3.3. 1. 1 public geological survey lacks a long-term mechanism.
The investment in public welfare geological work lacks a long-term mechanism. Non-profit geological survey team lacks regular working funds, personnel funds and public funds are seriously insufficient, and equipment funds lack regular updating mechanism, which is not conducive to the long-term stable development of geological work. The serious shortage of personnel funds and public funds leads to excessive dependence on project funds for income distribution, which directly affects the dynamic mechanism of public service of public welfare geological survey results to the society; Old equipment, heavy burden on retirees and insufficient medical expenses have affected the normal operation of geological survey. Some of these problems can be solved by our own efforts, but the solution of many problems is limited by the reform process of state institutions and needs fundamental reform and adjustment.
3.3. 1.2 The public welfare geological work team needs to be strengthened.
At present, China's public welfare geological survey system and mechanism can not meet the needs of the new situation. The central public welfare geological survey team needs to be refined and strong, and the provincial public welfare geological survey team needs to be built and improved. At present, the central and provincial public welfare geological work has not yet established a unified planning and deployment, overall coordination mechanism. The central government's "all-in-one package" for public welfare geological work has affected the enthusiasm of local finance to invest in public welfare geological work. In terms of investment in public welfare geological work, there is no clear division of labor between the central and local public welfare geological work, which often leads to repeated investment and waste of state financial funds. Progress in the construction of provincial public welfare geological teams is slow. Due to different local conditions, some provincial geological survey institutions have made substantial progress, but most of them have not been implemented. Two thirds of geological prospecting units in China are in a solid or semi-solid state.
3.3. 1.3 There are mechanism and policy bottlenecks in the development, utilization and service of geological data.
China's public welfare geological data are not open to the outside world because of the low degree of informatization, regional confidentiality and departmental interests. It is difficult to collect geological data, and the development, utilization and service of geological data are far from meeting the public's demand for geological information. Compared with the social demand and the situation in developed countries, the service mode and service ability to the industrial sector and the public are far from enough.
At present, there are many problems in the management and service of data collection, and investors have a strong reaction to the phenomenon of "commonweal geology is not commonweal". Due to the lack of supporting policies and regulations, a large number of basic geological data can not be provided to the public. There are a lot of excellent geological data, and the information resources of data collection institutions are insufficient. The management of geological data collection is not in place, and an effective collection management and supervision system has not been established. Geological data production units failed to submit data in a timely and high-quality manner in accordance with relevant regulations. A large number of geological data are not submitted in time, which leads to insufficient and untimely authoritative data of data acquisition institutions. The system of data collection is not smooth. Some geological survey project undertakers only submit data to the data management department of China Geological Survey, but not to the government departments stipulated in the Regulations on the Management of Geological Data. The management and service level of geoscience database is not high. The decentralized management of data information forms an information island, and the technologies and systems on which storage, maintenance and service depend are largely heterogeneous, with a low degree of standardization, which greatly increases the difficulty of data information management and application of results. Decentralized data organization and management mode lead to low information enjoyment and waste of resources. The infrastructure level of data warehouse, accessories and modern information technology equipment of data collection institutions is generally poor, the data storage conditions are poor, and the ability to provide services through the network is not strong. Limited by the number and quality of staff in collection institutions, it is difficult to conduct a comprehensive and in-depth study of geological data. The existing achievements can not be released to the society in time, the related needs can not be met in time, the service level is low, and it can only maintain daily work and can not adapt to the great changes brought by modern information technology to data work.
3.3.2 Exploration of Commercial Mineral Resources
3.3.2. 1 The inertia of the traditional operating mechanism is large.
Under the planned economy system, mineral exploration has been separated from mining for a long time, characterized by the verification system of geological prospecting fees and the free use of geological achievements, forming an operating mechanism of "state-funded exploration by geological prospecting units-mining enterprises-state-funded exploration", emphasizing "prospecting for the country" Therefore, mineral exploration is often used as a part of geological work, and it is used to relying on geological work mechanism in management system and investment mechanism. In the current transitional period, the inertia of this traditional operating mechanism is still very large. In fact, mineral exploration should be an indispensable link in mining reproduction. It is the fundamental way to realize a virtuous circle of mineral exploration investment to obtain returns through subsequent mining sales revenue and realize expanded reproduction. Therefore, only by taking mineral exploration as a part of mining industry can we fundamentally solve the problem of combining geological work with its service objects.
3.3.2.2's policies and regulations need to be improved.
The Mineral Resources Law stipulates that the compensation fee for mineral resources levied by the state reflects the owner's rights and interests, and the mineral resources tax is levied by the state power; The collection of royalties for exploration and mining rights reflects the paid acquisition of exploration and mining rights. Due to the collection and disposal of the proceeds from the paid transfer of exploration and mining rights, there is no unified method in the central government, and local governments at all levels divide the proceeds by themselves, with 70% in cities and counties and 30% in provinces (regions). The rights and interests of national owners of mineral resources have not been reflected. Many contents of the current mineral resources law and related laws and regulations can no longer meet the requirements of the development of market economy. At present, it is difficult to find a legal basis for solving some hot issues in promoting the marketization reform of mineral resources in the current laws and regulations. First, the understanding of mining rights is different in theory, mainly in the understanding of mineral resources ownership, use right and their relationship, which makes it very difficult to solve the problem of "clear property rights" in practice. Second, the ownership of mining rights formed by state-funded exploration is controversial. Third, there are no specific legal provisions on the market access and exit mechanism and the bidding, auction and listing of exploration rights, and there are great differences between the competent authorities and different stakeholders in implementation and practice. Fourth, there are no clear laws and regulations on the position and role of mineral resources authorities in the market of exploration and mining rights. Fifth, the legal provisions on the protection of the rights and interests of prospecting right holders are not clear.
