First, the competition pattern of China automobile market
(1) The overall development trend of the automobile industry is good.
In recent years, with the sustained and rapid growth of China's GDP and the increase of domestic automobile consumption demand, China's automobile industry has developed rapidly and become a pillar industry in China. The overall development momentum of China automobile industry is very good. In terms of car ownership, it increased from 1980 to1780,000 in 2003, with an average annual growth rate of 12%, which was higher than the GDP growth rate. The per capita car ownership increased from 1.978 to/.4 vehicles per thousand people to 1.8 vehicles per thousand people in 2003, with an average annual growth of 1.3%. From the perspective of automobile production and sales, the total amount of automobile production and sales in 2004 both exceeded 5 million, and the production and sales increased rapidly. From the perspective of automobile product structure, it has developed from a single medium-sized truck to a variety of series such as trucks, buses and cars, and the product structure of "lack of weight and less light, blank cars" has basically been alleviated and become more and more reasonable. With the continuous improvement of automobile products and manufacturing technology, FAW, Dongfeng Motor, Shanghai, Tianjin, Beijing, Weapons and Aviation Group and a large number of key parts enterprises have been established, forming a relatively complete product series and production layout in China. At present, the main attributes of automobiles have changed from the original means of production to consumer goods, and the main buyers have also changed from group buying to private consumption, so the long-term development prospects of the automobile market are promising.
(b) Market concentration is characterized by a loose oligopoly.
Market concentration is an important factor reflecting the market structure. A broader way to measure market concentration is to use CRN index, that is, to measure the cumulative market share of the largest enterprises in the industry as a whole. J.S.Bain America first used this index to classify the types of industrial monopoly and competition in the United States.
Automobile industry is a typical oligopoly industry in the world, which is mainly controlled by about 10 enterprise groups. The automobile industry in developed countries is generally monopolized by two or three automobile enterprise groups, such as GM, Ford and Dyke in the United States, Dyke, Volkswagen and BMW in Germany, Toyota, Honda and Nissan in Japan.
There are more than 100 automobile manufacturers in China, which exceeds the sum of American, European and Japanese automobile manufacturers. From the perspective of the number of enterprises, it seems to be a competitive market. However, from the perspective of market concentration, although there is a certain gap with developed countries in the automobile industry, the phenomenon of concentration is still obvious. According to the sales volume, share and concentration data of major automobile manufacturers in China in the first half of 200 1, it can be seen that CR4 is 50. 12% and CR8 is 74.40%, with a relatively high concentration. According to the sales volume, share and concentration data of major automobile manufacturers in China in 2004, CR4 was 58.58% and CR8 reached 76.05%, further enhancing the concentration. This market structure can be considered as a loose oligopoly market. The so-called loose oligopoly market refers to the market structure in which the market share concentration of the four major enterprises reaches more than 40%, but they can't collude in pricing, that is to say, there are a large number of manufacturers (there are 1 17 automobile manufacturers in China in 2004), and none of them can monopolize the market price. In 2004, FAW Group, the first enterprise, only occupied 19.88% market share.
Second, the game analysis of China automobile market competition.
The essential feature of enterprise behavior in oligopoly market lies in its interdependence. Because the number of enterprises in the market is limited, each enterprise must consider the influence of its own behavior on its competitors and how to take action on their reactions when deciding its own output and price. In other words, the profit of an enterprise depends not only on its own decisions, but also on the decisions of other enterprises. Therefore, when analyzing the decision-making behavior of enterprises in oligopoly market, the idea of game will inevitably be applied.
According to whether the participants cooperate or not, the game can be divided into cooperative game and non-cooperative game. The price competition in the automobile industry is non-cooperative competition, because there is no binding agreement between them, so they will make strategies to compete from their own interests.
The non-cooperative competition strategies of manufacturers can be mainly divided into two categories: price competition and output competition. Bertrand model is a theoretical model to describe price competition, and Cournot model is a theoretical model to describe output competition. Since 2004, the relationship between supply and demand in the automobile market has changed fundamentally, from the seller's market to the buyer's market, and the automobile inventory has been increasing. So at present, the competition in the automobile industry is mainly price competition, not output competition.
Due to the lack of independent innovation ability of most automobile enterprises in China, the homogenization of automobile products is serious. We can assume that the differentiated products provided by auto companies are free. So from the perspective of game theory, what kind of situation will the oligopoly market of automobile industry form? In the game process, every automobile manufacturer has two strategic choices: reducing the price and not reducing the price. When making price decisions, each automobile manufacturer can't know each other's actual strategic choice, but they can't ignore the influence of each other's choice on themselves, so they will consider their final choice according to the other two possible decisions. For the sake of explanation, we assume that there are only two competitors in the market, that is, the duopoly pattern.
