Although promoting the implementation of currency distribution is the focus of the Ministry of Construction every year, the actions of all localities always stop in hesitation. Five years later, the national monetary subsidies added up to tens of billions, and they got a medium-sized house with a meager salary. This used to be a well-off dream for workers in urban public-owned units.
The idea of reform even existed in the early 1980s. There are few ideological obstacles, so it is natural to privatize public housing. By the mid-1990s, the path of "monetization of housing distribution" was quite clear, and scholars later said that the housing system reform was a far-reaching property right reform of social distribution system.
Full of twists and turns, unforgettable 1998. The State Council ordered nationwide to stop housing distribution in kind and gradually implement monetization of housing distribution.
After the physical distribution of housing was stopped, the subsequent system design was to issue monetary subsidies for housing. Because for most low-income families in large and medium-sized cities with high housing prices, only by receiving housing subsidies can they afford to buy a house. Therefore, only by speeding up the implementation and distribution of housing subsidies can we further explore the people's market and maintain the sustained prosperity of the housing market. This is another key to realize the new system.
According to the design, there are three sources of monetary subsidies: one is the annual fixed housing construction fund of the unit; Second, the selling price of public houses by each unit; Third, the original unit raised housing funds by itself. In theory, raising subsidies should not be a problem.
At the national conference on real estate and housing reform in March, Liu Zhifeng, Vice Minister of Construction, further clarified the time for establishing the new system. He pointed out that all localities should strive to basically establish a monetization system for housing distribution suitable for local conditions in the first half of the year. This is a timetable for a quick victory. Xinhua News Agency reported at the time: "The monetization system of housing distribution is expected to be introduced in the first half of the year."
Plans are made very quickly in various places. Two months later, Liu Zhifeng, vice minister of the Ministry of Construction, announced that the reform had entered the stage of full implementation. At that time, 24 provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities directly under the Central Government issued housing reform plans, and 35 large and medium-sized cities will soon launch housing reform plans.
However, making a plan does not mean establishing a system, and implementing a plan is more complicated than making a plan. At the end of the second year, the Ministry of Construction held a national telephone conference on monetization of housing distribution, and the information revealed at the conference was not optimistic.
At that time, the monetization reform plan in a few areas had not yet been introduced, and some cities that had introduced the plan were still in the stage of pilot and formulating supporting policies, and the plan had not yet been fully implemented; Most provinces have just begun to guide the reform of housing distribution system in enterprises and institutions.
More importantly, the original policy of converting housing construction funds into housing subsidies has not been implemented, which makes it difficult to start the program, especially the monthly subsidy funds for new employees, and it is impossible to continue the reform.
Two years have passed, although the implementation of monetary distribution is the focus of the Ministry of Construction every year, but the actions of all localities have always stopped at hesitation. Except for some small-scale pilot projects, it is even difficult for some provinces and cities to make a decision on the plan.
In February, 2002, the National Conference on Housing and Real Estate, which opened in Shanghai, reported that according to the requirements of the Ministry of Construction, the monetization implementation plan of housing distribution, which is widely concerned by urban residents everywhere, is expected to be unveiled before the end of March of that year. However, this "plan" has not been followed since then.
Another year in a blink of an eye. At the beginning of April 2003, after the establishment of the new government, a large-scale survey was conducted on the progress of housing reform. Although the relevant leaders of the Ministry of Construction have repeatedly announced that China's new housing system has been basically established, what the reporter learned is that the housing reform cadres in various places generally reflect that since the State Council proposed to gradually implement the monetized housing distribution five years ago, most cities in China have not fully promoted the monetized housing distribution. "Basically, the whole country has not moved much." A local housing reform cadre who participated in the survey said.
It is understood that during the period of housing distribution in kind, the annual national housing construction funds will exceed 654.38+000 billion yuan. According to reason, after the housing distribution in kind stops, these funds should be directly converted into monetary subsidies.
In terms of figures, Jiangsu is the province with the largest amount of subsidies. In the past five years, a * * * has granted subsidies of 4 billion yuan. Followed by Guangdong, Zhejiang, Liaoning and other provinces, each with 3 billion yuan. In addition, Fujian, Anhui and other provinces each distributed about 654.38 billion yuan. In addition, subsidies in most provinces are only 200 million to 300 million.
Five years later, the state monetary subsidies add up to only tens of billions of yuan. Why on earth is this?
"I would rather have a house than a subsidy."
