The value chain is one of the most critical chains in the global economic cycle. Whoever occupies the core link of the value chain will control the wealth flow of the whole value chain. In the future, global competition will be value chain competition, and building China's own global value chain strategy should be upgraded to a national strategy, which is the key for China to move from an economic power to an economic power.
In the increasingly fierce global innovation competition, China faces multiple risks and challenges, such as low innovation intensity, convergence "catch-up window", weak innovation "late-comer advantage" and serious brain drain of innovative talents.
In the era of big data, data security is facing more severe challenges. Data sovereignty will become the foundation of governance and governance data and related technologies and infrastructure in all countries.
New Economic Challenges of China Based on Global Value Chain
The value chain is one of the most critical chains in the global economic cycle. Whoever occupies the core link of the value chain will control the wealth flow of the whole value chain. In the future, global competition will be value chain competition, and building China's own global value chain strategy should be upgraded to a national strategy, which is the key for China to move from an economic power to an economic power.
The global value chain dominates the deep-seated changes in the global trade pattern. In recent ten years, international division of labor has increasingly manifested itself as multi-level division of labor between different products in the same industry and between different processes and different value-added links of the same product. The scope and field of international division of labor are constantly expanding, gradually developing from inter-industry division to intra-industry division, and then evolving into an international division of labor system based on intra-product division.
The trade of intermediate inputs based on intra-product division of labor is called intra-product trade, thus forming a "global value chain division of labor" system. "Global value chain division of labor" has three remarkable characteristics: first, the final product has gone through two or more continuous production stages; Second, two or more countries participate in the production process and realize value-added at different stages; Third, at least one country uses imported inputs in its production process.
According to statistics, the average growth rate of world goods export was only 0.7% in 19 13-1938, and exceeded 6% in 1948-1990 and 1990. The proportion of world exports to world GDP was only 5% in the early 1950s, 10% in the early 1970s, 15% in the early 1990s and 20% in the early 1990s. From 1980 to 20 1 1, the world trade in goods increased by 7% on average, reaching 18.78 trillion US dollars in 20 13 years. Global value chain, industrial chain and supply chain have a far-reaching impact on international production, international trade and international investment, making the global market more and more dependent, but at the same time, global value chain.
First of all, the global value chain strengthens the coordination of the global economy, amplifies and accelerates the international transmission of shocks, and amplifies the fluctuation risk of global trade growth or decline. The reason is that different production links of products in the chain are located in different countries, which leads to frequent cross-border trade of intermediate products, thus amplifying the degree of trade volume; At the same time, the global supply chain is highly complex and all links are closely linked. If there is a problem in one link, it will be quickly transmitted to the whole trade production chain through structural effect and supply chain effect.
Structural effects are aimed at specific industries and regions in the global value chain that are more sensitive to changes in external income, such as durable goods departments and East Asia. When the crisis comes, consumers usually cut down the consumption of durable goods sharply first, and the consumption of daily necessities drops less. In 2008, durable goods accounted for nearly 40% of global trade, and the sharp decline in durable goods trade was an important reason why the global trade volume shrank more than GDP during the financial crisis. Due to deeper integration into global value chains, East Asia has become more vulnerable to the economic cycles of the United States and the European Union.
Supply chain effect means that the inherent characteristics of global value chain will accelerate or amplify the impact of business cycle. For example, the sensitivity of cross-border trade of intermediate products in the supply chain to systemic trade shocks has increased significantly; The inventory adjustment at any node in the supply chain due to the influence of business cycle will be rapidly transmitted along the supply chain, and the position of inventory in the production of the corresponding enterprise is likely to amplify the influence of business cycle.
Second, the global value chain magnifies the risk that enterprises with a high proportion of intermediate imports are affected by tariffs. This is because the extension of the global production chain makes intermediate imports cross the border many times, and the accumulation of small tariffs will eventually increase the actual tariff burden borne by export enterprises. According to the OECD Global Value Chain Trade Policy Report, the total export tariff of China's manufacturing industry was only 4% in 2009, but when converted into the tariff borne by the domestic added value of exports (that is, the effective tariff actually borne by China exporters), it rose to 17%, which was higher than that of the United States, the European Union, Japan, Vietnam and other countries.
Third, the following enterprises participating in the global value chain may face the risk of "low-end lock-in", and cause many problems such as society, environment, working conditions, occupational safety and health, employment security and so on. Facing the unreasonable global division of labor system and improving the level of foreign capital utilization in China, it is necessary to fundamentally reverse China's unfavorable position in the vertical division of labor system of global value chain.
In recent decades, the market presented worldwide has become increasingly fragmented, forming a vertical division system of global value chain. Buyers and brands at the upper end of the global value chain, by virtue of their control of core technologies, key technologies, technical standards and brands, transfer the production of intermediate products at the lower end of the value chain to other countries through the global arrangement of the supply chain, which not only relieves their own resource and environmental pressures, but also obtains high monopoly profits from them and firmly controls global suppliers through contractual relations.
