However, most people will understand the present situation. After all, it is common sense that China has a vast territory and a sparse population, and the per capita land resources are relatively scarce. Coupled with the policy of protecting cultivated land, it is necessary to use land intensively. It is an objective fact that urban residents live in a crowded place and a narrow place. It is destiny takes a hand and cannot be changed. Especially in big cities and megacities, overpopulation/traffic congestion/abnormally high housing prices is a common phenomenon all over the world. Even if the housing prices in big cities in China are rising faster and faster, many people will attribute it to financial policies, real estate speculation, lack of other investment channels and so on. They believe that only by strengthening restrictions on purchases and loans, strictly controlling the qualifications for buying houses, and even strictly controlling the inflow of people can we solve the problem. However, this paper will use a lot of data to show that China people are not "destined to live in crowded houses":
Poor living conditions in big cities stem from the mismatch of land resources. At present, all kinds of problems faced by economy, population and debt mostly come from the land policy that restricts the expansion of big cities. These problems can be completely solved without the efforts of young people and the upgrading of new economic industries. Encouraging childbearing needs more living space, upgrading consumption needs more living space, and education, medical care and transportation infrastructure also need more land supply.
First of all, let's look at the living conditions of residents in megacities. Before listing the data, let's feel an example around us. I have two friends of the same age, both in their early 30s, who work in the same company. One lives in Nanshao, Changping, and the other in Changping County. Let's take Nanshao, which is a little closer, as an example. Take the subway, one-way time from Nanshao to the company 1 hour 50 minutes.
One of these two friends has a Beijing car and the other has a Hebei license plate. If you drive to work, it's 46 kilometers one way. ...
Some people may ask, since I work in the East Third Ring Road, why don't I live in the East and why should I live in the North Sixth Ring Road? Because their wives all work in the north-now they usually choose the direction close to the woman's unit.
In addition to the above collocation, it is more common that the woman works in the East Third Ring Financial District and the man works in the Northwest Fifth Ring Software Park. In this case, the house is usually bought in Tongzhou, East Sixth Ring Road, which is longer than the commuting time of my two friends. This is the work route of a friend's wife. Although it is only from the North Sixth Ring Road to the North Fifth Ring Road, because there is no direct subway, you need to take the subway first and then take the bus. One way 1 hour for 40 minutes.
This is the status quo of big cities in Tao Tao. From 2005 to 20 19, I went back and forth for three or four hours almost every day. Some people will ask: why do you have to buy a house outside the North Sixth Ring Road, rather than a house closer to the urban area? I happen to know the experience of these two friends buying a house very well. They started from 20 14, and the house price is half cheaper than now. The recent transaction price of the same apartment in Nanshao is as follows: 82 square meters, 4.05 million.
If you buy a closer house, such as an old house moved from the North Sixth Ring Road to the Qinghe area outside the North Fifth Ring Road, the price is as follows: 77 square meters, 5.25 million yuan.
This community has been around for more than 20 years, and there is no formal property management. There is only a small window in the living room above, which is already a good north-south transparent apartment in the community.
Therefore, for my good friends, if I can spend more than one million yuan and lower the requirements for the quality and living area of the community, with the help of enjoying bicycles, my friends' one-way commuting time will be shortened to 1 hour, which is a very ideal situation for young people in first-tier cities today.
One of these two friends graduated from Tsinghua and the other got a master's degree in 985. Both of them work in well-known high-paying companies in China and have a child. Husband and wife spend about 14 hours on work and commuting every day. Both parents come to Beijing to take care of their children. There are five people in the family, and the per capita construction area is less than 20 square meters. They are all very lucky. They got a Beijing hukou after graduation and got on the bus before the house price doubled. Now I'm going to play for a few more years and sell my house for a closer one. And some of my young friends have no hope of getting on the bus in Beijing now.
The above are graduates from top schools and top companies in hot industries. For the vast majority of young people who are not top universities and top companies in hot industries, whether they can get on the bus in Beijing basically no longer depends on whether they work hard enough. I have listed the "horror" of top international students coming to Beijing to study and work in Zhihu before. Someone left a message saying, "You shouldn't tell the truth, or good students in small places will study hard. > Getting into a good university-> The road to finding a good job in a big city is desperate. "
This is what Tao Tao often said. It is more important to buy a house in Beijing if you have money than to be admitted to Peking University. He can't afford to buy a house in Beijing after being admitted to Peking University. In short, represented by the cases of my two good friends, megacities have two common problems: small living area and long commuting distance.
However, the megacities in China, due to human factors, make these two problems particularly serious, and are moving towards the "Hong Kong-ization" that everyone has been discussing a lot recently. In order to discuss this problem better, after reading the above examples, let's look at the statistics and see how these two "problems" were born.
