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Brilliance bankruptcy reorganization
165438+1On October 20th, Shenyang Intermediate People's Court ruled that it accepted the creditor reorganization application of Brilliance Automobile Group Holding Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as "Brilliance Holdings"), which marked that this automobile enterprise officially entered the bankruptcy reorganization procedure.
The court ruled that Brilliance Holdings' assets were insufficient to pay off all debts and had the bankruptcy reasons stipulated in the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law. But at the same time, it has the value and possibility of saving and the necessity and feasibility of reorganization.
A month ago, Brilliance Holdings defaulted on its bonds for the first time and was subsequently applied for bankruptcy and reorganization by creditors.
17123 October, Brilliance Holdings failed to pay private placement bond "17 Huaqi 05" on schedule, resulting in a major breach of contract. (Reply to "Brilliance Holdings" in the background to view the original text)
Subsequently, the credit ratings of Brilliance Holdings and its related debts were downgraded several times, and Dagong International and Oriental Jincheng finally downgraded their credit ratings from the initial AAA level to CCC level.
credit rating
165438+ 10 13, Brilliance Holdings was applied for bankruptcy and reorganization by creditors. The applicant is Gezhi Automobile Technology Co., Ltd., and the case number is (2020) Liao 0 1 Bao Shen No.27.
Bankruptcy reorganization information
It is worth noting that the bankruptcy reorganization of Brilliance Holdings will affect BMW's acquisition transaction.
2065438+In April 2008, the China Municipal Government announced that it would relax the restrictions on the foreign share ratio of China's automobile industry and open the China passenger car market in 2022. Subsequently, Brilliance Holdings and BMW reached an agreement to transfer 25% of the ownership of BMW Brilliance to the latter for 3.6 billion euros, and at the same time extend the operation period of the joint venture company to 2040.
The delivery of the above transactions will be completed when conditions permit in 2022. After the transaction is completed, Brilliance Holdings will lose control of BMW Brilliance.
Recently, BMW said in an email that for BMW, there is no indication that the validity of the previous contract will be limited by the status quo of the parent company of Brilliance, and the operation of BMW Brilliance will not be affected by the debt of Brilliance.
According to the latest statistics, Brilliance Holdings has constituted a total of 6.5 billion yuan in debt default and 65.438+0.44 billion yuan in overdue interest.
By the end of the second quarter of this year, Brilliance Holdings had total assets of 65.438+093.325 billion yuan, total liabilities of 65.438+032.844 billion yuan and asset-liability ratio of 68.72%. After deducting goodwill and intangible assets, the asset-liability ratio is 765.438+0.4%.
According to the statistics of small debt market, Brilliance Holdings currently has 13 bonds, with a scale of 162 billion yuan, which is huge. More importantly, how will its debts exceeding130 billion be resolved after bankruptcy and reorganization?
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Yongmei may trigger a cross default of 26.5 billion yuan.
On June165438+1October 10, Yongcheng Coal and Electricity Holding Group Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as "Yongmei Holdings") failed to pay the principal and interest in full and on time due to the shortage of liquidity, which constituted a material breach of contract, and the amount of principal and interest in default was RMB 65.438+0.32 billion. (Reply to "Yongmei Holdings" in the background to view the original text)
Subsequently, China Chengxin International downgraded the credit ratings of Yongmei Holdings and related debts from AAA to BB, and put them on the watch list for possible downgrade.
It is worth noting that the cliff-breaking downgrade of China Chengxin International was not only questioned by the market, but also investigated by self-discipline for allegedly violating relevant regulations.
credit rating
Surprisingly, Yongmei Holdings defaulted, which caused great waves in the credit bond market.
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After Yongmei Holdings defaulted, the secondary market plunged and trampled, and the issuers of abnormal bonds spread from coal enterprises to city investment and local state-owned enterprises, and the market suddenly "turned pale when talking about debt".
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As the market fluctuates greatly, it is not uncommon to cancel the issuance in the primary market. According to statistics, since Yongmei Holdings defaulted, more than 28 publicly issued bonds have been cancelled or postponed, with a scale of 22.6 billion yuan.
Different from previous defaults, this round of debt defaults represented by AAA-level state-owned enterprises are mostly unexpected to investors. Even before the Yongmei coal mine explosion, the benefits were released continuously, and the sudden breach of contract had a great impact on the market belief, and even the remarks about Yongmei's "evasion of debts" were rampant.
Subsequently, Henan bureau-level financial officials responded to the default of Yongmei Holdings, saying that the government must support enterprises to get out of the trough, and there is absolutely no problem of evading debts; The government will not support enterprises to evade debts, which is not in line with the laws of the market, but there is no principle to help.
This round of debt default represented by AAA state-owned enterprises is mostly unexpected by investors.