In a word, the sources of risks brought by global value chain to international trade include: economic risks (such as demand shocks, drastic fluctuation of commodity prices, global energy shortage, tariff fluctuation, labor shortage, border delay, ownership or investment restrictions, exchange rate fluctuation); Environmental risks (such as natural disasters, extreme weather and the spread of diseases); Geopolitical risks (such as conflicts and political tensions, import and export restrictions, terrorism, corruption, illegal trade and organized crime, piracy); Technical risks (such as information communication blocking, traffic infrastructure failure), etc.
The challenge of the new round of technological revolution to China's economy
1. After the financial crisis, countries all over the world have launched the strategy of making a strong country.
After the international financial crisis in 2008, in order to find new ways to promote economic growth, countries around the world began to attach importance to manufacturing again, and the United States, the European Union, Germany, Britain and so on have launched national strategies for manufacturing. Developed countries such as the United States, Germany and Japan focus on seven strategic emerging industries represented by the new generation of Internet, biotechnology, new energy and high-end preparations, and launch a new round of growth competition in an attempt to seize the strategic commanding heights of the new round of economic growth.
Since then, the United States, Germany, Japan, South Korea and other countries have introduced various policies and measures to encourage and support the development of their strategic emerging industries. For example, the U.S. government issued a number of bills, such as the National Strategic Plan for Advanced Manufacturing, the American Innovation Strategy: Promoting Sustainable Growth and High-quality Employment, and the Export Multiplication Plan, and proposed giving priority to supporting the high-tech clean energy industry, vigorously developing the bio-industry and the next-generation Internet industry, and revitalizing the automobile industry; The German government is actively promoting the Industry 4.0 strategy with the "smart factory" as the core, and supporting the research and development and innovation of a new generation of revolutionary technologies in the industrial field; Japan launched a new growth strategy in April 2009, proposing to focus on developing industries such as environmentally-friendly cars, electric cars and solar power generation; South Korea, on the other hand, put forward in the "New Growth Power Planning and Development Strategy": focus on developing six industries, such as energy and environment, emerging information technology and bio-industry, and 22 key directions, such as solar cells, marine biofuels and green cars.
As early as 20 10, the European union put forward the "Europe 2020 strategy", in which "intelligent growth" covers the main content of "re-industrialization", and "stronger European industry oriented to growth and economic recovery" published in 20 12 and 10 defined "re-industrialization" more clearly. At the member level, many countries, including France, Britain and Spain, have formulated corresponding "re-industrialization" strategies. For example, the report "The Road to Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth" published by UK 20 1 1 puts forward six priority industries. France set up a new production promotion department on 20 12 to revitalize French industry, and Spain set up a new production promotion department on 2065433.
From the perspective of Japan, a traditional manufacturing power, the Japanese government put forward five rounds of economic revitalization measures during the three years from June 5438+February to June 5438+ 10, 2002, and strengthening Japan's industrial competitiveness is an important part of these revitalization measures. After Abe took office, he paid attention to the revival of manufacturing while expanding monetary finance. In the "Japan Revitalization Strategy" put forward in June 20 13, the industrial revitalization strategy is regarded as one of the three key strategies in the future, and six concrete measures are put forward, such as urgent structural reform, employment system reform, promoting scientific and technological innovation, realizing the world's highest level IT society, strengthening regional competitiveness and supporting small and medium-sized enterprises.
2. Industry 4.0 triggered a new round of global manufacturing revolution.
The new industrial revolution after the international financial crisis is not only a digital revolution, but also a value chain revolution. The Internet, Internet of Things, robots, artificial intelligence, 3D printing, new materials and other breakthroughs, integration and interaction will promote the rise of new industries, new formats and new models. A post-mass production world is coming. This revolution will not only affect how to make products, but also affect where to make products, which will reshape the global industrial competition pattern.
At present, intelligent industrial equipment has become the basis of global manufacturing upgrading and transformation, and developed countries invariably regard manufacturing upgrading as the primary task of the new round of industrial revolution. The wave of "re-industrialization" in the United States, the strategy of "Industry 4.0" and "connecting factories" in Germany, and the transformation of manufacturing industries in Japan and South Korea are not simply the return of traditional manufacturing industries, but accompanied by the improvement of production efficiency, the innovation of production mode and the development of emerging industries, especially the strategy of "Industry 4.0" in Germany is regarded as the representative of a new round of industrial revolution.
