The legitimacy of the supervision unit's right to project management comes from the entrustment of the construction unit and the transfer and grant of rights, that is, the principal-agent relationship. In the construction management of some professional ministries and commissions, at present, the legitimacy of many construction units to obtain this right often comes from the multi-agency relationship of non-economic nature such as administration or politics, and they only bear administrative responsibility for project construction. The so-called administrative responsibility, specifically, is to be responsible for the progress of the project first and for the quality and construction safety accidents that cannot happen immediately. Basically do not have to bear, or bear less economic responsibility. Accurately speaking, it should be called: the organizer, that is, the "sponsor", is also the person who presides over some specific affairs of project construction management. This has created a problem: the irresponsible client-the construction unit, has produced the same irresponsible agent-the supervision unit! No matter the historical experience and lessons, the actual industry situation, the unfathomable principal-agent theory, or the practical activities of project construction management, there is no reason and evidence that the agent will bear the responsibility on the premise that the client does not bear or bears less economic responsibility, whether it is the construction unit or the supervision unit.
The current institutional arrangement does not meet the compatible conditions of rational incentives or rational constraints. At the micro level, it is not excluded that the responsibility of the engineering supervision unit of specific projects or specific parts is greater; On the macro and meso level, the supervision unit, as the agent entrusted by the construction unit, has insufficient responsibility for investment control except for factors beyond its control. Specifically, it is not responsible enough for the investment control that may be increased due to unforeseen factors or imperfect design in the construction site, which is quite different from the original intention of implementing the supervision system. The reason is that the client is not responsible enough, and it is not that the client is not responsible enough, but that the client is entrusted.
In fact, the requirements of the construction unit for the construction supervision unit to control the investment are relatively low, which is closely related to the reluctance of the construction unit to give up the vested interests and the economic boundary constraints it faces. The requirements of the construction unit for the supervision unit are relatively low, and the "requirements" of the construction unit for the supervision unit are not low. Under this basic strategic situation, according to the author's observation for many years, supervisors often have the following problems when dealing with engineering changes: 1, irresponsible signing; 2. A signature without independent judgment is neither recognized nor rejected. Both are concrete manifestations of irresponsibility.
Second, obtain the non-market competitive nature of supervision business.
In the engineering construction management of some professional ministries and commissions, the independence and autonomy of supervision are bound, hijacked and kidnapped under the constraint of administrative logic and "supervision with the same body", but supervision units also enjoy the protection with the same body. Due to departmental barriers, supervision units outside the same subject can't get their hands on project management within the same subject, so * * * can compete for supervision business within the same subject. To make an inappropriate analogy, * * * is the father and the supervision unit is the son. Although the father improperly exercised "patriarchy" over his son and rudely interfered with his son's freedom of marriage, he did his duty as a father and showed "fatherly love" to a certain extent. Under the "paternalistic" care, the father buys, decorates and arranges a new house for his son and assumes the responsibility for his son and grandson. The former inhibits the exertion of supervision power; The latter alleviates the pressure on the survival of supervision units, which naturally includes the pressure of investment control and whether the quality level of engineering changes will be lost. The training textbook for supervision engineers says: "Generally speaking, it is easy for supervision units to safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of owners, but it is more difficult to safeguard the interests of contractors. The root cause is that I am afraid that others will say that I have betrayed the interests of the owners, and I am afraid that it will affect my undertaking supervision business. " People who write textbooks are either dogmatic, unfamiliar with the current situation of the industry, or limited by the discourse space. The current supervision unit is just the opposite. In this sense, the vast number of supervision units and their employees are both victims, needless to say, but also vested interests.
Third, the cost of supervision is low, and the scope and scale of supervision projects are growing.
