As Mr. Fu Chengyu pointed out, the reform of state-owned enterprises has two levels: the reform of supervision and the reform of state-owned enterprises. The so-called reform at the regulatory level, that is, the reform of shareholder supervision mode, focuses on the preservation and appreciation of assets, and the extended system is to manage people and things. The stubborn disease is that government and enterprises are not divided, which is the goal of reform for many years.
State-owned enterprises are one of the main bodies of market economy, and they have the ability of self-management, self-financing, self-development and self-restraint. The core of state-owned enterprise reform is to reform all enterprise management mechanisms that hinder development, including decision-making mechanism, operating mechanism, innovation mechanism, employment mechanism and incentive mechanism. These mechanisms are indispensable to jointly create the production capacity of enterprises. Due to the different resource endowments and development conditions of enterprises, these mechanisms also have long and short board problems in different periods. Shortcomings will lead to inefficient operation of the mechanism, so to reform these shortcomings, only enterprises themselves are most familiar with these shortcomings.
Therefore, the construction and optimization of state-owned enterprise management mechanism is more comprehensive and complicated than the reform of state-owned assets supervision mode. The reform from the shareholder level is only one of the important aspects, and it cannot replace the reform of the enterprise's own management mechanism. From the reform goal, property right reform is to create a more relaxed environment and governance structure for enterprise reform, and enterprise mechanism reform is an important content to build core competitiveness. For example, the enterprise's product technology can not be innovated, the business process is not standardized and unreasonable, the market network channels are not fully covered, and the customer's sales and services are insufficient, which may affect the formation of core competitiveness. These are not things that can be replaced only through property rights reform.
For some state-owned enterprises in fully competitive industries, it is urgent to reform their management mechanism, especially the innovation mechanism of products and services, which is an important key to affect their core competitiveness, and the success of innovation often depends on the investment intensity of enterprises and the market promotion of incentive mechanisms.
In a sense, the reform of state-owned assets supervision mode should highly respect and understand the reform of state-owned enterprises, understand the differences of each state-owned enterprise reform, and let state-owned enterprises formulate mechanism reform plans according to their own advantages and disadvantages in market competition, and bear the responsibility for the success or failure of the reform themselves.
Overlapping bedstead houses for corporate internal governance.
In the eyes of investors, a modern and standardized corporate governance structure is an important content for enterprises to establish a modern enterprise system and an important milestone for the success of enterprise restructuring.
The author believes that corporate governance structure is the legal framework of the relationship between investors and business operators. From the enterprise's point of view, this structure is mainly established at the group headquarters level, with shares, directors, supervisors, party, workers, league and managers performing their respective duties, but the construction of corporate governance structure at the headquarters level has not really solved some substantive problems of corporate governance.
For example, in the process of joint-stock reform, some state-owned enterprises can't go public as a whole, and usually a two-tier management structure will be formed in which the corporate governance structure of the group parent company and listed subsidiaries coexist. There are different understandings and practices about the so-called mother-child relationship or brotherly relationship between them, which bring different results.
Formally speaking, the group headquarters, as the investor, exercises the power of the major shareholder, but in fact, the group headquarters is the actual operator of the listed company and undertakes the management of the listed company. From the institutional point of view, there are supply and marketing, personnel, property and other institutions in the group headquarters, and listed companies also have a set of supply and marketing, personnel, property management institutions stipulated in the Company Law, which actually leads to overlapping rights and responsibilities. The two headquarters have the same management responsibilities, many people, long reporting lines and low management efficiency.
Some group headquarters also try to distinguish the relationship between the two headquarters through different positioning. For example, the group headquarters is the decision-making center, strategic control center and investment center, and the headquarters of listed companies is the operating entity and operation center, or the chairman of the group is also the chairman of listed companies. However, in practice, the responsibilities of the two headquarters are unclear and check and balance each other. In particular, the centralization of the group headquarters as the funder has seriously affected the operational efficiency of listed companies.