The carefully calculated monetary subsidy has formed a strong value contrast with the real housing. Some people who fail to meet the standards would rather have houses than subsidies, and some units, especially old state-owned enterprises, simply have no money to pay subsidies. As far as the whole country is concerned, the reasons for the long-standing monetization of housing distribution are very complicated. Relatively speaking, the situation in Beijing is more representative.
1999 During August and September, the implementation plans for the housing system reform of Beijing central and state organs and the housing reform of Beijing and the military system were successively issued. At that time, the person in charge of the Ministry of Construction believed that this had played a role in demonstrating and promoting the monetization of housing distribution throughout the country. The following year, Beijing rent subsidy monetization plan was initiated by the central government.
Unexpectedly, the first step in establishing a new system is particularly difficult.
When Beijing's relatively detailed plans were introduced, many departments repeatedly deliberated and discussed them. The controversy once focused on the purchase standard of new houses, which was related to the standard of subsidies in the future. The level of subsidy means the value of monetized housing allocation. Despite the monetization of housing distribution, on the issue of subsidies, all units still have to face the extreme imbalance in the distribution of social resources similar to the previous housing distribution in kind. "Some departments want to set a higher level, mostly government agencies and units. Considering that I can afford it, I want to pay more subsidies; Some departments also hope not to set uniform standards, especially enterprises, for fear that they will not be able to provide subsidies. " Relevant persons from the Ministry of Construction who directly participated in the planning told reporters.
According to the plan, public officials in Beijing who have no housing or whose housing is not up to standard can apply for housing subsidies when purchasing affordable housing, commercial housing and retired husband's housing. There are two kinds of employee housing subsidies. One is the benchmark subsidy, that is, before the employees stop the housing distribution in kind, they are compensated for their insufficient housing consumption. According to Beijing's regulations, employees can get a subsidy of 1 .265 yuan for every1square meter of housing; In addition, there is a monthly subsidy, that is, the component that increases housing consumption in the wages of employees after the physical housing distribution is stopped. Beijing stipulates that 66% of the standard salary will be paid.
The amount of subsidies is not fixed out of thin air. After repeated consideration, the Beijing joint program team finally selected several communities between the Third Ring Road and the Fourth Ring Road in Beijing and took the average price of affordable housing-4,000 yuan. The amount of subsidies for workers without housing and workers with substandard housing is also determined accordingly. At the same time, this price has also become the adjustment line of the secondary market price of public houses. This is a relatively compromised scheme after a complicated balance of interests.
Taking the benchmark subsidy as an example, the ratio of house price to income that a family can bear is about 4: 1, which is an internationally recognized reasonable standard. According to the average income of workers in Beijing from 65438 to 0996, a family can afford the price of 65438 to 0470 yuan per square meter of housing. The purchase standard of monetary subsidy is 4000 yuan per square meter, and each employee is calculated as husband and wife. The amount of subsidy is set at 2530 yuan, the difference between family affordability and house price. The so-called subsidy per person 1265 yuan.
With a monthly salary of 10 thousand, I was called by those people in British universities! !
The sales price of "old houses" continues the calculation method of standard price plus cost price in Beijing's reform in previous years, and is set at 1485 yuan per square meter. Starting from 200 1, the selling cost of public houses will increase to 1640 yuan.
Because the differential rent is not considered and the construction cost of different housing reform houses is not evaluated, the public houses sold by various units themselves contain the huge unfairness that exists when welfare is distributed. Those housing reform houses that occupy good lots by virtue of their innate advantages may have a price difference of six to eight times that of commercial houses in the same lots.
In fact, there is a strong value contrast between carefully calculated monetary subsidies and physical housing distribution. For example, as a department-level cadre, according to the "old house policy", A can buy a 60-square-meter house with a market price of more than 300,000 yuan for 60-70,000 yuan; According to the "new system for newcomers", B can only receive a subsidy of more than 70,000 yuan. In Beijing, where commodity prices are high, this money is obviously far from realizing the dream of housing.
By the same token, those who can't meet the housing standards would rather have a house than a subsidy. The reporter learned from the Housing Management Office of the State Council Municipal Bureau of Organs Affairs and the Beijing Housing Reform Office that the new system was generally resisted before leaving the office. "We are asking them for subsidies now, but no one wants to receive them." A housing reform cadre told reporters.
Faced with a large number of people who refuse to receive subsidies, the new system seems helpless. The farce of fighting for a house is often staged. These people obviously miss the real housing distribution.