3. The standard dispute has become a new direction of global manufacturing competition.
The competition mode of global manufacturing industry has undergone profound changes, and technology patents and standard control have become important international competition tools. Developed countries are increasingly aware that standards, especially safety, health and environmental protection standards, represent the further development of control technology and industry. Taking new energy vehicles as an example, eight automobile manufacturers from Germany and the United States (Audi, BMW, Chrysler, Daimler, Ford, General Motors, Porsche and Volkswagen) announced that they will adopt a unified charging interface standard in the future, and the new standard will be used in Europe and the United States.
The European Automobile Manufacturers Association also stipulates that starting from 20 17, all new electric vehicles sold in Europe will adopt this new interface standard. No matter whether the German-American Eight Automobile Enterprise Alliance formulates charging standards or not, its purpose is not only to focus on its own local market, but to jointly push the standards to the global market, so as to take the lead in the global electric vehicle industry and gain the dominance and control of the future electric vehicle market.
4. Facing multiple risks and challenges in the new round of global innovation competition.
In the increasingly fierce global innovation competition, China faces multiple risks and challenges, such as low innovation intensity, convergence "catch-up window", weak innovation "late-comer advantage" and serious brain drain of innovative talents.
First of all, the innovation competitiveness of China countries does not match their economic strength.
The evaluation results of "National Innovation Index Report 20 13" issued by China Academy of Science and Technology Development Strategy show that the United States has become the most innovative country with rich innovation resources and excellent innovation performance.
Relying on outstanding enterprise innovation performance and knowledge creation ability, Japan and South Korea rank second and fourth respectively, and continue to lead other Asian countries. Although the national innovation index of China has increased by 1 compared with the previous year, it still ranks 19 in the world.
In addition, according to the 20 14 Global Innovation Index Report jointly released by Cornell University, European Business School and World Intellectual Property Organization, high-income economies occupy the top 25 in this year's ranking, among which European economies such as Switzerland, Britain, Sweden, Finland and the Netherlands rank among the top 5 "most innovative economies" in turn. In middle-income economies, although China and Brazil are leaders in innovation,
Second, on the whole, the innovation intensity of China countries is generally low.
The R&D intensity of American manufacturing industry is 3.35%. In 20 13 years, the R&D intensity of China's manufacturing industry was 0.88%, which was quite different. The data shows that China, as the largest manufacturing base in the world, the R&D intensity of manufacturing industry was only 0.88% in 20 13 years, while it reached 4% in Japan in 2009, 3.3% in the United States in 2008 and 2.4% in Germany. In 2008-2009, the R&D intensity of China's manufacturing industry was much lower than that of developed countries.
Third, the "catch-up window" of technological innovation in China is converging.
Countries all over the world have launched a strategic innovation competition. After the financial crisis, major economies launched a new round of growth competition around seven strategic emerging industries, such as the new generation Internet, biotechnology, new energy and high-end manufacturing, and launched their own innovative growth strategies.
Global manufacturing is upgrading rather than returning. Regardless of developed economies in Europe and America or emerging economies such as India, global manufacturing is moving towards a higher level of high-end and high-tech. Especially with the rapid development of global intelligent networking, supercomputing, virtual reality, network manufacturing, network value-added services and other industries have risen rapidly, and the technology gap and technology gap similar to traditional industries have also appeared in China's strategic emerging industries.
Fourth, as a late-developing country, the "late-developing advantage" of innovation is not outstanding.
The advantage of latecomer is an important variable for latecomer countries to catch up with advanced countries. From the experience of successful countries in catching up with and surpassing technology, the proportion of funds for technology introduction, digestion and absorption reached about 1:3, while in China it was 1:0.43 in 2009,1:0.45,438+0 in 2065, and dropped to 0.45,438+in 2065. Technology absorption in key industries is seriously insufficient. The ratio of general equipment manufacturing industry is 1:0.39, special equipment manufacturing industry is 1:0.33, computer industry is only 1:0.05, and instrument industry is 1:0.26. This is the inevitable result of attaching importance to materialized technology investment and ignoring technical ability.
Fifth, the core resource of innovation-brain drain is serious.
Almost all countries in the world have made plans for the introduction and training of innovative talents facing the future. The competition for talents, especially high-end technical talents, is fierce, and many countries focus on the cultivation of the next generation of cutting-edge talents. The brain drain of innovative talents in China is very serious. Relevant authoritative data show that the number of top brain drain in China ranks first in the world, and the average retention rate of science and engineering reaches 87%.
New Challenges of Big Data to China's Non-traditional Security
With the application of new technologies such as cloud computing, cloud storage and Internet of Things, all kinds of data collected and processed by people through social networks, e-commerce platforms, mobile intelligent terminals and sensors are exploding, and the cross-border flow and storage of data are more routine and convenient. In the era of big data, data security is facing more severe challenges. Data sovereignty will become the foundation of governance and governance data and related technologies and infrastructure in all countries.
