
Applicant: a, male,
Applicant: b, female,
Respondent: C, male.
Respondent: Ding, female,
The dispute over the right of way between the applicant and the respondent was tried by Funan County People's Court, and the civil judgment was (20XX) Nan Min Yi Chu ZiNo.. 0 130 1 was made in 20XX 10. Ordering the respondent to have the right of way on the applicant's homestead; 2. Order the applicant to remove obstacles within the above scope within ten days; 3。 And ordered the respondent to pay the applicant compensation of 30,000 yuan. The applicant refused to accept this judgment and appealed to Fuyang Intermediate People's Court according to law. After hearing the case, Fuyang Intermediate People's Court made a civil judgment of (20XX) Fu Min Zhong Yizhino. 0 1282: Items 1, 2 and 4 upheld the judgment of the first instance. Cancel the third item of the first-instance judgment.
The applicant thinks that the original judgment found the facts wrong, and the judge handling the case has human relations, and the judgment result is extremely unfair to the applicant, so he applies to your hospital to lodge a protest against this case according to law.
Reasons for applying for protest:
First, the court of first instance found that the homestead on the east side of the applicant's house was a "public passage", which was a factual error and the respondent did not enjoy the right of way.
1. The court of first instance confirmed the above facts according to the mediation opinions of the People's Mediation Committee of Guankou Township and the certificate of Xiaohe Village Committee of Guankou Township. In fact, the mediation opinions of Guankou Township People's Mediation Committee have no legal effect at all, and it is obviously wrong for the court of first instance to accept the matters identified in the mediation opinions and use them as the basis for judgment. As for the certificate of Xiaohe Village Committee, since the disputed homestead belongs to the management scope of Huaihe River Administration, it is not the land collectively owned by the villagers, and the certificate issued by the village Committee has no legal effect.
2. The above identification of "public access" contradicts the facts admitted by the respondent in court.
During the trial, the respondent Ding admitted that there were only two houses in the east and west when the homestead was originally distributed, and the east side of the house was a slope, and then the homestead was added after the soil was taken from the slope to fill it up. The east of the applicant's house is also Tai Po. After years of leveling, new homestead was added. Later, because the neighbor wang hong asked the applicant for the homestead, the applicant paid a transfer fee of 3,600 yuan to wang hong, and the applicant submitted a sales agreement to the court. The above facts show that the open space on the east side of the house of the party in this case is all newly-added land filled by himself, and it is not a public passage reserved when distributing the foundation of the house. Both parties in this case recognized the above facts, but the court of first instance refused to adopt them, which obviously violated the principle of objective judgment based on facts.
3. The homestead of the applicant and the respondent belongs to the north-south boundary, and the respondent does not enjoy the right of way to the homestead on the east side of the applicant's house.
The foundation of the house here is the kitchen land reserved by the applicant when building a house, which is not a natural north-south passage, and the applicant has never passed through it before tearing down the old and building a new one. The respondent used to pass through the public north-south passage from the right to the west, but now the neighbors in the west are building houses on the east and west sides when building new houses, resulting in the respondent's western passage being blocked. In addition, the residents on the north side of the plaintiff have been traveling westward through the public north-south lane since they built their houses. The respondent can completely open the door in the north of his home and then go west through the expressway.
Second, the court of first instance violated legal procedures and was obviously partial to the defendant.
The fourth page of the original judgment said that "the court obtained evidence ex officio" includes:
1, the applicant's household registration certificate;
2. Mediation opinions of the People's Mediation Committee of Guankou Township;
3. Testimony of Ming-tsai Wu and Guo Guoqiang;
4, on-site inspection records and inspection chart.
