1. Ask questions
In recent years, theoretical workers in the field of construction economy have made beneficial explorations from different angles around the problems existing in the transformation process of construction industry. Jin et al. (1999) put forward the restructuring plan of the construction industry and its enterprises with the production and operation process reengineering as the core and related policy suggestions. Zhang Yuanlin and others (1999) regard assets and asset ownership as the focus of the reform of state-owned construction enterprises, and demonstrate the feasibility of applying asset securitization in the reform of state-owned construction enterprises. Starting from the dilemma faced by the reform of state-owned construction enterprises, that is, the contradiction between the improvement of labor productivity and the decline of profit level, this paper studies the improvement of incentive mechanism of state-owned construction enterprises from the perspective of game theory and information economics, and puts forward some suggestions. (refer to the Chinese website of architecture)
Twenty years' reform has brought great changes to state-owned construction enterprises. Although there is still a big gap between the absolute level of labor productivity of state-owned construction enterprises in China and the construction industry in developed countries and the domestic power, electronics, chemical and other industries, the relative improvement of labor productivity can still reflect the effectiveness of the reform to a great extent. In recent years, the labor productivity of state-owned construction enterprises has been on the rise, with an increase of 2. Seven times, from 8772 yuan/person-year in 1992 to 3254 yuan/person-year in 1997. However, because some deep-seated contradictions have not been fundamentally solved, most state-owned construction enterprises are still in trouble. In recent years, the profit level of state-owned construction enterprises has shown a downward trend. Especially since 1993, the loss of state-owned construction enterprises has been expanding, with the loss of 1997 exceeding 30% and the profit rate hovering around 1.3%.
The fact that the improvement of labor productivity and the decline of profit level coexist shows the dual effects of reform. On the one hand, decentralization and separation of powers have indeed injected vitality into state-owned construction enterprises and brought about efficiency improvement. On the other hand, the decline of profit rate and the expansion of enterprise losses expose deep-seated contradictions such as imperfect market environment, disharmony between government behavior and enterprise managers' behavior.
Since 1980s, game theory has rapidly become an important part of mainstream economics. As an application of game theory, information economics has made great progress in recent years. Game theory holds that personal utility function depends not only on one's own choice, but also on the choice of others. Because of the contradiction between individual rationality and collective rationality, Nash equilibrium does not necessarily lead to Pareto dominance, that is, the individual rational behavior of rational people may lead to collective irrationality. This challenges the basic proposition of neoclassical economics that the behavior of maximizing personal utility will inevitably lead to the optimal social welfare. Traditional economics overemphasizes the role of price in resource allocation and thinks that price can make individual rationality and collective rationality consistent. Information economics emphasizes the influence of information asymmetry on personal choice and institutional arrangement, and attaches importance to information cost and transaction cost in economy.
The reform process can be regarded as a complex game process involving multiple subjects, which is determined by the whole social and economic foundation and interest pattern. The effect of each reform measure ultimately depends on the mutual game of relevant parties, not the subjective will of decision makers. As the saying goes, "there are policies at the top and countermeasures at the bottom." In formulating the above policies, the following countermeasures must be considered, and policies that do not consider the following countermeasures are not feasible. The principal-agent model in information economics helps to deepen the understanding of institutional arrangements, and also provides new ideas and methods for studying and solving the reform problems of state-owned construction enterprises.
2. Analysis of the principal-agent relationship between the state and business operators.
Principal-agent theory studies the incentive problem under asymmetric information. In the principal-agent model, the principal can't observe what action the agent chooses, but can only observe the incomplete information of the agent's action, that is, the variables determined by the agent's action and other exogenous random factors. The principal's problem is to choose a mechanism, that is, to design a game rule to motivate the agent to choose the most beneficial action for the principal. In other words, the principal should choose an incentive contract to maximize its expected utility function under the premise of satisfying the agent's personal rational constraints and incentive compatibility constraints.
Sufficient statistics's concept is very important for the design of the optimal incentive contract, which can be used to determine which observed variables should enter the incentive contract. The significance of full statistics is that it can significantly reduce the amount of data without destroying the information contained in the sample. It is impossible and unnecessary for the principal to know all the information of the agent. He only needs to know the limited necessary information to supervise the agent's behavior. The necessary information is sufficient statistics, which can also be called sufficient information. Figure 1 shows the relationship between the country (the principal), the agent of the enterprise operator), the business environment of the enterprise (virtual participants refer to the mechanism that determines the probability distribution of exogenous random variables, also known as "nature"), adequate information and information cost. Generally speaking, the fiercer the market competition, the fewer variables required in sufficient information, and the lower the information cost, the simpler and more effective the state's supervision of enterprise operators. In developed countries with mature markets, the profit level of enterprises can be used as a sufficient information index to measure the business performance of enterprises. However, under the planned economy system, because the cost of state supervision of enterprise operation is too high, depriving enterprises of their autonomy in operation has become a logical second-best choice. Although after 20 years of reform, the operating mechanism of state-owned construction enterprises has not fundamentally changed, and they still face a series of unequal competition conditions:
Distorted price system. The price of construction products is artificially controlled below the market equilibrium level. After deducting 3% technical equipment fees, the profit rate of the construction industry is only 4%. This profit rate, which is far below the social average, can neither reflect the relationship between supply and demand in the market nor reflect the operating performance of construction enterprises.
A heavy social burden. State-owned construction enterprises should not only undertake additional social functions such as social welfare, social security and social management, but also pay a large number of retirement funds for retirees. In some enterprises, the ratio of active employees to retired employees has reached 1: 1.