According to the prediction of professional organizations, it is predicted that by 2020, the global data usage will reach about 40ZB (1zb =10000000000000000000 TB), which will cover all fields of economic and social development and become a new important driving force. In the era of big data, the focus of competition between countries is shifting from the competition for capital, land, population, resources/energy to the competition for big data. Information control right (No.) has become a new right after land, sea and air control right.
At present, with the help of the big data revolution, the global data monitoring capabilities of developed countries such as the United States have been upgraded, which has led to an increase in data security and data defense risks in China. Take the United States as an example In the past, the United States has been monitoring global data intelligence with the help of the Internet and information technology, and has successively launched important strategic plans such as International Strategy for Cyberspace and International Action for Cyberspace to ensure its dominant position in cyberspace and data space. The big data revolution is a "sharp weapon" for the United States to achieve this strategic goal, which can greatly enhance its global data collection capabilities, monitoring capabilities and analysis capabilities, thus posing greater risks to China's big data security and the loss of big data assets.
In addition, the economic security risks in the import and export of goods and services are increasing. China's sustained and rapid economic development is largely due to the active use of foreign advanced equipment and technology, as well as the mature management and services of developed countries. For example, IBM servers of American enterprises, Intel computer equipment, Cisco communication equipment products, Microsoft operating system and so on. All these foreign products have almost monopolized the relevant market in China. According to the research on China's economy and informatization, China's information security exists in name only before the American "Eight donkey kong" (Cisco, IBM, Google, Qualcomm, Intel, Apple, Oracle Bone Inscriptions and Microsoft) represented by Cisco. These enterprises have direct or indirect contact and cooperation with the American security department. When necessary, they can use their products and services to obtain all kinds of information of China government and enterprises, including sensitive economic information, and even directly attack relevant equipment in China.
We believe that information, data and network security in the future era of big data need to pay attention to several key points.
First, global data governance issues.
In the era of big data, there are new changes in data storage and application methods, some of which are cross-regional or even cross-border. The problem of data governance is both prominent and particularly important. In this regard, policy formulation needs to deal with two "rights and interests". First, we must face up to hegemony (foreign monopoly advantage), that is, we must clearly realize that China is still subject to developed countries in network control, key technologies and high-end equipment. The second is to clarify data sovereignty. As an important strategic resource, data, whether owned by individuals or countries, should be included in the scope of sovereignty.
Sovereignty may not be manageable. For example, data is stored abroad, and cloud computing crosses national boundaries, which may not be within your sovereignty. How to transfer power? The key is to have the right of governance, treat different data differently, manage the data that really needs protection effectively, and have practical and reliable means. If we can't manage data effectively, big data will be out of control.
Second, data responsibility sharing.
This problem involves the dispersion of security risks. Information security risks exist in the whole life cycle of data, and the corresponding security responsibilities should be shared from all aspects such as technical ideas, product development, user use and service management. The security issues of big data involve the government, related enterprises, network operators, service providers, data producers, users and other aspects, and their respective security responsibilities must be clarified through policies.
Third, the new infrastructure problem.
The development of big data is inseparable from key infrastructures such as telecommunication network, IDC and even industrial control system, and its security and reliability also depend on these infrastructures. Due to the globalization of supply chain and the privatization of industry, the security between network and key infrastructure becomes more and more complicated. One country's big data may be stored in other countries' networks, and one country's infrastructure may serve multiple countries at the same time, which is highly interdependent on a global scale and challenges the original concept of national sovereignty. Therefore, the safety supervision system of key infrastructure is very important. In China, it is necessary to establish substantive national security review of supply chain and normalized security supervision of basic network as soon as possible.
Fourth, data conflict management.
This issue is related to the interest game of online big data. The resource value of big data is getting higher and higher, and the competition and conflict around big data are becoming more and more fierce. The generation, processing and utilization of big data will greatly change the manifestation and destructive intensity of various conflicts. The contents include protecting intellectual property rights, dealing with cyber crimes, cyber sabotage activities, especially combating cyber terrorism and cyber war threats.
Fifth, data power and benefit distribution.
In terms of global share, China has outstanding potential as a big data country. In 20 10, the proportion of China in the whole digital universe will be 10% and 20 13 years, and it will reach 18% in 2020. By then, China's data scale will surpass that of the United States, ranking first in the world.
However, in reality, there are 65,438+03 root servers in the world, and 65,438+00 of these 65,438+03 root servers (including a master root server) are located in the United States. The world Internet relies heavily on the United States.
Therefore, from the perspective of reconstructing the new global Internet governance order, it is necessary to redistribute the regional weight of ICANN board members according to international indicators such as the number of netizens. Redistribute the multi-center top-level root servers in different geographical regions of the world according to the usage traffic, and form a multi-center top-level root domain name resolution system instead of a single center, which is a real multi-center interconnected global network.