What are the problems in China's market economy mechanism?

Problems existing in the capital market structure

1. The investment subject structure is unreasonable.

The structure of investors in China's capital market is unreasonable. At present, investors are mainly individual investors, and the number of institutional investors is relatively small, which is quite different. The investment behavior of individual investors is mainly speculation, and its investment behavior depends on the individual's investment preference for securities products, which has great randomness in the market and increases instability; Institutional investors pay more attention to the fundamental analysis of listed companies and choose strategic investment objects for rational value investment, which is an important force to stabilize the capital market. However, at present, institutional investors such as pension funds and insurance funds in the market are still relatively weak, and it is difficult to meet the needs of investment institutionalization, which hinders the function of this stable capital market.

2. The structure of listed companies is unreasonable.

(1) The ownership structure of listed companies is unreasonable. Mainly reflected in: ① the state shares, legal person shares and other non-tradable shares are too concentrated, leading to the phenomenon of "one share dominates"; The proportion of public tradable shares is very low, and most of the shares cannot be listed and circulated; ③ The circulating shares are too scattered and the proportion of institutional investors is small; ④ The largest shareholder of a listed company is not a natural person, but usually a holding company. The unreasonable ownership structure of listed companies has caused many problems: because state shares and legal person shares cannot be listed and circulated, state shares and legal person shares always account for the main part of listed companies' shares. In this case, although the state-owned enterprises are restructured into joint-stock companies, they are still the original state-owned enterprises in essence, and it is difficult to expect them to truly change their operating mechanisms. In this way, although listing helps enterprises to obtain funds directly in the market, thus alleviating operational difficulties, in the long run, the impact on their corporate governance structure may not be ideal. At the same time, in the case that state-owned shares and legal person shares are always dominant, the scale of tradable shares is small, which is easy to form a situation in which large institutions manipulate the market. Moreover, because state-owned shares cannot be traded and transferred freely, asset merger and reorganization determined by the market cannot happen. Mergers and acquisitions in the stock market can only take place at the behest of government departments, which determines that speculation in the China stock market is inevitable.

(2) The structure of listed companies is unreasonable. Mainly reflected in: ① the proportion of state-owned enterprises is large, and the proportion of non-state-owned enterprises is small; The proportion of large and medium-sized enterprises is large, and the proportion of small enterprises is small; (3) There are many state-controlled listed companies, but there are few listed companies in the whole enterprise; ④ There are many listed companies in traditional industries and few listed companies in high-tech industries. For example, among more than 200 listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets, the proportion of private enterprises listed through direct listing and shell purchase is only about 16%; There are great defects in the distribution of industries, such as too many listed companies in traditional industries and more than 85% enterprises in competitive fields; More than 65% of the shares cannot flow, which is a great waste of social resources.

3. The structure of financial products is unreasonable.

(1) Traditional financial services products have a single structure. In banking, business is concentrated in traditional retail business areas such as credit. Even in the traditional retail business, there is a lack of a series of products that provide all-round financial services for enterprises, and the wholesale business such as financial intermediary is seriously insufficient; However, foreign banks will provide a series of financial services during the whole development period, maturity period and even the second venture period. In the securities market, China's stock market has developed rapidly compared with the bond market, and there are also problems in the circulation of legal person shares and state-owned shares and the merger of A shares and B shares.

(2) The development of financial derivatives lags behind. Derivative instruments are one of the important means for enterprises to avoid or disperse management and investment risks. 199 1 year, China established a futures market, but the trading varieties were limited to commodity futures such as mung beans and non-ferrous metals. So far, interest rates, exchange rates, stock index futures, options, currency swaps and equity swaps have not been introduced to avoid financial risks. Due to the lack of financial derivatives necessary for portfolio investment, the behaviors of all kinds of investors tend to be consistent, which is easy to form unilateral operation of the market and may lead to risk accumulation when macroeconomic operation and financial supervision direction change.

(3) Lack of innovation in financial instruments. Under the development trend of globalization and integration of financial industry, with the development of electronic technology, the financial industry in various countries has rapidly realized the electronization and networking of financial industry, in order to improve their competitiveness and expand their living and development space in the increasingly fierce international competition. China's banking and securities industry has basically realized electronization, and the networking of banking and securities business has also started, but there is still a big gap compared with the developed level abroad. At the same time, due to institutional problems, financial institutions are fighting for each other in the process of electronization and networking. For example, the bank's automatic withdrawal system and settlement system operate independently and are incompatible with each other, which increases the development cost of electronic and networked financial industry and inhibits its rapid development because of uneconomical scale and insufficient convenience.