Serious redundancy. Enterprise organizations with permanent workers as the main body can neither adapt to the characteristics of the construction industry nor meet the needs of market competition. Some state-owned construction enterprises have more than 3% surplus staff. These factors not only make state-owned construction enterprises
Industry is at a disadvantage in market competition, which also provides an excuse for business operators to bargain with the state. The complex enterprise environment leads to the increase of exogenous variables in sufficient information, which in turn increases the information cost of state-supervised enterprises.
3. Improvement of the incentive mechanism of state-owned construction enterprises
The reform practice of more than 20 years shows that the fundamental problem of the reform of state-owned construction enterprises is not specific difficulties, nor is it the direct cause of these specific difficulties. To solve the deep-seated problems in the reform of state-owned construction enterprises, we should start with the special relationship between the state and enterprises, that is, the principal-agent relationship, and improve and perfect the incentive mechanism of state-owned construction enterprises. The effectiveness of incentive mechanism depends on the level of information cost and the structure of sufficient information, and ultimately depends on the business environment of the enterprise. Therefore, we must create a fully competitive construction market environment, reduce the interference of exogenous random factors, and reduce the cost of state supervision of enterprises.
According to the principle of unity, openness and competition, improve the operation mechanism of the construction market. At present, rent-seeking is prevalent, corruption is serious, and vicious accidents continue in some places, indicating that a market without competition may be more terrible than no market. A perfect construction market should include:
(1) The construction product market and factor market without industrial barriers and regional blockade. Competition mechanism should be introduced into all entrusted links of construction and production.
(2) A fully competitive manager market. Managers should be free to flow, and the salary level should be determined by the market. At present, a considerable number of managers in construction enterprises are overpaid, which is a manifestation of the imperfect manager market.
(3) For joint-stock enterprises, a fully competitive stock market is also necessary. The stock price should mainly depend on the expected income of enterprise operation, that is, the dividend level.
Reducing the burden of unequal competition in state-owned construction enterprises is a necessary condition for hardening the budget constraints of enterprises. This work mainly includes:
(1) The medical and old-age security system has gradually changed from the original model of low wages and large benefits to the model of "individual account plus social pooling".
(2) Accelerate the reform of housing system and actively promote the process of housing commercialization and socialization.
(3) Solve the problem of policy redundancy. On the one hand, it is necessary to realize the separation of service layer and management layer through enterprise restructuring; On the other hand, we should speed up the establishment and improvement of the social unemployment insurance system.
According to the principle of "controlling quantity, guiding price and competition fee", we will speed up the reform of construction project cost system, so that the price of construction products will become the correct signal reflecting the relationship between product value and supply and demand in the construction market. Rationalize the relationship between price and cost on the basis of reasonably formulating the composition of project cost; Reform the valuation basis with reference to international practice and implement the separation of quantity and price; Timely release price information and project cost index, and dynamically adjust the project cost. Construction enterprises should gradually establish an internal cost estimation quota system to meet the needs of market competition.
Reform the construction project management system with legal person responsibility system, bidding system, project supervision system and contract management system as the core. As the third institutional variable besides government and market, intermediary organizations have comparative advantages in incentive mechanism and information feedback, and should give full play to the role of engineering consulting units with professionals as the mainstay. The implementation of construction supervision system can not only ensure the realization of investment, progress and quality objectives of construction projects, but also have great significance to the structural changes of the construction market.
With reference to international practice, establish and improve the system of construction laws, regulations and technical standards to ensure the healthy and orderly operation and development of the construction market. Correct and predictable legal rules can greatly reduce transaction disputes and information costs. At present, although China's building laws and regulations system has begun to take shape, it lacks systematic research in theory and lags behind the development of the construction industry itself in practice. Some terms are of poor quality, which is neither in line with the reality of China's construction market nor with international practice. It is an urgent problem to establish and improve the laws and regulations on engineering quality and safety production. 、
4. Conclusion
Under any institutional conditions, any principal-agent relationship has problems such as incompatible incentives, unequal responsibilities and asymmetric information. The inconsistency of utility function between the state and the operators of state-owned construction enterprises will inevitably lead to the incompatibility of incentives, and the responsibility of the two for the operating consequences is not equal, which makes the operators prone to opportunistic behavior. Information asymmetry makes operators confuse the cost structure, conceal the profit level and intercept the surplus output of enterprises, thus infringing on the owners' rights and interests. In a mature market economy, it is usually possible to create more effective institutional arrangements to solve the principal-agent problem. If the cost of the owner supervising the operator is too high, it is inevitable that the operator will infringe on the owner's rights and interests.
The suggestions put forward in this paper involve many problems such as market, price, legal system, construction project management system, social security, etc. It also shows that the problems of state-owned enterprises are the concentrated expression of the problems of the whole economic system, and the reform of state-owned construction enterprises is an arduous long-term work. The practice of reform has proved that it is not enough to rely only on the limited policy adjustment with the main content of "decentralization and profit-making". Privatization of state-owned enterprises will only lead to a large loss of state-owned assets. Stiglitz, the chief economist of the World Bank, described the view that economic efficiency can only be guaranteed by correctly defining property rights as "the myth of property rights". He believes that "the decomposition of property rights is obviously insufficient or even unnecessary for the success of reform in transitional countries". The fundamental problem of state-owned construction enterprises lies in the principal-agent relationship between the state and enterprises. The core of perfecting the incentive mechanism of state-owned construction enterprises should be to create a fully competitive construction market environment, and then create sufficient information at low cost.
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