"Evidence that the people's court considers necessary for the trial of a case" as stipulated in Article 15 of the Supreme People's Court's Several Provisions on Evidence in the Civil Procedure Law and Article 64 of the Civil Procedure Law refers to the following situations: (1) Facts that may harm national interests, social public interests or the legitimate rights and interests of others; (two) involving the addition of parties ex officio, suspension of litigation, termination of litigation, withdrawal of litigation and other procedural matters unrelated to substantive disputes. Article 16 Except under the circumstances stipulated in Article 15 of these Provisions, the people's court shall investigate and collect evidence at the request of the parties. The evidence of the appeal does not belong to the scope of evidence investigated by the people's court ex officio. The court of first instance violated the above provisions of the Supreme Law, helped the respondent to collect evidence, and was obviously partial to the respondent, resulting in an obviously unfair judgment.
To sum up, the applicant believes that the court of first instance found the facts wrong, the presiding judge handled the case illegally and the judgment was unfair. According to Article 187 of the Civil Procedure Law, the applicant requests your hospital to lodge a protest against this case according to law.
in this regard
XXX people's procuratorate
Applicant: A and B..
Date of application: XXXX, xx, xx, xx.
Apply for protest 3
Applicant: * * *, male, Han nationality, 5 1 year old, 1 May, 9601day, from * * * County, Shaanxi Province, with junior high school education, living in * * *, and being the father of the victim Lu Moumou.
Applicant: * * *, female, Han nationality, 5 1 year old, 1960, from * * * County, Shaanxi Province, with a junior high school education and the same address, is the mother of the victim Lu Moumou.
Protest request:
1. Request the Beijing Municipal People's Procuratorate to lodge a protest with the Beijing Higher People's Court on the case that the defendant Ruan Zhenbing refused to accept the criminal judgment of Beijing No.2 Intermediate People's Court (20XX).
2. Request that the defendant Ruan Zhenbing be sentenced to death and executed immediately.
3. The applicant is willing to give up all the compensation incidental to civil compensation.
Apply for protest 4
Applicant: * * *, male, Han nationality, born on * * * * * village, Shandong Province, and now lives in * * * * * district.
Defendant: xxx
Address: xxx
Request: Withdraw the request
In the case of a general loan contract dispute between the applicant and the respondent, the civil ruling of Huimin County People's Court (20 1 1) ruled that the applicant refused to accept the ruling of first instance and appealed to Binzhou Intermediate People's Court. Binzhou Intermediate People's Court rejected the appeal and upheld the original judgment on the grounds that the repayment voucher provided by the applicant had no official seal. The applicant thinks that the evidence for ascertaining the facts is insufficient, and according to the provisions of Article 185 of the Civil Procedure Law, he applies and requests the people's procuratorate to lodge a protest.
First, the final ruling found that the factual evidence was insufficient.
The final ruling found that the repayment voucher provided by the applicant was not supported without the official seal. Due to the chaotic internal management of Cai Xia Carpet Group Co., Ltd. at that time, some documents were only signed by the payee, and the payee could testify in court as a witness, but the court made a final judgment without summoning witnesses to testify in court.
Therefore, it is unreasonable that the final ruling finds that the repayment voucher provided by the applicant cannot be supported without the official seal.
Second, the Court of Final Appeal wrongly applied the law.
The final ruling found that the signature of the applicant's wife on the statement had the same legal effect. According to Article 66 of the General Principles of Civil Law, an act without agency, beyond agency or after agency termination can only bear civil liability if it is ratified by the principal. Knowing that another person has committed a civil act in his own name without denying it is deemed as consent. The applicant denied his wife's signature in court, so the signature on the statement has no legal effect.
Therefore, the application of the law is wrong, so it is submitted to the procuratorate for protest.
This demonstration
* * * * Court
Applicant: * * *
Xxxx，xxxx
Apply for protest 5
Applicant (plaintiff in the first instance and appellant in the second instance) xxx, female,/kloc-0, born on June 7, 957, Han nationality, former teacher of Shikong Primary School in Nan 'an District, Chongqing, lives in. Nan 'an District, four kilometers, xx College, teacher dormitory, building xx, xx.
