(A) the number of restrictions on the regulatory model
Refers to the mode of supervising annuity investment according to the principle of quantity limitation. The principle of quantity restriction means that the government rigidly controls the investment of enterprise annuity funds, and makes clear restrictions and regulations on market access qualifications, contract terms management, investment portfolio and so on. This model is mainly implemented in civil law countries and developing countries.
(B) prudential supervision model
Refers to the mode of supervising annuity investment and operation according to the principle of prudence. Prudence principle means that the annuity investment manager carefully chooses a portfolio that can best spread risks for the annuity. This model is mainly adopted by common law countries. Under this model, the regulatory agencies relaxed the constraints on contract terms, market access conditions, investment portfolio, etc. Investment and operation are not subject to license restrictions. Regulators rely on auditors, actuaries and intermediary organizations of asset appraisal institutions to supervise the operation of funds, and rarely intervene in the daily activities of funds, only when the parties ask for it or there are problems in fund investment.
China's supervision of enterprise annuity investment operation basically follows the idea of quantity limitation, which is consistent with China's current macro-financial environment, supervision ability and micro-governance level of enterprises, but there are also many problems.
Problems existing in the supervision mechanism of enterprise annuity investment operation in China;
(A) accounting information disclosure and reporting system is not perfect
1. The laws related to information disclosure are not perfect. At present, there is no law specifically for the disclosure of enterprise annuity accounting information in China, and in the limited legislation at present, the information reporting system of each subject is only roughly stipulated, but there is no relevant punishment provision. This makes information disclosure a kind of "vase", which has no substantive binding force and cannot guarantee the right to know of relevant stakeholders at all.
2. Information asymmetry. The operation of enterprise annuity is based on trust relationship and entrustment relationship. There is a trust relationship among enterprises, employees and trustees, and there is a trust relationship between trustees and account managers, investment institutions and custodian banks. Under the imperfect trust law in China, the relationship between the two layers greatly increases the risk of false and inadequate disclosure of annuity information.
3. There are limitations in accounting standards. The accounting subject of enterprise annuity should involve two aspects: one is enterprise annuity fund, the other is enterprise itself. In February, 2006, the Accounting Standards for Enterprise Annuity issued by the Ministry of Finance standardized the accounting treatment and financial statement presentation standards of enterprise annuity funds as independent accounting entities, but there were no rules to follow for enterprises as payment entities.
(2) There are too many funds supervision departments and the supervision efficiency is not high.
The existing laws and regulations 1 1 have established the regulatory position of Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, CSRC, CBRC, CIRC, Ministry of Finance, State Administration of Taxation and other institutions in the enterprise annuity market. Because there are many regulatory agencies involved, it is inevitable that there will be overlapping or gaps in the scope of powers and responsibilities, which will lead to higher negotiation costs and information communication costs, which will not only help improve the regulatory efficiency, but also help improve the operational efficiency of enterprise annuities.
(C) The relevant legal system is not perfect, and there is no unified enterprise annuity law.
So far, there is still no special enterprise annuity law in China. At present, the supervision is carried out according to relevant laws, administrative regulations of the regulatory authorities, or with reference to other laws (such as trust law and contract law). Compared with the laws enacted by the National People's Congress, these departmental rules are not only limited in binding force, but also poor in operability and uniformity in the framework.
(D) the lack of high-quality professional supervisors
The complexity of enterprise annuity business determines that its supervision is difficult and requires high professional quality of supervisors. Supervisors not only need to master the basic knowledge of financial management, financial investment and management information, but also need to understand social security system, laws and regulations, macroeconomic policies and so on. However, the quality of in-service supervisors is uneven.
(E) Lack of interaction with the capital market
From foreign experience, the close relationship between pension fund and capital market has become an important influence force of capital market; The mature and active capital market provides a broad operating space for maintaining and increasing the value of pension funds. As an important part of pension, the development of enterprise annuity market in China was initially considered as good news in the capital market. But on the one hand, due to the small annuity scale, the market is still in its infancy, and the funds invested in the stock market in the short term are limited, which makes it difficult to have a significant impact on the capital market; On the other hand, from the perspective of capital market, China's capital market system is not perfect. In order to control the operational risk of enterprise annuity, the regulatory authorities have restricted its investment scope.