1, classical family business. The ownership and management rights of classical family enterprises are combined into one, and a family has absolute control over the enterprise.
The simplification of ownership structure of 1. 1 is not conducive to the expansion of enterprise scale. Highly centralized enterprise ownership and management rights determine the simplification of enterprise investment subjects, and it is difficult for enterprises to absorb external capital. Limited resources within the family make it difficult to meet the needs of enterprise expansion.
1.2 unscientific decision-making is not conducive to the long-term survival of enterprises. In most classical family businesses, not only important business decisions, but also daily general management decisions are mostly made by parents of family businesses.
1.3 unclear property rights. The phenomenon of vague property rights in family enterprises is common, which is manifested in: unclear property rights among family members. Due to the weak concept of legal system and the influence of China traditional culture's concepts of "family harmony" and "human harmony", enterprises generally do not divide property rights at the beginning of their establishment, which will bring crisis to the development of enterprises sooner or later, and even make enterprises come to an end. "The relationship between family business and external property rights is not clear. In order to get the support of the government, some enterprises often become "red hat" or "fake collective" enterprises by affiliated with state-owned or collective enterprises. This will lead to property rights disputes and increase the operating expenses of enterprises.
1.4 financial opacity, financing difficulties. Classical family business is naturally "closed", so it is difficult for the outside world to know the financial situation of the enterprise and dare not rashly enter.
1.6 "successor" problem. This has been plaguing countless family businesses. Scholars who study the history of family businesses find that at least 80% of family businesses that transferred all their wealth to the next generation died in the second generation, and only 13% of family businesses were inherited by the third generation. As the saying goes, "one generation starts a business, the second generation stays in business, and the third generation fails."
1.7 others. Classical family business itself is a flawed supervision system, and the rules and regulations of the enterprise are useless to family members, which makes the "parents" of the enterprise wander between family ties and systems and affect their work. In addition, most of the classical family enterprises did not form a corporate culture, did not pay attention to social benefits, exploited non-family members in disguise, and the labor relations deteriorated.
2. Modern family business. The ownership and management rights of modern family businesses are relatively separated. Due to the introduction of external talents or the absorption of external investment, there are two situations: one is that a family still holds the controlling stake in the enterprise and entrusts external experts or enterprises to operate the target enterprise, that is, the mode of "high ownership-low control". In this model, because the family holds the controlling stake in the enterprise, it has the ultimate substantive control over the enterprise. The other is that a family lost its controlling stake in order to absorb foreign capital, but still firmly controlled the enterprise, forming a substantial control, that is, the "low ownership-high control" model.
2. 1 corporate culture is difficult to form. Corporate culture is the concentrated expression of the mental outlook and inner beliefs of all employees. Due to the influence of family internal relations, the corporate culture of family enterprises inevitably has a strong family color, and it is difficult for non-family members to integrate into it and form a cohesive corporate culture.
2.2 It is difficult to establish a scientific restraint and incentive mechanism. Because the culture of family business is difficult to form, the incentive system can only be linked to money. Because money is in the hands of the family, more prizes and less prizes are all decided by the family, and it is easy to walk into the misunderstanding that money is always thought of when it comes to rewards. Moreover, the incentive mechanism of family enterprises is subjective and arbitrary, and enterprises do not pay attention to meeting the needs of managers in other aspects, so it is impossible to establish a scientific incentive system.
2.3 The employment mechanism is backward. Mainly in: 1. Value loyalty over talent. 2. Employers have no long-term planning, generally do not train employees, do not visit and study, and do not conduct actual inspections. 3. High-tech talents and management talents can't get their due status and respect. They always feel that they are "working" for others, which is not conducive to exerting their talents.
2.4 The correct trap of working parents. It is generally difficult for enterprise "parents" to accept the reality of retiring from the highest position in the enterprise, so they are unwilling to hand over their rights too early and let new and more capable people take his place. Enterprise "parents" often can't handle the relationship between decentralization and centralization, and there is often an embarrassing situation of "wanting to get together but not letting go".