This phenomenon once caused the theoretical circle to discuss whether the group headquarters and listed subsidiaries are mother-child relations or brotherly relations. The father-son relationship means that it is reasonable for the group headquarters to undertake the operation and management of listed subsidiaries, and the group headquarters is the decision-making center, and the corporate governance system of listed subsidiaries is virtual and real. However, in the eyes of other shareholders of listed companies, the parent company of the group has the right but not the responsibility, and the listed company has the responsibility but not the right. Such a company is counterfeiting and deceiving other investors. If it is a brotherly relationship, that is, the corporate governance structure of listed subsidiaries is true, and the group headquarters can only play the role of investor, without establishing a standardized corporate governance structure. Such a positioning will also cause the identity of the investor of the group headquarters and the state-owned assets supervision department to be repeated, which is obviously redundant.
The level of the group headquarters cannot be simply abolished, mainly because the group has listed companies, as well as some non-listed companies, assets and personnel. To solve some problems left over from history, it needs an organization to undertake management. One way of thinking is that the state-owned assets supervision department can merge similar projects among state-owned enterprises, or set up asset management companies to take over these companies to help listed companies go into battle lightly.
Construction of market selection mechanism for managers of state-owned enterprises
At present, the sources of state-owned enterprise operators are mainly two aspects: one is the party and government system, and the other is the personnel of state-owned enterprises. In terms of quantity ratio, the proportion of internal personnel in state-owned enterprises is larger. Systematically, senior executives of central enterprises are divided into two types: the management of the Central Organization Department and the management of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission. SASAC also made detailed regulations on the selection mechanism, qualifications, term of office, performance evaluation and reward of enterprise executives, and there are rules to follow. The problem is that state-owned enterprises never lack senior managers, but real entrepreneurs, more precisely, the institutional environment for cultivating entrepreneurs.
State-owned assets supervision institutions have been trying to recruit some state-owned enterprise operators in the market, which is a correct direction. The problem is that in the construction of enterprise senior management team, the proportion of operators recruited through the market is still very small, and outsiders are easily assimilated by the current system and culture. In addition, it is difficult for post income to be in line with international enterprises of the same type and scale, and equal pay for equal work is different. Incentives can't be rewarded by capitalization such as shares and dividends, which also limits some global talents from entering the senior management team.
According to the requirements of market economy, it is a great challenge to establish a complete mechanism for selecting, managing, rewarding and punishing enterprise managers.
State-owned enterprise employees lack institutional identity
Theoretically, state-owned enterprises are regarded as the realization form of ownership by the whole people, the ownership of state-owned assets belongs to the whole people, and the employees of state-owned enterprises are regarded as on-site owners and have the rights and obligations to participate in enterprise management. With the emergence and development of other economic forms in society, state-owned assets have evolved into state ownership and management. In addition to private means of production, operators and workers in the form of non-public economy also theoretically own part of the rights and interests of state-owned assets.
In theory, employees of state-owned enterprises have all the rights and interests of complete state-owned assets, but with the restructuring of enterprises, employees' identity as site owners has also been lost, and signing labor contracts with state-owned enterprises has become an employment relationship. Although in this process, some state-owned enterprises have completed this transformation through economic compensation, and some state-owned enterprises have completed this transformation through continued employment, but they have not faced this problem squarely in policy.
At present, the right of employees to participate in enterprise management is mainly exercised through trade unions. Employees strive for some welfare benefits around protecting their labor rights and interests. The so-called full participation in enterprise decision-making and management has become a desire and form.
In state-owned enterprises, apart from the salary, bonus and welfare system, one of the ways to mobilize employees' enthusiasm is mostly explained as creating a so-called corporate culture, which can eliminate employees' employment mentality, make employees willing to grow up with the enterprise, and make up for the adverse impact of management failure on employees' enthusiasm. In fact, these practices are similar to those of private enterprises. In state-owned enterprises, the enterprise management team is dominant, and it is not easy for employees to participate in decision-making and management.
Holding shares within employees is conducive to binding the long-term interests of enterprises and employees, so that employees have the enthusiasm to care about the development of enterprises and do their jobs well. You can also express some opinions of employees on enterprise management through internal forms such as shareholders' meeting. However, in practice, some employees are unwilling to hold shares as minority shareholders because of the general benefits of their enterprises or poor market prospects, lack of confidence in the ability of current operators, and the unlisted state-owned enterprises. In addition, if employees are not allowed to buy market value stocks at a discount in the scheme design, some employees are unwilling to buy equivalent stocks in cash, and feel that it is better to choose other social financial management methods. However, if the stock is discounted, the state-owned assets supervision department will question the loss of state-owned assets, which is difficult to grasp in practice.