The main disadvantage of running money into the department

On the afternoons of March 12 and 10, Liu Xirong, member of the National People's Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC), deputy director of NPC Law Committee and former deputy secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, said at the plenary meeting of the Zhejiang delegation to consider the National People's Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC)'s work report that the financial expenditure was very random and all localities were "running away", which brought great pressure to the anti-corruption work. There are four problems: first, the integrity is not enough; Second, the authenticity is not enough, and the data of central statistics are very different from those of local statistics. Third, it is not scientific enough. Many decisions are patted on the head. Children who cry have milk to eat, and their annual income is 10 trillion. How to distribute it is unscientific and opaque. Scientific Outlook on Development, the first thing should be scientific distribution. Fourth, it is arbitrary, financial discipline is not serious, and transfer payments account for a large proportion of central fiscal expenditure. Everywhere is "running for money", and the vicinity of the Ministry of Finance is overcrowded, which brings great pressure to the anti-corruption work. When Beijing's offices are gone, politics will be clear.

It is an indisputable fact that the Beijing Office has become a high-incidence area of corruption. In some major corruption cases that shocked the whole country, the name of the person in charge of the Beijing Office appeared from time to time-the case of Li Zhen, former director of the State Taxation Bureau of Hebei Province, and Wang, former director of the Beijing Office of the Hebei Provincial Government, was sentenced to life imprisonment for committing corruption, misappropriation of public funds and bribery; In the case, the deputy director of the Beijing Office of the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region Government was investigated for accepting bribes; Cui Li, director of the Beijing Office of Shenyang, was sentenced for accepting bribes and misappropriating public funds in the "Horse-herding Case" in Shenyang.

The embarrassing situation of "running the department to earn money" is naturally due to the inherent deficiency of the "self-supervision" system, the weak legal concept of department leaders, and the ineffective investigation and punishment of these behaviors by organizations, but the most fundamental reason is the so-called "running the department to earn money" caused by the "departmental interests" formed over the years.

Indeed, comrades who have worked in local governments know that for the rapid development of their own regions and departments, people often "pay tribute" to superior departments and leaders regularly or irregularly. This is true for projects, funds and policies from local to central ministries and commissions, as well as for cities and counties to handle affairs in the province. This has become a hidden rule. The ways of "paying tribute" can be described as varied and complete, and the level of "paying tribute" is also constantly improving. This method of "running part of the money" is not only effective, but also the quantity and quality of "tribute" are often directly proportional to "income".

In order to win more "support" from superiors, lower-level localities and departments will naturally raise "tribute" funds through various means and methods. Some come from enterprises, and it can be said that wool is on sheep; Some must be financed by local governments and government departments from their own funds. In this way, it is not surprising that the above-mentioned 15 government departments were "completely annihilated" in the audit.

The purpose of "paying tribute" from the lower level to the higher level can be justified under the banner of accelerating local development, which is reasonable and impressive. But its essence is upward "rent-seeking" or downward "rent-seeking". To put it bluntly, it is actually corrupt wholesale and retail. Moreover, this kind of corruption can often be effectively protected by local governments, because no one dares to look up and does not want to leave a bad reputation in this place. Therefore, "running money into the department" has intensified.

In fact, this kind of behavior of "running money into the department" is the biggest behavior that undermines economic construction or economic order. This is harmful to both the country and the individual. If this behavior is allowed to develop, the ruling position of the * * * production party will not last long, and the goal of building a harmonious socialist society proposed by the new CPC Central Committee will not be realized. Honest people have long dared to be angry and dare not speak.

It is a good thing to pierce enough paper and tell the people what you have been holding in your heart. Because it won't break or stand. The problem is "broken", how to "stand"? Because it is impossible to achieve this "establishment" by only one person or only one audit institution. Repeated trials and repeated offenses are obvious examples. Reduce the power of those units or individuals who have the right to do nothing or less, and add it to those who are willing to do things. This is one aspect of the problem, and the other aspect of the problem is focusing on our system construction, how to really implement or further modify the budget law in accordance with the provisions of the budget law and activate a large number of doers.

Why is there no system to regulate "running money into the department"? I often hear about so-and-so, and how much money does so-and-so go up for. Think from the perspective of ordinary people, is money won? Whose money and power have no plans and arrangements? Did you fight for it? Money belongs to the state, so the so-called "Ministry" in charge of money above (the Ministry should have most small bureaus, from provinces to cities and counties) should analyze and investigate the situation of different departments and regions below, who to give and how much to give. Now we advocate the sunshine operation of power, and the allocated funds should be discussed collectively, verified and calculated, and distributed according to regulations. No one should fight for it, otherwise there will be no rules.

The local government takes Shanghai as its income plan. Winning funds is a kind of ability and skill, and the government will reward it. This gives some people who are striving for funds a misleading idea: it is better to develop the economy than to run more, and money comes quickly and easily.

Who gave the power? Do crying children really have milk to eat? In the survey, it was found that many people went there to fight for funds, some by returning some funds, some by the personal relationship between the people fighting for funds and a leader of the Ministry above, some by persistent perseverance, and so on. In this way, the country's money flows downwards through this abnormal relationship. Of course, it is undeniable that money has saved the following emergency, but it is doubtful whether it is fair and whether there are units that need money more. I think this will inevitably lead to "acquaintances eat more oil", or that people with more contacts will strive for more funds, and they will not get a penny without contacts. At the same time, there is another situation: if I can win100000, it is worthwhile for me to spend 80000. Then, let's think about it further. Where did the 80,000 go? A discerning person can see it clearly at a glance, without explanation.

There are also some "ministries" that allocate funds below and then return them to the "ministries" above. It doesn't have to be put into personal pockets, but it may be put into the unit's small treasury for distributing benefits or giving it to the main leaders for reception. When investigating cases or conducting research in rural areas, we found that many townships and departments ran up at the end of the year, fighting for hundreds of thousands at most and tens of thousands at least, but only a few townships and departments actually implemented them. Why? First, when fighting for funds, we should spend a considerable amount of money to wait on the people in charge of money above, ask them to relax and give them gifts, and only a little of them really go to the village. Second, some of the "ministries" above did not give much money to the following, but why did the village account have this money? After repeated questioning, the village cadres mysteriously said: You can't bother me, they only gave me a little, and all you saw was "stickers". What is "posting"? When asked, it turned out that it was the "Ministry" above that delegated the money to the village below or the counterpart department, and the "Ministry" above spent it. If this "department" spends so much money on entertainment, its face will be ugly and it will fail the year-end assessment. However, it does not rule out that there are illegal acts. Even if there are few illegal acts, it is a prone and high-incidence place for corruption, which cannot but arouse people's vigilance.

In short, from the above situation, the state funds are constantly "lacking" in the process of flowing up and down. It's hard for companies to get funds from above: they don't have that much money, but there is indeed that much in their accounts. After checking the account, it shows that I am sorry for some leaders of the "Ministry" above. Will I give money next time? I don't know. I'm sorry. I may be disciplined. If the "Ministry" in charge of the money bag above can allocate funds according to the actual situation, instead of relying on personal likes and dislikes and personal relationships to put an end to the so-called "running the money into the department" and realize the sunshine operation of allocating funds, then departments and units that really need funds will definitely get timely rain and disaster relief funds, and corruption loopholes will also be eliminated, and the social atmosphere will certainly be greatly clear.