Suppose the manager (or entrepreneur) signs a contract with the investor, which stipulates how the manager will use the funds and how the investment income will be distributed between the manager and the investor. If both parties can sign a complete contract, which clearly stipulates how the manager should deal with it in any possible situation in the future, then any conflict of interest or management decision will not occur. In other words, with such a complete contract, the agency problem will not happen. However, in fact, it is impossible to predict all possible things in the future, that is, it is impossible to sign a complete contract. This means that managers and investors must allocate decision-making power when there is no clear uncertain event in the contract. Because external investors have no ability or interest to make business decisions, managers finally gain residual control, that is, investors provide funds to the company, but they do not participate in the company's daily decisions. Therefore, many listed companies have formed a situation of "strong managers and weak shareholders"