According to the relevant agreement, Yongmei Holdings can get a grace period of 65,438+00 working days after the cross-default clause is triggered. If the debt cannot be fully repaid within this period, the company may face a great risk of cross-default.
A week after the default, Yunenghua Group and Yongmei Holdings communicated with investors about "20 Yongmei SCP003" and the extension of the principal of the two bonds that are about to expire, but at present some creditors disagree with the extension plan, which also means that the 26.5 billion Yunenghua and Yongmei bonds may trigger cross-default.
According to the statistics of "small debts look at the market", Yongmei Holdings currently has 23 bonds with a stock size of 2,346,438+0 billion yuan; The bonds of Yunenghua Group are 2 1, with a scale of 2610.30 billion yuan.
According to the latest news, Yongmei Holdings has given a revised plan. Compared with the previous direct extension of 270 days, Yongmei indicated that it can pay 5% of the principal first and then extend the remaining principal.
The grace period of ten working days is approaching, and whether Yu Nenghua and Yongmei can trigger a cross-default of 26.5 billion debts will continue to be tracked by "small debts to see the market".
By the end of the third quarter of this year, the total liabilities of Yongmei Holdings were 654.38+034.395 billion yuan, and the asset-liability ratio was 77.84%. The total debt of Yunenghua Group is 265.438+05.476 billion yuan, and the asset-liability ratio is 865.438+0.55%. Yu Nenghua's debt situation is even heavier.
It is worth noting that in this round of credit debt turmoil, the regulatory performance is very positive. In response to Yongmei's breach of contract, the Dealers' Association informed the intermediaries of the violation for two consecutive days, and at the same time issued a document referring to the structured issuance of bonds.
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Violet crisis
165438+1October16, Ziguang Group Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as "Ziguang Group") and "17 Ziguang PPN005" were invalid, no effective resolution was formed, and the extension plan was not adopted.
This means that Ziguang Group "17 Ziguang PPN005" has a substantial default, which is the first time that Ziguang Group has defaulted on its bonds. (Reply to "Yongmei Holdings" in the background to view the original text)
After Founder Group, another large school-enterprise is in debt crisis.
It is worth noting that after the default of Ziguang Group, the bonds of Tsinghua Holdings, the parent company, plummeted and stopped trading for many times. The default of "17 Ziguang PPN005" may lead to cross-default between Ziguang Group and Tsinghua Holdings.
The debt crisis of Ziguang Group originated from the abandonment of redemption of perpetual bonds in June 5438+10, and the market's concerns about its financial situation and solvency intensified. Subsequently, many of its bonds plummeted and were suspended for many times by the Shanghai Stock Exchange.
Soon, China Chengxin International downgraded the credit rating of the main body and related debts of Ziguang Group from AAA to AA, and continued to be included in the watch list for possible downgrade.
credit rating
In recent years, a series of large-scale mergers and acquisitions of Ziguang Group have laid a hidden danger for today's debt explosion.
In 20 17, Ziguang Group received a total of150 billion yuan of investment and financing support, and since then it has entered the outbreak period of mergers and acquisitions. Has acquired dozens of companies, such as Heine Wiltai (002058. SZ), Western Securities (002673. SZ), Xianglong Electric, Yinglite, etc.
While the chip strength has improved, the financial situation of Ziguang Group has gone from bad to worse.
By the end of September this year, Ziguang Group had total assets of 300.753 billion yuan, total liabilities of 265.438+00.686 billion yuan and asset-liability ratio of 70.05%. Domestic bonds 12, scale17.4 billion yuan, and the redemption period is mainly concentrated in 202 1 year.
From 20 18, with the reform of school-enterprise system, Ziguang Group began to reorganize, and at the same time gradually sold its subsidiaries to seek war investment, which was a way of frequent financing in the past two years.
However, the market is not optimistic about the restructuring process of Ziguang Group and the introduction of war investment, and it keeps selling bonds, causing the secondary market to plummet.
Within a month, three high-credit bonds that used to be AAA defaulted one after another, and the "state-owned enterprise belief" and "school-enterprise belief" were constantly strongly impacted.
On the one hand, in the first three quarters of this year, due to the improvement of the financing environment of the epidemic, the credit risk exposure slowed down compared with the same period of last year, but the default risk of credit bonds accelerated in the fourth quarter.
On the other hand, unlike the 20 18 wave of default by private enterprises, large state-owned enterprises, leading enterprises and high-credit bonds have defaulted one after another this year. In addition to being questioned by the market, rating agencies are also facing enormous market pressure, and financial institutions participating in the issuance are also facing the risk of being supervised and investigated.
With the occurrence of recent default events, investors will pay more attention to credit risk, the credit research system will also change accordingly, and the future credit risk pricing will be more market-oriented.