Take September 2020 as an example, the overdue rate is 57.03%. The overdue rate at the end of 2020 10 was 62.32%. By the end of 202 1 and 1, the overdue rate climbed to 76.04%. (Sack Fortune 20 19 12 no longer has P2P loans, and there is no new loan to dilute bad debts. A large number of historical bad debts have settled up to now, which is also the reason for the increase in overdue rate). It is not difficult to see that its overdue rate will climb by 4%~5% every month.
What is even more amazing is that most overdue loans are overdue loans for more than 90 days, commonly known as "bad debts".
The last public data disclosure of Sack Wealth stayed at 202 1 1 3 1, and there was no data disclosure after that.
In addition, in my impression, the data of sack wealth in 2020 1 month should be released in February, but it seems to be delayed until March.
Another trap is that the data published by sack wealth will be taken off the shelf, and it is difficult for people to track the development of their credit risk through historical data.
Overdue bad debts are one of the risks and the fundamental risk, but they are by no means the only risk.
According to the simplest way of understanding, there are too many overdue bad debts, and there will definitely be problems in the cash flow recovery of the platform, which may lead to a liquidity crisis.
If we want to solve the liquidity crisis, there are only two ways: attracting more lenders' funds to take over, or simply using our own or third-party funds.
From June, 5438 to February, 2020, the overdue amount of gunny bag financing for more than 90 days increased by more than 654.38+billion, but the compensation amount was only 654.38+million. Is this enough?
Sack wealth makes me feel more like the former.
This involves another important source of online loan risk: the transfer pricing of creditor's rights.
Many people say that P2P financial management is a Ponzi scheme, but it is also about the pricing of creditor's rights in essence. When transferring the creditor's rights, in order to "borrow the new and return the old", the platform often transfers the creditor's rights to the receiver at a price much higher than the market value.
In order to understand this, we might as well consider it from the perspective of the lender's income.
In June 5438+February last year, the cumulative investor income of Sack Wealth was 65 10000 yuan higher than that of 165438, that is, the lender income generated in June 5438+00000 yuan.
According to the investment interface of sack wealth at that time, its yield was 6.5% in 95 days, 7.5% in 185 days and 8.5% in 365 days. Assuming that the average income is 7.5%, the investment amount corresponding to the income of 656 1 million yuan generated in June 5438+February is about 1, 5 1 * 12/7.5%, far exceeding the loan balance.
It is worth noting that its loan balance is less than 4.9 billion, of which more than 3.5 billion are claims overdue for more than 90 days.
Can the overdue creditor's rights of about 654.38+03 billion yuan at that time support the payment of more than 60 million yuan to the borrower every month? This is worth pondering! At the same time, the officially disclosed interest balance only decreased by 6.5438+0.022 million yuan, a huge difference.
Taking June 5438+February 2020 as an example, the lender's investment in sack financing is about 65.438+0.34 billion yuan. About 5 billion plates, do you need 1 100 million lenders to increase funds in a month? This is also worth pondering!
To sum up, I personally think that Sack Wealth may make up the deficit caused by bad debts with the new funds of lenders, thus filling the principal and interest of lenders who need to quit.
Only in this way can we explain why the lender's loan principal (calculated by investment income) is higher than the loan principal balance (loan balance), why the new investment income of 65438+ last February can be as high as 60 million yuan, and why the monthly new investment of 65438+ last February and 65438+ this year 10 can be close to 65438 billion yuan.
Many people invest in sacks of wealth because of the background of CITIC Group, thinking that CITIC Group may take into account its own reputation.
However, pinning your hopes on others is the most unreliable.
The main body of Sack Wealth is Shanghai An Kai Information Technology Co., Ltd., and its shareholders are mostly equity investment institutions. From the perspective of equity penetration, CITIC Group does not hold many shares.
Moreover, shareholders generally only bear the responsibility within the scope of capital contribution, and the registered capital of sack wealth subject 1. 1 billion yuan is only a fraction of the amount of bad debts. ...
Perhaps it is CITIC, Zhongtengxin, Xiaohua Wallet, which are related to sack wealth, that quietly tap profits. ...
Perhaps the loan interest rate is too high to support. After all, if the loan interest rate can be around 60%, and there are more than one billion overdue loans, it will be enough to support the lender's income of about 60 million. ........................................................................................................................ Xiaohua wallet and sack wealth are accused of involving yin and yang contracts, and the annual interest rate of beheading far exceeds 36%.
It may also be that there are too many lenders willing to continue investing, which leads to abundant liquidity of sack wealth, so there is no redemption crisis. I remember looking at the bidding situation in May this year, I found that lenders willing to invest hundreds of thousands or even millions of dollars in sacks abound. ...
In short, at present, sack wealth has not exploded, and no one is sure whether it will explode in the future. I just hope that everyone will be rational when paying money.