"Gathering troops and valleys" is the only chance for Shu Han to rush out of the local security corner.

Since ancient times, many people like to talk about heroes by success or failure. Just like: Deng Aisheng, many people praise him; Jiang Wei lost, many people lost; Zhuge Liang's northern expedition was futile, and people said that he was too cautious; Jiang Wei miscalculated. People say he likes adventure. In particular, Jiang Wei's strategy of "gathering troops and gathering valleys" is despised by many people, who think that this strategy is the chief culprit of Shu Han's national subjugation. Judging from the results, it seems that Wei Yan and Wang Ping's "sticking to the risk" is extremely safe, but in fact it is only the passive defense of the weak side. In this way, how can Shu Han jump out of the "cage" of Yizhou mountain disaster? It is impossible to make a substantive breakthrough in the Northern Expedition, and it is still the weakest party among the three countries. The dream of defeating the Central Plains can only become an eternal bubble. "Gather troops and gather valleys"-the crystallization of wisdom of two generations of Northern Expeditionaries. Whether Zhuge Liang or Jiang Wei, who inherited his legacy, how could they not know that the strength gap between Wei and Shu is wide, but they are on the same line, knowing that they can't do it; Knowing that there are tigers in the mountains, they tend to go to the tiger mountains, while the unconventional "waiting for the world to change" will take the passive road of the Northern Expedition. Everyone knows that it is easier to drift with the current than to sail against it. Therefore, from the perspective of Jiang Wei's beliefs, he has been doomed to take a bumpy road all his life. Because, with the huge geographical and population base of Cao Wei, if the competitive strength is restored, the weak position of Shu Han will only become weaker and weaker with the passage of time. For example, at that time, the population of Cao Wei was about130 thousand, and the land area was about 3.97 million square kilometers; Shu * * * has a population of about 4 million and a land area of about 6,543.8+0,600 square kilometers. Obviously, under the same conditions, Jiang Wei's restored national strength is more than three times that of Shu Han. After years of superposition, the national strength gap between Wei and Shu will only become more and more wide. Zhuge Liang and Jiang Wei both advocated that the Northern Expedition should attack Wei with weak Shu, which was actually delaying the recovery of Cao Wei's national strength and the continuous expansion of the strength of the two countries. Therefore, Shu Han's Northern Expedition ended Shu Han's national fortune a few years ahead of schedule at most, but it could not change the fate of being destroyed. Because, defeating the strong with the weak is a helpless move of "hurting the enemy by one thousand and losing eight hundred". Then, why did Jiang Wei insist on inheriting Zhuge Liang's legacy of the Northern Expedition? There is a simple reason. The increasingly weak Shu Han, clinging to it, is doomed to national subjugation. However, only the Northern Expedition can change this fate. For this opportunity, whether to seize or give up, the decision is in the hands of those in power in the country. Obviously, the civil and military officials in Shu Han supported rest and recuperation. For example: Jiang Wan, Fei Yi and other successors of Zhuge Liang. However, are these court officials who support recuperation really considering the development of the country? Obviously, this is not the case. All DPRK officials who sneaked into Jiangyou, Yinping, and then went to Luoxian County through Mianzhu, United as one, and collectively supported surrender. It can be seen that most of these officials in Shu and Han dynasties were vegetarians, and they probably all held the idea of working less. Who wants to fight? Therefore, regardless of whether Jiang Wei's Northern Expedition is "militaristic" or not, he is definitely a national cadre with conscience only by his work style of "being in office, seeking politics and doing his duty". As the saying goes, "when you are busy, you are busy, and you often make suggestions when you are free." According to the Records of the Three Kingdoms, from 238 to 262 AD, Jiang Wei made eleven northern expeditions, two victories, three small victories, four draws, one big defeat and one small defeat. Although victory or defeat is a common occurrence among military strategists, it was criticized by many North Korean officials for failing to achieve the strategic goal of the Northern Expedition. Even Liao Hua once advised: "Don't try to do difficult things." In other words, from the imperial court to its subordinates, the significance of the Northern Expedition was questioned. Faced with such pressure, Jiang Wei put forward the strategy of "gathering troops and gathering valleys" through the research of two generations of Northern Expeditions. It can not only quell the voice of the imperial court against the Northern Expedition, but also conform to its own style of doing things. The key is that it is very likely to hit the main force of Cao Wei in one fell swoop and realize the dream of Shu Han breaking out of the "cage" of the Northern Expedition. "Gather troops and gather valleys"-the last chance for Shu Han to turn around gorgeously. So, what happened to the plan of "gathering troops and gathering valleys"? What is the essential difference between Wei Yan's "risk sharing" strategy and Wei Yan's? "Gather troops to gather in the valley": When the spies heard that the enemy was attacking Hanzhong, they contracted the troops stationed in various places, evacuated the people to the rear, hoarded food and grass, and gathered troops in the towns of Han, Le and Yang 'an to prevent the enemy from invading. At the same time, the "Flying Army", the ace unit of the mountain war between Shu and Han, was guerrilla to turn to the grain and grass line thousands of miles away from the enemy, which caused the enemy's grain and grass to be poor and the soldiers to be tired. When the enemy retreats, the main forces of the cities will pursue them, and the guerrillas will set up obstacles on various dangerous roads and intercept and block them layer by layer. At this time, it will form a trend of "closing the door and beating the dog", which is very likely to destroy the invading enemy. Then, with the division of victory coming out from Longyou and Qishan, it is entirely possible to easily break through the