By comparing the payment levels of the tables in the payment matrix, we can see that the duopoly is in a dilemma similar to the prisoner's dilemma. Now let's analyze the strategy of oligarch A. Assuming that oligarch B reduces the price, the profit brought by oligarch A's strategy of reducing the price is 5, while the profit brought by his strategy of not reducing the price is only 2, so oligarch A will adopt the strategy of reducing the price. Assuming that oligarch B doesn't reduce the price, the profit brought by oligarch A's price reduction strategy is 18, while the profit brought by his price reduction strategy is only 10. In this case, oligarch A will also adopt the strategy of price reduction. In the same way, it can be analyzed that oligarch B will also adopt the strategy of price reduction. Therefore, the final result of this game must be that both oligarchs adopt the strategy of price reduction, and the income is 5, which constitutes a Nash equilibrium and is a dominant strategic equilibrium. Obviously, this is not the best interest plan for both sides, and both sides will get smaller profits, and the beneficiaries are consumers; It is the best scheme for automobile manufacturers (no price reduction, no price reduction), so that they can get more profits, but this result is impossible and not a Nash equilibrium solution. Therefore, in real life, in the face of changes in the market situation, many automobile manufacturers have adopted the way of reducing prices to expand sales and reduce inventory, which makes the price war in the automobile market continue to heat up. Compared with the price, the cost of automobile enterprises is rising. Due to the strong global demand for steel, the shortage of supply, and the rising domestic energy prices such as hydropower and coal, the profits of automobile enterprises are decreasing.
Third, the automobile enterprise's countermeasures
Excessive price competition is unfavorable to the development of the industry. Although the state protects competition, it does not mean that the state unconditionally agrees with price competition. Price competition must be conducive to economic development and people's long-term interests. Recently, we can feel the country's concern about the possible excessive price competition in the automobile industry from all aspects. There are signs that the state has been regulating automobile consumption loans and strictly controlling the number of enterprises entering the automobile industry. National macro-control is one aspect. More importantly, automobile enterprises should also take measures to change the prisoner's dilemma, jump out of the vicious competition of price war, avoid taking the old road of VCD war and color TV war, and avoid the automobile industry from entering the endless cycle of "price reduction-loss".
(A) differentiated management
Through Bertrand's paradox, we know that one party's price reduction will inevitably lead to the other party's profit being zero, so the final result of the price war will be the cost war. If the unit cost is different, low-cost enterprises will eventually occupy the whole market, and high-cost enterprises will be eliminated. If the unit cost is equal, in an equilibrium situation, the price is equal to the marginal cost, and the profit of the enterprise is zero, which is the same as the equilibrium situation of a perfectly competitive market. One way to solve Bertrand's paradox is to introduce product differences. If different enterprises produce different products, the elasticity of substitution will not be infinite. At this time, consumers have different preferences for products of different enterprises, and price is not the only variable they are interested in. When there are product differences, the equilibrium price will not be equal to the marginal cost. Therefore, vigorously carrying out technological innovation, subdividing the target market and realizing product differentiation are the countermeasures to break the vicious price competition. Of course, in real life, the differentiated operation of the automobile industry should not only be limited to product differentiation, but also shift the key to winning competition to service, take customers as the center, and realize service differentiation, for example, extending the warranty period or warranty mileage, making relevant quality and service commitments, automobile renovation, automobile financing, emergency assistance, information consultation, etc.
(B) brand management
Brand represents quality and taste, and finally embodies the business philosophy of the enterprise. In the automobile industry, brand loyalty is almost one of the core competitiveness of all multinational groups. J.D.Power, an internationally renowned consulting and investigation company in the automobile industry, conducted a survey on the "customer return rate" of world-renowned automobile brands. The results show that successful brands largely rely on their strong customer brand loyalty to maintain market share. In China, automobile manufacturers are still in the initial stage of building customer brand loyalty. The establishment and maintenance of brand must be based on stable and continuously improved quality. Quality defects are fatal to brands. On the contrary, high reliability enables automobile manufacturers to provide higher prices, obtain ideal customer satisfaction and reduce warranty costs. Therefore, from a strategic point of view, automobile enterprises should practice hard, strictly monitor the quality in the whole process of R&D, supplier selection, production and assembly, channel distribution and after-sales service, and provide customers with products with superior performance and high cost performance.