The respondent (defendant in the first instance, appellee in the second instance) is Shikong Primary School in Nan 'an District, Chongqing, and his domicile is No.75 Guangqian Road, Shikong, Nan 'an District.
Legal representative xxx, president of this school.
apply for a project
Requesting the people's procuratorate to lodge a protest and urging the people's court to revoke the judgments of the first and second instance, the retrial will change the favorable situation for the applicant.
Reasons for application
The judgment of the first and second instance holds that the school's behavior of issuing blank lesson plans to teachers cannot prove that the ownership has been transferred, but requires the parties to prove a well-known fact, which violates the law.
The applicant believes that the school's distribution of teaching materials to the applicant is enough to show that the ownership of teaching materials has been transferred and the applicant owns the ownership of teaching materials through derivative acquisition.
As stated in the original judgment, the textbook was purchased by the respondent, and its ownership belongs to the respondent. But this is only the state before the respondent distributed the teaching materials to the applicant. After the appellee distributed the textbook to the applicant, the ownership of the textbook was transferred and the applicant successfully obtained it.
The original judgment held that the respondent issued the lesson plan to the applicant only as office supplies, with the purpose of compiling the lesson plan for the applicant, and there was no intention to transfer the ownership of the lesson plan. This view is incorrect.
First, there are two forms of expression of will, express and implied, with the same effect. When the respondent distributed the teaching materials to the appellant, it may not have clearly indicated the intention of transferring the ownership of the teaching materials, but as a long-term practice and for the education department (in fact, not only the education department! After office supplies are distributed to teachers, schools no longer claim the ownership of office supplies, and teachers are not obliged to return office supplies, which is a common practice. Because as a well-known fact, office supplies distributed to teachers will be consumed in the process of office work. All educators, including education administrators and teachers, know and abide by this practice. For the respondent who distributes textbooks, the positive behavior of distributing textbooks to the applicant, together with the implied cognition that he no longer claims the ownership of the distributed textbooks, constitutes the meaning expression of the ownership transfer of textbooks. Therefore, the applicant obtained the ownership of the textbook through inheritance. In this case, we can't think that the school has no intention of transferring the ownership of teaching materials. As a well-known fact, according to Several Provisions of the Supreme People's Court on Evidence in Civil Proceedings, the parties need not provide supplementary evidence.
Secondly, the respondent's behavior of asking the applicant to hand in the lesson plan book is not to claim the ownership of the lesson plan book, but to complete the teaching management work.
After the respondent issued the lesson plan, he never claimed the ownership of the lesson plan. The respondent asked the applicant to hand in the lesson plan book in order to check the teacher's preparation of the lesson plan, so there are provisions in its management system that teachers can be punished in some form if they don't hand in the lesson plan. What needs to be clear is that this kind of punishment is the administrative punishment of the school to the teacher, not the civil liability that the school requires the teacher to bear because the teacher infringes the ownership of the textbook. Therefore, it can also be said that the school has not claimed the ownership of the textbook since it was issued, which is consistent with the implied behavior of the respondent to transfer the ownership of the textbook.
Second, the applicant claims the ownership of the specific things, and the original judgment did not prove that the ownership of the attached lesson plan still belongs to the respondent, that is, it is wrong to claim that the respondent should not return it.
In this case, the lesson plan book has two different meanings and properties: one is the lesson plan book sent by the respondent to the applicant, which is a blank lesson plan book and belongs to a species; Second, the lesson plan book submitted by the applicant to the respondent is a lesson plan book with lesson plans, which belongs to a special object. When an applicant writes a lesson plan in a blank lesson plan book, it is no longer something else, and the lesson plan book is no longer a species, but a concrete thing. If the original judgment holds that the respondent has the right to claim its blank lesson plan (kind), the applicant only needs to return the blank lesson plan (kind) that is the same as or similar to the original. Why did the written lesson plan (special object) in the original judgment satisfy the respondent's claim? This is obviously a misunderstanding of the relationship between species and specific objects, which leads to the judgment result irrelevant to the article.