The engineering characteristics of a professional department are "many points, long lines and wide areas", and the traffic and communication are inconvenient. Engineering supervision fee is 0.4%~2.0% of Jian 'an cost (excluding pre-project cost), mostly between 0.6%~ 1.4%, which is often too low regardless of project characteristics. A professional ministry stipulates that all new projects and renovation projects with investments ranging from several billion yuan to tens of thousands of yuan must be supervised. It is no exaggeration to say that this not only affects the long-term strategic problems such as the difficulty in attracting high-quality talents in the construction supervision industry and the lack of sustainable development ability of supervision units, but also damages the image, prestige and status of supervision from the current operational level. The main reason is that the number of existing supervisors is limited, far from covering the projects above the prescribed standards, and the supervision work is naturally not in place. In addition, the level and echelon of supervisors are not clear enough. According to the requirements of the specification, the supervisors of project supervision institutions should be divided into three levels: director, professional supervision engineer and supervisor. If necessary, we should increase the level of director representation, often three-in-one or four-in-one. Even conversely, "one" gives birth to two, three, and how "one" gives birth to two, three and even everything and its harm will be discussed in another article. The level and echelon of supervisors are not enough, which also means that supervision is not in place. Inadequate supervision leads to information asymmetry, which is contrary to the original intention of implementing the supervision system, at least not fully realized, and the actual consequence is the loss of state-owned investment capital.
Fourthly, the non-uniqueness of information sources for implementing engineering changes.
Article 6.2.3 of the Code for Construction Engineering Supervision (GB503 19-2000) stipulates: "The contractor shall not implement the engineering change before the chief supervision engineer issues the engineering change order." That is to say, compared with the construction unit, only the director is the only source of information for implementing engineering changes and how to change them. In the game pattern of project construction management of some professional ministries, the performance of contracts and specifications is extremely serious. * * * and relevant functional departments in the organization can, can and often instruct-often verbally-the construction unit to implement engineering changes. In many cases, the construction unit can, can, will or have to implement engineering changes without the approval of the supervisor, but in the end, the supervisor can sign a positive opinion in writing and affix the official seal. In this regard, the supervision unit has to passively adapt. That is to say, not only the director has the power to instruct the implementation of engineering changes, but also the relevant functional departments in the body, including the construction unit, have the power, even more, without notice or supervision, which has little impact on the construction party and the construction party. This not only affects the image, prestige and status of the supervisor, but also means that the work of the supervisor is unfair compared with that of the supervised.
The provisions of the code are reasonable. Power is information, and tangible and intangible contracts such as systems, laws, regulations, norms, rules and contracts between the parties are the transmission channels of power information. As long as the power information for implementing the engineering change is not the only information source from the supervision, it theoretically means that the transmission channel of the power (right) information of the supervision unit is cut off by other power information, which will increase the information cost of the supervision unit, and the more extreme case is concealed engineering. In this way, the loss of state-owned investment funds is obvious.
Fifth, the self-discipline of the construction supervision industry is poor, and the self-discipline mechanism and restraint mechanism are basically absent.
Trade association is the flag, symbol and representative of the industry. At present, the situation of trade associations is rather embarrassing. On the one hand, it can't get rid of the status of "two governments". On the other hand, it is not binding, appealing, cohesive and attractive to the vast number of business units and employees, and the latter is fatal. Judging from the historical origin, realistic existence and specific functions of trade associations in developed countries, the only reason for the existence of trade associations is the spontaneous requirements of the majority of business units and employees. The trade association in China is very special. It is a "gift" given to the latter by the government. Compared with the government, it is difficult to fully represent the overall interests of the industry and reflect the voice, and it is impossible to exert its due influence on the government's administrative decision-making, administrative execution and administrative supervision. Compared with the latter, the trade association is not a government, and its performance is very similar to that of the government, but it has no proper authority, can not provide effective management and services, and lacks attraction. The latter obviously does not buy it. On the other hand, the direct consequence of the latter's refusal to buy it is that it is difficult to realize the functional orientation of industry associations as "industry service, industry self-discipline, industry representative and industry coordination", and the indirect consequence is that the transformation of government functions and the strategic reform measures of "doing something and not doing something" are difficult and difficult, which makes people want to say it. The same direction of the two is the disorder and irregularity of the industry, the serious lack of self-discipline mechanism and restraint mechanism of the industry, and the lack of institutionalized guarantee. The fundamental reason why the latter does not buy is that there is no real market elimination mechanism for its survival, the knife has not been put around its neck, and there is no spontaneous demand for industry services and industry self-discipline to save its transaction costs.
At present, the supervision units and supervisors are still in the stage of straggle, and the self-discipline of supervisors is extremely poor, far from forming advanced and stable moral concepts and values that professional life must be fair, independent and independent, and they are too careless about supervision work and engineering changes, resulting in the loss of state-owned investment funds. Moreover, due to the comparative advantage of information cost of supervision units, it is difficult to restrain them externally. From this point of view, the only power (right) of investment control of supervision units is a double-edged sword, both sides of which are not too sharp.
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