4. The hierarchical structure of the capital market is unreasonable.

China's capital market system is single in structure and lacks hierarchy. First of all, from the perspective of easy supervision and risk prevention, a single capital market centered on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges has been formed, and there is no multi-level market system to meet market demand. At present, there is only the main board market in China. Although the SME board has been launched, there is still a considerable distance from the real second board market. The third board market is far from forming a climate, and the capital market lacks hierarchy, which cannot meet the diversified investment and financing requirements of investors and fundraisers. The property right transaction system is not perfect, and the development of the capital market system is not perfect.

(B) Problems in the capital market system

1, institutional problems

The problems of China's capital market system are mainly institutional problems. China's capital market is a "planned" capital market due to the intervention of the government and administrative agencies. First of all, the capital primary market is subject to administrative monopoly, which affects the socialization of the market financing system and the opening of financing channels. In order to ensure local fiscal revenue, local governments seldom consider the growth of listed companies. Therefore, enterprises will focus on "government public relations" and "packaging and listing" rather than on production, operation and structural adjustment. Many listed companies did not carry out substantial restructuring before listing. The main purpose is to "circle money" and fail to make effective use of the money. In addition, the issue price-earnings ratio is also limited. One of the reasons why brokers can't perform their duties is that the primary market operates in a way of "break even", and the interests of investors are not protected. 1999, strictly limit the price-earnings ratio of stock issuance. Even if the P/E ratio limit was relaxed later, the primary market rate of return declined, but it did not change the reality of "break even". Secondly, the secondary capital market has the abnormal phenomenon of "policy market". In China's capital market, the government has a strong color of protection for enterprises, which leads to the failure of the stock market to form a market mechanism of survival of the fittest. The existence of "policy market" makes the stock market change with the change of government attitude.

2. Mechanism problems.

To some extent, institutional problems are the main reason for the slow development of China's capital market. It is precisely because of the lag of the system that there are some problems in China's capital market, such as ineffective competition mechanism, weakened restraint mechanism and imperfect incentive mechanism.

(1) Competition mechanism is invalid. In listed companies, one is the lack of market subject with clear property rights relationship, and the other is the lack of market price formed by competition mechanism, which leads to the failure to form an effective resource allocation mechanism in the capital market, and the administrative mechanism has replaced the market mechanism to some extent.

(2) The restraint mechanism is weakened. Most listed companies in China are transformed from state-owned enterprises, and there is a phenomenon of "transformation" without transformation. Mainly manifested in: First, "flop". Change the original name enterprise without fundamental reform into a joint stock limited company, and establish the corresponding organization. The second is to "circle money." Raise funds at a premium in the listing, ensure the qualification of allotment, and achieve the purpose of circling money. In listed companies, state-owned shares are in a controlling position and in a state of "virtual property rights". The original competent department of a listed company intervened in the enterprise as a representative of state-owned shares and was irresponsible for the consequences; Moreover, most members of the board of directors come from major shareholders and enterprises, so it is difficult to really play a supervisory role.

(3) The incentive mechanism is not perfect. Managers of listed companies in developed countries implement the income form of combining spot salary and long-term salary, which has great incentive effect; However, in China, there is only the incentive mode of spot salary, and the change of the stock price of listed companies has no interest relationship with the company's decision-making and operation. As a result, operators pay little attention to the long-term development of enterprises and often sacrifice long-term interests for immediate interests.

3, the problem of rules

The normal operation of the capital market must follow the laws of the market economy and be based on a sound legal system. At present, China has not really established a sound legal system, lacking a complete and effective market supervision system and institutionalized communication and coordination mechanism.

The functions and levels of supervision departments at all levels are not clear, and there is no set of strict and effective measures to ensure them to perform their functions and make them bear corresponding responsibilities, resulting in a large number of post-event supervision and reducing the efficiency of supervision. With the development of the securities market, the management authority and efficiency of securities management institutions need to be strengthened, and the laws and regulations on which supervision is based are not perfect, which lags behind the rapid development of the securities market and increases the difficulty of supervision. For example, the Securities Law has been promulgated, but it lacks corresponding implementation rules and relevant laws; The Securities Exchange Law and the Securities Credit Rating Law have not yet been promulgated. In addition, the formulation, promulgation and implementation of the securities law are too slow, which affects the development of the securities market.