3.3.2.3's market reform lags behind.
Based on the reality of mineral exploration in China, the former state-owned geological prospecting units and state-owned mining enterprises constitute two important subjects in China's mineral exploration market. At present, the basic framework of the institutional geological prospecting system of state-owned geological prospecting units has not changed, and mineral exploration has not been operated as an industry. Geological prospecting units not only undertake public geological work such as geological survey, but also undertake a lot of commercial geological work. Limited by investment capacity, although geological prospecting units have registered a large number of exploration blocks, they have invested little, which objectively hinders the development of commercial mineral exploration market. On the other hand, many state-owned mining enterprises do not regard mineral exploration as an essential production process for their sustainable production, and still hope that the government can solve it. The sales revenue of Dexing Copper Mine in Jiangxi Province in 2003 was 654.38+0.05 billion yuan, and five of its six mines were short of reserve resources, but the annual expenses for production prospecting were only 2.6-2.8 million yuan. This traditional habit of relying on the state to provide mineral land is very unfavorable to the development of commercial mineral exploration. In recent years, private mining enterprises have made great progress and become one of the main players in the market, but there are few enterprises with large scale, advanced technology and standardized operation. Most of them are small enterprises, and the negative impact brought by irregular operation is even greater. The opening up of mineral exploration lags behind, making it difficult to form a new market subject, which is not conducive to the formation of a vibrant exploration market.
A good investment and financing environment in 3.3.2.4 has not yet been established.
The overall investment environment of China's mining industry is not ideal because of the low degree of protection of mining rights, the confusion of taxes and fees, the disharmony between central and local policies, the disharmony between mining activities and land use, and local protectionism. In the protection of mining rights and interests, the legal status of mining rights is not clear, and the status of property rights is difficult to implement. Mining right conflicts with neighboring right and lacks protection. For example, the stipulation that the prospecting right holder has the priority to obtain the mining right is questioned in practice. The prospecting right holder cannot guarantee to obtain the mining right, and the expectation of exploration income is not clear. As for "priority", some local governments interpret it as the priority of the same price, that is, after successful exploration, the competent government departments will auction, and the highest bidder will take precedence, which increases investors' concerns.
3.3.2.5's market system and operating mechanism need to be improved.
Commercial mineral exploration lacks a standardized and orderly market operation environment. The mining right market is underdeveloped, which mainly shows that the primary market is active and the secondary market is underdeveloped. Because the government determines, approves and manages mining rights through administrative power, especially by using resource compensation fees and transferring mining rights through bidding, auction and auction, it has essentially formed market manipulation and monopoly. Among them, the "re-transfer" of mining rights funded by the government is theoretically not a primary market, but a secondary market. Excessive government intervention in the secondary market will inevitably affect the normal development of the mining rights market. In some provinces, the primary market almost completely replaces the secondary market, which seriously restricts the role of the market and is not conducive to the healthy development of the market.
The lack of exploration capital market, an important factor market in mineral exploration market, is also an important manifestation of the underdeveloped exploration market at present. The mineral exploration company with diversified property rights established by Yunnan Geological Exploration Bureau is ready to go public, but it has been operating for many years and has never been successful. The reason is that the risk of mineral exploration is high, the evaluation of mining rights and capitalization of exploration investment are difficult to be widely recognized by the society, there are many obstacles in policy and system, and it is difficult to raise funds. This lack of exploration capital market is the deep-seated reason for the insufficient investment in risk survey and evaluation in China.
Intermediary services around the normal operation of mining rights market are also not perfect. The qualification management of intermediary institutions is not strict and lacks industry self-discipline; The evaluation method is unreasonable; In particular, the evaluation itself is interfered by many parties, which is arbitrary and lacks impartiality. Other consulting services are basically blank. In addition, the public welfare geological information is not fully disclosed, and there is a lack of necessary information communication between mining rights holders and mining capital investors, which seriously affects the full and comprehensive play of the market. It is also a prominent problem that China's intermediary institutions are not independent enough, lack of legal constraints and integrity, and aim at maximizing interests.
Some administrative approvals in 3.3.2.6 are not standardized.
The current mining management can not meet the needs of the development of commercial mineral exploration market, some administrative examination and approval are not standardized, and there is local protectionism; The phenomenon that local governments control resources, allocate resources and pursue rights and interests is serious; Government's participation in operation makes capital investment and non-capital investment coexist, which has a great negative impact on market regulation and social investment. At present, the government generally controls mining rights, especially primary exploration rights. The concrete manifestations are as follows: adding administrative license at will, multi-level examination of exploration registration, and setting obstacles at different levels; Bidding, auction and listing of mining rights are not standardized.