As far as system design is concerned, the fulfillment of corporate social responsibility can not be separated from the perfect design of legal system and ethical system. For example, the government should encourage enterprises to take social responsibility through government procurement and simplifying administrative procedures; Legislators should encourage investors, especially institutional investors, to invest in corporate social responsibility.
As far as business practice is concerned, companies should consciously introduce social responsibility policies that are beneficial to workers, consumers, environmental interests and social interests. The highest level of corporate social responsibility movement is not to force enterprises to assume social responsibility through the strong pressure of law and external public opinion, but to help the concept of corporate social responsibility take root deeply in the hearts of corporate investors and their operators and turn it into a voluntary corporate social responsibility movement at any time.
Corporate social responsibility has both substantive and procedural significance. As a procedural concept, corporate social responsibility requires that corporate decision-making procedures consider and reflect social interests and social rights. For example, the employee supervisor system in Germany allows employee representatives to participate in the company's decision-making procedures (such as appointing and removing directors, determining directors' remuneration and other major decisions) and supervision activities by serving as supervisors. As a substantive concept, corporate social responsibility requires that the results of corporate decision-making can be responsible for social interests and social rights. For example, the state legislation in the United States that adopts the theory of corporate stakeholders allows the board of directors of companies to take anti-takeover measures in order to enhance the legitimate rights and interests of stakeholders, rather than sticking to the thinking mode of maximizing shareholders' interests when making anti-takeover decisions.