The bigger problem lies in the enterprise. According to the reporter's understanding, among institutions, institutions and enterprises, the housing situation is the worst, and a considerable number of state-owned enterprises generally have no households and households with substandard housing. Most government agencies and institutions are clearly funded by the government, and the sources of funds are stable. After canceling welfare housing distribution, they can at least afford subsidies; As the barrier of unit ownership has not been broken, the stock is uneven and cannot be adjusted. For those state-owned enterprises that have made long-term contributions but are now suffering huge losses, the problem lies not in the amount of subsidies, but in where they come from.
Jingmian Group, located near the East Fourth Ring Road in Beijing, is a typical example. Most of the workers' residential areas in this cotton mill with a history of more than 40 years are tube-shaped buildings built in the 1950s. There is no heating in winter, and the per capita living area is less than 6 square meters. The long-term benefit of Jingmian Group is not good. According to the relevant person of the factory office, the rent was raised and subsidies were given a few years ago, but the rent was not raised and subsidies were not given. A considerable number of employees' families in the factory are still renting welfare houses at low prices.
Cheng Jianhua, the project office of Beijing Housing Reform Office, told the reporter that the funds allocated to the housing of state-owned enterprises come from the original housing funds and the current cost savings, and it is difficult to form a stable cash flow due to the operation of enterprises. What's more, except for a few monopoly industries such as telecommunications, petroleum and electric power, the benefits of enterprises are generally not good, and most of them have no money to pay subsidies. It is precisely because of this that the relevant departments in the State Council have not made rigid provisions on enterprise housing reform.
Organs, institutions and enterprises are all "state-owned" and have all made contributions to the country for many years. Things should not have been so different. This is a helpless and rather sad reality: since the housing reform plan has chosen a gradual road that touches less, while acknowledging the vested interests of some people, it is doomed to sacrifice the interests of others. However, this "other part" is not in the minority.
"Fine-tuning" of deformation
In Shanghai, an important reason why the monetization implementation plan of housing distribution originally planned to be implemented in 2002 did not appear as scheduled was that "some employees of enterprises asked for money immediately after hearing the news". Because of the entanglement of interests, it was only this year that Beijing issued housing subsidies to municipal organs and institutions.
At the beginning of the year, a message was quietly circulated in Beijing's housing reform system-municipal institutions and institutions will issue housing subsidies in the first half of the year. All the cadres concerned were told not to publicize. In fact, as early as mid-June 2002, some preliminary work had been carried out in an all-round way as planned, and the financial funds were already in place. However, even the beneficiaries of this policy rarely know about it, because this action is quite secret.
There is a simple reason. This subsidy is limited to government agencies and institutions with financial allocations. Not only the employees of state-owned enterprises are not among them, but also there are various interest differences among the beneficiaries. The relevant documents specifically pointed out: "The implementation of housing subsidies in administrative institutions in our city will inevitably have an impact on the employees of state-owned enterprises, especially in units with poor economic benefits that are difficult to implement housing subsidies, which may cause some employees to compare with others and cause ideological fluctuations."
Coincidentally. According to relevant sources of the Ministry of Construction, in Shanghai, an important reason why the monetization implementation plan of housing distribution originally planned to be implemented in 2002 was not "unveiled" as scheduled was that "employees of enterprises asked for money immediately after hearing the news".
A person from the Beijing Economic Commission told the reporter: "Most state-owned enterprises are in great difficulty now. We can't say that sending a paper on it will solve it. " In order to make the city's monetization distribution go smoothly, the Beijing Housing Reform Office has established such a working order: First, low-rent housing is implemented for the people with the lowest income and the most difficult housing; Secondly, take the monetization distribution as the leading factor to promote the housing reform of state-owned enterprises; Finally, start housing subsidies for civil servants and employees of public institutions.
By the end of 2002, Beijing Housing Reform Office had instructed 6 1 enterprises to implement the monetization reform of housing distribution and provided housing subsidies to more than 30,000 employees. Even so, the relevant people of the Housing Reform Office do not deny that this is far from the goal, and ultimately they dare not disclose the news that civil servants and employees of public institutions issue housing subsidies.
Cheng Jianhua, director of the Housing Reform Program Department of Beijing Housing Reform Office, believes that under the current monetary distribution system, the family burden standard is often much higher than the physical distribution; Moreover, institutions and enterprises have different sources of funds for monetizing housing distribution; In addition, because the monetization of housing distribution is not synchronized with the monetization reform of heating fees and property fees, units often give individuals a considerable number of hidden stickers.
