(A) to strengthen the market supervision of voluntary information disclosure
The market supervision of voluntary information disclosure must be based on China's national conditions, fully draw lessons from the securities market supervision experience of mature market economy countries, and establish a set of voluntary information disclosure supervision system from the aspects of completeness, systematicness, dynamics, extensiveness and comparability, so as to standardize the expression and disclosure of voluntary information and reduce the information deviation in voluntary information disclosure. The author thinks: firstly, the audit of voluntary information disclosure by certified public accountants should be strengthened to improve and ensure the credibility and effectiveness of information; Second, establish an insurance system and a civil compensation system for voluntary information disclosure; Third, the regulatory authorities should stipulate anti-fraud clauses and necessary legal responsibilities, and establish a strict punishment mechanism afterwards.
(2) Standardize the formation mechanism of voluntary information disclosure of listed companies.
In the process of voluntary information disclosure, listed companies should embody the principles of openness, fairness and justice, treat all investors equally, objectively, accurately and completely introduce and reflect the actual situation of the company in the process of voluntary information disclosure through shareholders' meetings, websites, analyst meetings, performance briefings, roadshows, one-on-one communication, on-site visits and telephone consultation, so as to avoid insider trading caused by information deviation. Attention should be paid to voluntary information disclosure: (1) When voluntarily disclosing some predictive information, relevant risk factors should be listed in clear warning words to remind investors of possible uncertainties and risks; (2) In voluntary information disclosure, when the situation changes greatly, which makes the disclosed forecast difficult to realize, the listed company shall update the disclosed information in time; (3) The listed company has the obligation to continuously and completely disclose the uncovered unfinished matters until the matter is finally settled.
(C) improve the corporate governance mechanism of listed companies
The basis of mandatory information disclosure is the formulation and enforcement of laws, while the improvement of voluntary information disclosure quality depends on the design and effectiveness of corporate governance. Information deviation and weak corporate governance are companion organisms. To improve the corporate governance mechanism of listed companies, we should: (1) strengthen the supervisory role of the board of directors to prevent the board of directors from being controlled by the management; (2) Optimize the ownership structure of listed companies, standardize the behavior of controlling shareholders, and prevent them from harming the interests of minority shareholders; (3) improve the principal-agent relationship between shareholders and management, and establish an effective incentive and restraint mechanism by perfecting the contract terms of both parties; (4) Give full play to the agency competition function of the manager market and the M&A mechanism of the capital market, and supervise and restrain the company managers externally.