It should be pointed out that the subject matter requested by the applicant is the attached lesson plan. Although the applicant wrote the lesson plan to complete the task, it cannot be inferred that the ownership relationship between the specific object attached to the lesson plan and the species not attached to the lesson plan has not changed. If the school still has the right to claim the ownership of the species as a blank lesson plan, it should not be realized by possessing the special objects attached to the lesson plan. In fact, the civil law has stipulated the methods for the parties to claim species: substituting species, that is, returning another blank lesson plan to the school to realize the ownership claim of the blank lesson plan originally sent to the applicant; If there is no substitute, the compensation will be discounted, that is, if there are no other blank lesson plans, the applicant can return the blank lesson plans issued by the school at a discount to realize the ownership of the blank lesson plans advocated by the school. Therefore, there is no legal basis for the second-instance judgment that the applicant has no right to ask the respondent to return the attached lesson plan.
Three, the original judgment that the applicant does not own the copyright of the lesson plan is not only wrong, but also ultra vires, and should be corrected according to law.
This case is a real right dispute, and copyright belongs to the category of intellectual property. Property disputes and copyright disputes are completely different civil disputes. The court can only take the determined nature of the case and the facts advocated by the parties as the content of the trial, and should not go beyond this scope. This case is a real right dispute, but the original judgment talked about copyright protection, ignored the express provision of "works including written works" in the first paragraph of Article 3 of the Copyright Law of People's Republic of China (PRC), misinterpreted Articles 2 and 4 of the Regulations for the Implementation of the Copyright Law of People's Republic of China (PRC), and claimed that the lesson plan did not belong to the category of "works", with the intention of rejecting the appellant's claim. However, this reason of the original judgment has no factual, legal or logical connection with the result of the original judgment, and the viewpoint is wrong, which is beyond the scope of the trial.
Judging from the legal provisions of court-level jurisdiction, the intermediate people's court is the people's court of first instance for copyright disputes. If the case involves copyright issues, only the intermediate people's court has the right to make a judgment in the first instance. However, in the case of real right disputes, the court of first instance of this case talked about copyright, which obviously violated the principle of hierarchical jurisdiction stipulated by law and was illegal. Although the judgment of the second instance considers the focal plan as a "work", it is also wrong to say nothing about the reasons for the judgment that the applicant does not own the copyright of the plan and uphold the original judgment. Because the effective judgment has res judicata, the lesson plan identified in the original judgment does not belong to the category of "works", or the teacher does not own the copyright of the lesson plan, it will be fixed, which sets an insurmountable obstacle for the applicant to seek legal relief for the copyright ownership of the lesson plan. Therefore, the judgments of the first and second instance should be revoked.
To sum up, the applicant thinks that the first-instance judgment is wrong, and it is also wrong for the second-instance judgment to maintain the first-instance judgment. I sincerely hope that your court will uphold justice, lodge a protest in accordance with the law, request the court to revoke the first-instance judgment and the second-instance judgment in accordance with the law, and support the applicant's claim.
I am here to convey
Chongqing people's procuratorate no.1 branch
Apply for protest 6
Applicant: Liu Wanli, male,1born on August 2, 1963, Han nationality, now living at 22-2-30 1, District 1, Yuan Shuxiang, Zhuo Da, Shijiazhuang, Tel: * * *
Authorized Agent: Hou Heshu, lawyer of Hebei Tianjie Law Firm.
The applicant refuses to accept the civil judgment of Shijiazhuang Intermediate People's Court (20xx) Shi Famin Zhong Yizi No.00837, and now applies for protest.
Protest request
Request for cancellation of (20xx) civil judgment No.00837 of the Municipal Law People's First Final Word and the second and third judgments No.259 of (20xx) Yumin First Initial Word.
Facts and reasons