In view of this, he believes that the monetization reform of housing distribution in China needs a long-term process. "Any idea that is divorced from reality and expects to be fully implemented by sending a document will not work in reality." He said.
According to the calculation, before the end of 1.998, Beijing only needs 1.874 million yuan to solve the housing subsidy for elderly workers without housing and workers with substandard housing. According to the amount of convertible funds in Beijing, it will take seven years to gradually solve it. This does not include enterprises. In a city with relatively abundant financial funds like Beijing, it takes such a long and gradual process to realize the monetization of housing distribution, which can be imagined in other places.
The reporter also learned from the housing reform departments of Nanjing, Jinan, Xi, Wuhan and other cities that the biggest obstacle to the smooth transition of the old and new systems is enterprise housing reform. Director Wang of Jinan Housing Reform Office told reporters that there are many problems in the local operation of monetized subsidies. The biggest difficulty is the housing subsidy of enterprises, especially those with poor efficiency. There is no good solution at present.
The director of the Housing Reform Division of the Housing Reform Bureau of Xi City also said that the local monetized housing distribution has not made much progress, mainly because the subsidy funds of enterprises cannot be implemented. "Places like research institutes and design institutes can still be guaranteed, but it is hard to say that the textile and military benefits are poor."
He told reporters that the housing prices in Xi are on the high side, and the people have great demand for ordinary houses. However, the total amount of local affordable housing is about 3 million square meters. In addition to self-built units, there is little supply in society. For the current situation, in addition to guiding qualified enterprises to issue housing subsidies, Xi 'an can only let unqualified enterprises raise funds in full to build houses. "We hope to solve the problem of homeless households and unqualified households in kind."
The thorny issue of gradual reform
After the physical distribution of housing stops, but the income does not increase and the price level does not decrease, then it is impossible to really stop the physical distribution. With the housing reform in quite a few areas, the commercial housing market has developed rapidly, and urban land prices have soared. The monetary subsidies generated by the complex balance of interests are also facing the test of housing prices.
The director of the Housing Reform Department of Xi Housing Reform Bureau reported that the local benchmark subsidy is 980 yuan per square meter, and the average price of commercial housing is as high as 3,000 yuan per square meter. Even if employees get subsidies, it is difficult to buy a suitable house. What's more, the amount of subsidy is calculated by two couples in a family. If only one person in a two-person family can receive subsidies, it is even more impossible to buy a house.
Cheng Jianhua, the project office of Beijing Housing Reform Office, also pointed out that after the physical distribution of housing is stopped, the income will not increase and the price level will not decrease, so it is impossible to really stop the physical distribution.
In this context, corresponding to the stop-and-go process of monetized housing distribution, quasi-welfare housing distribution has gradually emerged in various places. Some units and regions continue to build houses and purchase houses and sell them at lower prices. (See the article "Double Track Operation of Affordable Housing in Beijing" for details.)
There are roughly two situations. First, the regions and units that can't provide subsidies hope to solve the housing difficulties of employees by raising funds to build houses; The other is that some regions and units that can afford subsidies increase subsidies in disguised form in the same way. Although the person in charge of the Ministry of Construction severely accused some provinces and cities of building houses and buying houses on different occasions, and even organized an inspection team to investigate and deal with them, it was eventually dropped because of its wide coverage.
200 1 Beijing issued a document to solve the housing problem of employees in state-owned enterprises by organizing the renovation of dilapidated houses, encouraging the use of self-owned land to raise funds to build houses, providing discount loans for retired employees with housing difficulties in enterprises with difficulties, providing affordable housing, and raising funds for housing by cooperatives. These measures are unanimously regarded as an effective way to solve the difficulties of poor units at present.
In order to solve the employee's housing problem, Beijing Jingmian Group started the "rebuild housing reform" project. After nearly two years of planning, the project started in May this year and will be completed two years later. By then, employees only need to pay more than 2,000 yuan per square meter. But for such cheap and affordable housing, there are still many employees who say they can't afford it.
It is understood that the relevant departments are planning to adjust the housing subsidy policy, among which the prominent plan is to increase the housing subsidy for government officials.
/kloc-the housing reform stopped in the difficult adjustment of interest pattern in 0/3, but it was officially accelerated from 1998. This round of mainstream programs is still advancing gradually, and only a few provinces have chosen the comprehensive reform to the end of World War I..