1in June, 944, Alan Brooke, the chief of staff of the British army, proposed to Marshall, the chief of staff of the US army: mountbatten, commander of the Southeast Asian theater and general of the British army, could no longer continue to cooperate with Stilwell, the general of the US army, in this theater, and history must change. On the 29th, the War Department of the US General Staff made a decision: "Stilwell's meritorious service in fighting against Myitkyina can be awarded to the general to lead the China national army, let him leave the Southeast Asian war zone, satisfy the British people's desire to go to history, and enhance the effectiveness of China's military operations." ①
1 In July, Marshall asked Stilwell about the plan. On the 4th, Shi called back and said: If the President of the United States calls Chiang Kai-shek, Chiang Kai-shek "may be forced to assume this post", and he is confident to command all China troops, including China's. On July 6, Marshall drafted a telegram to Chiang Kai-shek, which was presented to Roosevelt on July 7 and signed by Luo. It said, "I intend to promote Stilwell to general. I suggest that the Iraqi army be placed under your direct jurisdiction to command all China and American troops, and please give them full power and responsibility." This was the beginning of the US seizing all the command of China's army at the end of the Anti-Japanese War. Although the US claimed that the move was aimed at saving China's anti-Japanese situation, the fundamental reason was that the US military wanted to find a decent way out for Stilwell, a "hero" who could not stand in the Southeast Asian war zone. ②
Although Jiang thought this sudden request of the United States was a great shame, he decided to accept it considering the overall situation of Sino-Japanese War's aid to the United States. However, it is difficult to establish a trust relationship between Chiang Kai-shek and Shi, so Chiang Kai-shek has repeatedly asked the US to sign a formal agreement with China to clarify Shi's specific rights and obligations as a constraint, which is the practice in the European battlefield. However, this request was rudely rejected. The matter was deadlocked, and Jiang finally chose to break with the United States and completely drive Stilwell away. The Sino-US relations fell to the bottom, which seriously affected the development of the post-war situation in China. ③
Mountbatten talks with Stilwell. 1944, the former is determined to drive the latter out of its own war zone.
Chiang Kai-shek finally chose to break up and called Roosevelt to elaborate on how Stilwell jeopardized the war of resistance.
Historians have come to a conclusion about Stilwell's historical merits and demerits in China War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression. Only Jiang 1944 10 10. On 9 October, there was a memo to Roosevelt complaining about Stilwell's damage to China's Anti-Japanese War. The draft of the memorandum has been revised several times, and all inaccurate and controversial facts have been deleted, so it is of great historical value, and its position also represents the basic evaluation of Stilwell by the National Government. Today, it is not difficult to see how deeply China was humiliated by his allies during the Anti-Japanese War. ... [Details]
The full text of the memorandum is as follows:
"China's military situation, President Roosevelt and the U.S. military department heard, all from general Stilwell's report. Therefore, the distrust of Stilwell and the suspicion of General Shi's point of view are beyond the understanding of President Roosevelt and the US military department. In short:
I agree with General Shi that Myanmar has great expectations for the fighting relationship in the international passage of China, but the enemy already has favorable terrain and communication lines, so I think if our army wants to have a strategic advantage, it must have amphibious attacks in southern Myanmar to contain the enemy's resistance. Yu Dieji warned General Shi: "The local war in northern Myanmar is not only costly but also dangerous." This intention was put forward to President Roosevelt at the Cairo Conference.
At the Cairo Conference, China, Britain and the United States reached an agreement on the strategy of attacking northern Myanmar and southern Myanmar. Unfortunately, this agreement was abandoned after leaving Cairo. Later, Stilwell came to visit and planned to continue the war in northern Myanmar with or without attack. Giving and warning of dangers and telling China that limited resources are lighter than throwing them away in today's crisis is not worth the candle. Stilwell didn't care about the warning. He said he had reservations. He gave Kai allies the suspicion that "China refused to contribute what it could" and had to hand over the American-equipped Indian "troops stationed in China" to them for use, but he clearly told them that this was all the troops he could use.
Soon, the early warning was fully realized. As soon as the war in Myanmar became difficult, Stilwell put all kinds of pressure on him to send more troops. At the beginning of May, during the war in northern China, all the equipment stored in was used up, and at the same time, the tonnage that should have been airlifted to China was occupied, which affected other munitions in China. It was not until June that the supply of 1 month was replenished.
As expected, when Japan invaded North Myanmar, it violently attacked Henan and Hunan provinces. Because of the war in northern Myanmar, the battlefield in China lacked the support of ordnance supplement and hump air transport, and the pressure was six times that of northern Myanmar. The victory in the corner of northern Myanmar is not enough to offset the losses in the eastern battlefield of China. However, Stilwell was indifferent to the eastern battlefield. In every local crisis, Stilwell controls it. After June, Stilwell came to Chongqing for business talks many times. Although he sent a little ammunition, the Japanese army still achieved military expectations!
During this period, except for the expeditionary force, China's army only got 60 mountain guns, 320 tank guns and 506 mortars.
In a word, Stilwell lost the eastern battlefield because of the capture of Myitkyina, and this responsibility cannot be shirked. However, in any case, Stilwell was appointed by me, so he should gain my trust first, and according to my observation, Stilwell can't bear this important and complicated responsibility.
President Luo called and said: "The situation in China has deteriorated to such a degree that the US government is unwilling to send officers to command China's army to take responsibility." This is beyond my understanding. First, no matter how the facts change, I should not shirk my responsibilities. I'm still responsible for Stilwell's mistake. He was appointed because he always believed that others would supervise and persuade him. Second, the war situation in China is not as sinister as President Romania predicted. According to the experience and measurement of the Japanese army in the past, although the battlefield in China was defeated, the war in China was not defeated. I am convinced that after Stilwell's recall, if President Roosevelt chooses another suitable person to succeed him, we will be able to cooperate and make effective contributions to the final victory. "... [Details]
Presidential envoy Hurley also concluded: Jiang seeks cooperation with Stilwell, and Stilwell seeks to yield to Jiang.
The day after Jiang's telegram was sent, that is,1October 10, 10, Stilwell called Marshall, claiming that as long as Washington continued to exert pressure, Jiang was likely to submit. In June of 5438+02, President's Special Envoy Hurley called Roosevelt and summarized the contradiction between Chiang Kai-shek and history according to his observation:
"The generalissimo is a man who can't accept oppression, and all methods of coercion and ultimatum can't be used for the generalissimo. Stilwell could not cooperate with Chiang Kai-shek politically. His words and deeds were based on oppression of Chiang Kai-shek ... Chiang Kai-shek sought to cooperate with Stilwell, and Stilwell sought to yield to Chiang Kai-shek. Stilwell's mistake was to succumb to a revolutionary who could lead a poorly equipped army to fight the Japanese for seven years. He thinks that if my president supports General Stilwell, he will lose Chiang Kai-shek and even China. After receiving this telegram, Roosevelt chose to give up supporting Stilwell to seize all the command of China's army. ⑤
During 1944, President Roosevelt's special envoys Hurley (second from right) and Stilwell (third from right) were in Chongqing.
Precautions:
① Liang Jingke: Stilwell Incident, Commercial Press, 1973, P25 1. (2) The United States has forced China to surrender all its military forces. 170.(3) Chiang Kai-shek seriously considers breaking diplomatic relations with the United States, Short HistoryNo. 17 1. ④ Major Events of President Jiang Volume IV, P 143- 147. (5) Hurley biography, P299—303. Quoted from Liang Jingke's Stilwell Incident, pp. 286-287.