Analytical framework of corporate governance theory

From a historical perspective, the boundaries of corporate governance framework are constantly expanding. Its expansion path is: owner governance-owner and operator governance-owner, operator and stakeholders co-governance.

(family business) (Berry and means business) (modern business)

Second, the empirical study of corporate governance

Ownership and corporate governance

Archian and Demsetz (1972) briefly discussed the difference between private enterprises and socialist enterprises with the theory of joint investment and team production. Zhan Sen and meckling (1979) pointed out that Soviet-style state-owned enterprises often can't give proper incentives to individuals in the course of operation. Zhang (1995a) thinks that the state-owned principal-agent relationship in China is a multi-layer principal-agent relationship, and the optimal supervision enthusiasm of the initial principal (the same subject member) and the optimal work effort of the final agent decrease with the extension of the agency chain. Lin Yifu (1997a) put forward different opinions, arguing that when solving the problem of sufficient information in a competitive market, the principal-agent relationship will not be different because of different levels.

Another issue related to ownership and corporate governance is the governance of transitional companies. Boico and others (boyco, M., A. Shleifer and Vishny, R., 1994) discussed different ways of privatization of state-owned companies. Boico believes that privatization is an effective means to solve the corruption of government officials. After privatization, the efficiency of state-owned enterprises will be improved, but the efficiency of different privatization methods is also different. They pointed out that Britain, the Democratic Republic of Germany, Hungary and some Asian countries adopted direct sales, while Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union adopted popular private methods due to historical and practical political reasons, which were relatively inefficient and full of contradictions.

Jones and Mygind (1999) have made an empirical analysis of Estonian privatized companies, which shows that the hypothesis that privatization leads to the optimization of ownership structure may not hold water. Estrin and Roseveare (1999) also made an empirical study on 1997 and 150 Ukrainian privatized companies, which also showed that privatization did not improve the performance and expected restructuring of Ukrainian companies, and concluded that ownership had nothing to do with company performance.