Let's talk about the data caliber first. "Urban household" refers to Beijing household registration and foreign household registration families who have lived in Beijing for more than half a year, with an average of 2.7 people in each family (adult singles are also counted as a family). This data does not include students, soldiers and other people living in collective dormitories. In other words, the survey does not include dormitories, and the sampling of groups/illegal spaces is not comprehensive enough, which generally reflects the living conditions of Jinghu+foreign permanent residents who live normally in Beijing.
As can be seen from the above table, 52. 1% of the permanent families in Beijing live in one-bedroom and two-bedroom houses, and1/0.7% live in bungalows/bungalows (mixed). Only 17.5% people have three bedrooms and only 2.2% people have four bedrooms. In other words, as many as 63.8% of Beijing's permanent families live in worse conditions than two bedrooms, which is in line with people's common sense that life in first-tier cities is poor.
Let's look at another data: in 20 13 years, the residential building area on Beijing's state-owned land was 47,665,438+10,000 square meters (the data after 20 13 years will not be published), while in 20 1825 1000, the permanent population of Beijing's cities and towns. That is to say, excluding the migrants who have lived in Beijing for less than half a year and the permanent residents in other places who cannot be counted, the per capita residential construction area of permanent residents in Beijing is 26. 1 square meter, and the average for a family of three is 78.3 square meters (construction area).
Among the housing sources of Beijing residents, commercial housing accounts for just over 1/4, renovated housing accounts for 1/5, rented housing accounts for 14.5%, affordable housing accounts for 10.6%, and a large part of them are self-built houses (rural collective land homesteads and hutong quadrangles in the old city).
People who buy or rent a house in Beijing should be aware of the following basic conditions: the number of new houses and sub-new houses in Beijing is very small. For Beijing, an economic population area with a permanent population of 3-4 million, which is equivalent to the population of a medium-sized provincial capital city, the newly opened buildings can be counted with one hand every year, and there are usually only one or two buildings, not the whole building. Compared with other booming capital cities, Beijing's housing is generally getting older and older, even in the suburbs with extremely rich land.
The residential area where the author lives was built in 2009, which is located on the edge of the North Fifth Ring Road. This neighborhood, which is close to the age of 10, already belongs to the famous "second new house" which is scarce in a large area of Fiona Fang. And those old buildings that belong to the scope of old city reconstruction in other urban areas still exist widely in Beijing. In recent years, an important livelihood project in Beijing is to provide free seismic reinforcement, pipeline renewal and elevator installation for these 30-30-year-old buildings.
Many young people who have just graduated and come into contact with the Beijing property market will have such questions: The average income in Beijing is so much higher than that in their hometown, and everyone's housing conditions are so poor and the demand is so strong. Even in the urban area, why not build more new houses in the suburbs? The house price is 65438+100000, and the cost of building a house is only several thousand yuan. Why are these old buildings not demolished to build new houses, but rebuilt with financial funds?
It can be seen that 2005 is a watershed. At present, the supply of commercial housing in Beijing has decreased by nearly half compared with the peak, returning to the level of 265,438+in the early 20th century, while the permanent population in Beijing has increased from130,000+in the early 20th century to 2 10/0,000+now. The following is the per capita residential completed area of permanent residents in Beijing, which was also a watershed in 2005, and now it has exceeded the peak period.
In order to make the above figures more vivid, look at these two figures: the total area enclosed by the Sixth Ring Road in Beijing is 2200 square kilometers, and the area enclosed by the Fifth Ring Road is about 700 square kilometers. In other words, a lot of space in Beijing's Sixth Ring Road or even the Fifth Ring Road is undeveloped. The area of cultivated land and gardens in Beijing is 2.5 times that of urban built-up areas. Forget the outer suburbs. Let's take Haidian District, an important main city in Beijing, as an example. In the mountainous area of Haidian, within the Sixth Ring Road, there are still a lot of open space and cultivated land that can be developed into residential quarters.
Below is the Huilongguan area (Huilongguan+Huo Ying), once known as "the largest community in Asia", next to Haidian District, with a total built-up area of less than 1 1 square kilometer, accommodating hundreds of thousands of people. According to the overall land use planning of Haidian District, by 2020, Haidian District still needs to retain 148 square kilometers of agricultural land.
According to the master plan of Beijing in 2035, the construction land in Beijing will gradually decrease-"decreasing development" is the theme of Beijing in the future. However, Beijing was not like this before. More than a decade ago, Beijing was a rapidly expanding city: the built-up area of Beijing increased from 488 square kilometers in 1998 to182 square kilometers in 2004, and the average annual growth rate from 1998 to 2004 was 16544. By 20 16, the built-up area of Beijing will increase to 1420 square kilometers. From 2004 to 20 16, the average annual growth rate was only 14 square kilometers, which was 12% of the previous speed, an order of magnitude lower. The root of this problem comes from two important policies: the "land auction and auction" implemented on August 3, 20041,which prohibits the transfer of land by agreement and must be bought and sold by the government. In the Master Plan of Land Use (2006-2020) revised in 2005, "Red Line of Cultivated Land" became the core KPI.