Cao-Wei defense line in Longyou and Qishan, thus occupying Cao-Wei Guanzhong in one fell swoop, and then recovering the Central Plains and unifying the world will no longer be just a dream. "Hold on to the risks separately": hold on to the dangers everywhere with heavy troops and stop the invading enemy. Both Wei Yan and Wang Ping used this strategy to ensure the safety of Hanzhong, the barrier of Shu State, for decades. Analysis of the advantages of "gathering troops and grain" and "sticking to risks separately": Obviously, "sticking to risks separately" can only play a passive defense role. The enemy can come and go whenever he wants, and the initiative is in the hands of the enemy. It is difficult to change the situation of Shu in essence, but it has a great advantage, that is, "stability"; "Gathering troops to gather the valley" is a new strategy to defend the enemy under the combination of "luring the enemy in depth" and "closing the door and beating the dog", which may make the future enemies catch the whole gang, thus reversing the embarrassing situation that Shu Han was trapped in Yizhou in one fell swoop. However, there are also great risks. If anything happens to Han, Dong and An Yang, and everything is empty, the gate of Shu Han will be gone. Jiang Wei can say that "gathering troops and gathering valleys" is the only godsend opportunity for Liu Bei's gorgeous reversal since the founding of Shu State. Otherwise, the fate of Shu Han is only a few years earlier and a few years later. ""Gather troops to gather in the valley ""-killed by a villain, stillborn, as the saying goes: how big the risk is, how big the opportunity is. Regrettably, Jiang Wei drank the bitter wine of "gathering troops and gathering valleys", but what Shu Han lost was a godsend opportunity to turn around Gan Kun. Then, what is the root cause of the failure of the strategy of "gathering troops and gathering valleys"? What happened to the "three villains" directly killed the once-in-a-lifetime good plan of "gathering troops and gathering valleys"? Why did Jiang Wei go to "wasteland" to avoid disasters? Was it not framed by eunuch Huang Hao and right general Yan Yu? Before Jiang Wei went to the stack, he ordered Hu Ji, the governor of Hanzhong, to retreat to Hanshou, the general Wang Ai to keep Lecheng, and the bodyguard Jiang Bin to keep Seoul, and set up fortifications in Xi 'an, Jianwei, Wuwei, Shimen, Wucheng, Jianchang and Linyuan. It can be said that the defensive deployment of "gathering troops and gathering valleys" at that time basically reached a foolproof level. However, from Tuzhong to Hanzhong, 393.8 kilometers have recently passed through 3 13 provincial highway and 10-day expressway. Obviously, Jiang Wei has lost the opportunity to deal with the front-line crisis, which leads to the passive defense of Shu Han everywhere. At the same time, in view of Zhong Hui's military rule in Guanzhong, Jiang Wei once assisted and should send troops to stop Wei from transferring troops. What is hateful is that Huang Hao deceived by "evil words" and said that Wei would not send troops. The key point is that Liu Chan took it for granted and ignored it, virtually cutting another knife on the defense line of "gathering troops and gathering valleys". The third villain is Jiang Shu who surrendered in the battle. Jiang Shu was originally the governor of Xing Wu, but because of his incompetence, he was demoted to Hanzhong by the court to assist Fu Qian, the governor of Guanzhong, in defending Yang 'an Pass. At that time, Zhong Hui led an army to attack Shu and surrounded the cities of Han and Le. After a long time, he couldn't attack them. He wrote a letter to persuade Jiang Bin, son of Jiang Wan, commander of Seoul, to surrender, but he was rejected. In desperation, I retired with my life. At the critical moment, Jiang Shu, deputy governor of Yang 'an Pass, surrendered, and the bell would be "as big as a treasure house". Since then, the defense line of "gathering soldiers and gathering valleys" has been broken, which indicates the early death of painting "gathering soldiers and gathering valleys". Therefore, there is no problem for Jiang Wei to "gather troops and gather valleys" and there is no problem for employing people. The main problem is obviously in the court. If Jiang Wei has Zhuge Liang's authority, this plan will have a perfect ending. Unfortunately, if. "Gathering Soldiers and Gathering Valley"-A meteor on the road to charge, from Jiang Wei's eleven northern expeditions to his plan to gather troops and gather valley, and then to his fake surrender, stayed on the road to charge all his life, hardly defending, and basically attacking. If the plan of "gathering troops and gathering valleys" is a meteor on the road of charge, then "pretending to surrender" is the brilliant glory left by the meteor. Jiang Wei's plan of "gathering troops and gathering valleys" has failed, and Liu Chan surrendered to Wargo. However, Jiang Wei's persistent belief in the charge has not changed, and he has no idea of surrendering for wealth. Instead, he implemented the plan of "pretending to surrender". Jiang Wei wants to persuade the enemy generals to rebel, and it is not difficult for him to kill them again and recapture Shu. In 346 AD, after the Eastern Jin Dynasty's constant temperature destroyed the Han regime, its Ministry found a secret letter written by Jiang Wei to Liu Chan in the secret archives of the imperial court: "May your majesty endure humiliation for a few days, and I want to restore the country's security, the sun and the moon will be peaceful, and I will see the light of day again." So that Jiang Wei's plan of "pretending to surrender" was made public. As a result, Jiang Wei, as a general, actually persuaded Zhong Hui, an enemy general, to rebel, and gained the trust of Zhong Hui, trying to allocate 50,000 generals to support each other. Unfortunately, such a shocking plan was not beheaded because Zhong realized the friendship of his colleagues, but was finally beheaded. Jiang Wei died by the sword and his wife and children were implicated. Perhaps Jiang Wei may not be better than Wargo in tactics, but his ingenious plan of "gathering troops and gathering valleys" can definitely be called a jaw-dropping strategic layout. Combined with his plan of "pretending to surrender", Jiang Wei is definitely a rare strategic master in history. Although Jiang Wei's strategy of "gathering troops to gather in the valley" and "pretending to surrender" is suspected of "desperate", if not, how can Shu Han have a chance to oppose Gan Kun? Image source network