From 1998 to 2003, the area of cultivated land in Beijing increased rapidly, corresponding to the soaring area of built-up areas in the same period. Since 2004, the decline rate of cultivated land in Beijing has slowed down significantly, and the growth rate of built-up areas has dropped by an order of magnitude. Generally speaking, from the mid-1990s to 2004, the rapid development of Beijing's economy was accompanied by the rapid expansion of the city and the rapid growth of housing construction, and house prices were generally stable. Since 2005, Beijing's housing prices have skyrocketed: the big brake of land supply has made people's nominal income growth far behind the increase in housing prices. Since 2005, house prices in most parts of Beijing have increased by 10 times, while the per capita disposable income has only increased by 5.2 times (Beijing Statistical Yearbook 20 17). Compared with the purchasing power of housing per unit area-corresponding to the per capita housing supply in the same period, people's income is halved.
Except Beijing, the situation in Shanghai is similar-2004-05 became the turning point of Shanghai's construction land supply, and now Shanghai is also proposing "reduced development": second-tier cities are not much better. Taking Hangzhou as an example, its overall land use planning requires: "The urban and rural construction land will increase from 107004 hectares in 2005 to 126900 hectares in 2020. Looking at the data of Nanjing, like Beijing and Shanghai, it is "taking 2005 as the turning point, the scale of urban construction land experienced a process of rapid growth and slow growth, with an average annual growth of 55.87% from 2000 to 2005; From 2006 to 20 14, the average annual growth rate was only 4.7%, which was 1 1.89 times in the early stage. "In many people's memory, housing prices in major cities began to rise around 2004-2005-first, it was blamed on real estate speculators, then it was required to limit purchases and loans, and in recent years, the price was directly limited-until now, most people did not realize that the fundamental reason was that the growth rate of construction land in mega-cities was orders of magnitude since 2005. Chongqing is an exception among many big cities. Huang used his famous "land ticket" system to replace the land index from rural areas, which provided sufficient construction land resources for urban construction, leading to the long-term downturn of housing prices in Chongqing. However, in the past two years, even the supply of residential land in Chongqing has begun to shrink sharply.
Then, unreasonable planning created their long commuting distance. Let's look at another example: feel the land use planning in the north of Haidian, which is a "suburb" located in the fifth ring road in the northwest-the sixth ring road in the northwest. It takes 32 kilometers to drive from the center of Beijing to point A and 36 kilometers to point B.
The idea of Beijing is not to "spread the pie", to separate the suburban sub-centers from the main city, and to live and work in separate groups instead of "disorderly expansion". Just like the example of Haidian above, as long as the sixth district of the city is employed (even if it is as far away as the sixth ring road, it is only to build an industrial park), it will abandon its household registration and move to other districts. In addition, commuting needs to go through a huge area of farmland and green barriers, which increases the commuting distance in vain, but it does not realize the idea that everyone works and gets employment in their own groups.
Generous provision of industrial land, low price or even free to industrial and commercial units, extremely stingy supply of residential land, this is the status quo of urban land supply in China-industry and commerce can bring a steady stream of taxes, while residential land can be bought and sold with one hammer, holding back a little to maximize benefits. A giant garden-style software park with a plot ratio of only 1. 1 is surrounded by a high housing price of 8-65438+100000 square meters. Employees enjoy the lawn with small bridges and flowing water downstairs and go home to live in humble abode.
Let's take a look at the master plan of Qingpu District, a suburb of Shanghai: the proportion of agricultural land is large (light green)+the proportion of construction land is very small, most of which is industrial land (brown red) and a small part is residential land (yellow).
Now, even in the fourth-and fifth-tier cities, and even in the new urban areas of many small counties, only 30-to 40-story towers and high-rise buildings can be built, because the control of new urban construction land is extremely strict. This is what Professor Fan Gang said-"We are destined to live in a crowded house". The article here has caused the root cause of urban residents' crowded living, and I think everyone should be very clear.
Land supply in big cities is like family planning-planning of space and population. In the final analysis, we are not "destined to live in a crowded house", but the land policy has led to all this. Both cultivated land and water resources are just excuses rather than scientific reasons. At least we should live as well as the Japanese. This is not a trivial matter at the technical level, but a major event that will affect the fate of the country and the nation.
The last question of the soul. Is this unexpected or intentional? Tao Tao has always been inclined to the latter, so Shang Feng's attitude towards real estate has always been very clear, and he hopes that house prices will grow steadily. Can't get on or off. If it goes up, there will be public anger, and if it goes down, the banker can't stand it. Chongqing has proved by facts that house prices are controllable. If you can't, you can't.
Many people are arguing about the rise and fall of house prices every day. You are talking about regulating the price-limited property. Why can't you believe a simpler fact, that is, as a banker, you just want house prices to rise! It's just that the dealer is bullish and can't convince other players that he is bullish. Can't you see the obvious truth from the ironclad facts of the past 20 years?