Specifically, through the cooperation between banks and enterprises, banks can issue loans without using deposits, but raise funds by issuing trust wealth management products and distribute them to enterprises. Because trust wealth management products belong to off-balance-sheet assets of banks rather than on-balance-sheet assets, they can be less or even not supervised by banking supervision departments. Bank-trust cooperation mode: At the previous annual meeting of Boao Forum for Asia 20 1 1, Liu suggested that the CBRC pay close attention to the cooperation between "shadow banking" and bank-trust, which will lead to high leverage ratio. These institutions provide liquidity and credit, just like banks and insurance companies. Their wages are higher than those of banks and insurance companies, but their risks and costs are not well measured. Inflation continues to rise, banks tighten monetary policy, and SMEs are hungry for funds. 20 1 1 the ecology of China's financial industry is undergoing profound changes-more and more funds "jump out" of the bank's balance sheet and enter the real economy through various channels. "Shadow banking" has gradually surfaced.
"Shadow banking" is a system, which refers to lending platforms such as entrusted loans, trusts, micro-loans and even pawn shops, as well as "gray" private lending and even usury. The "shadow bank" grows wildly, one is tenacious, and the people have great demand for it, cultivating soil for its development; Secondly, its "invisible" part poses a strong challenge to existing rules and regulations. However, the scale of "shadow banking" is still inconclusive. One of the reasons is that it has developed too fast and there is no clear and unified concept: some people think that financing guarantee is not a "shadow bank" because its capital is essentially bank credit; Some people think that private equity financing and venture capital should be included in the scope, while others suggest that only loans should be counted and equity investment should be ignored, because the substitution effect of equity investment on credit is not obvious.
SG Research recently pointed out in a research report that it is difficult to estimate the exact scale of this kind of lending behavior, but it is estimated that nearly 3 trillion yuan (470 billion US dollars) should flow from the traditional commercial lending channels to the underground banking business. Nomura's estimate is that China's overall shadow banking loan scale has reached 8.5 trillion yuan, and their conclusion is that the market must pay serious attention to this. "There is too much money for banks to put down"-this is the same reason as the emergence of "shadow banking" in various countries.
Taking private lending as an example, the background of its vigorous development is the massive precipitation of private funds. In order to preserve and increase the value of funds, besides buying assets, the most convenient way is to borrow.
From a global perspective, "shadow banking" all stems from the flood of liquidity, but different financial environments in different countries have caused the differentiation of "shadow banking" forms.
Before the American financial crisis, monetary easing, financial innovation continued to deepen, and various derivatives transactions flourished. "Shadow banking" mainly deals in securitized real estate loans, so it is accused as one of the culprits of the crisis.
The situation in China is different. Under the financial control and fund monopoly, "shadow banking" funds are mostly invested in small and medium-sized enterprises. Large state-owned enterprises can obtain large loans from banks at low interest rates, while small and medium-sized private enterprises generally obtain funds through "shadow banking", forming a financial "dual track system".
Some analysts also believe that the shadow system can grow and develop because the interest rate of the formal financial sector is strictly controlled and kept within a narrow range. At the same time, the number of entrepreneurs and other rich people with excessive savings is increasing. When the actual deposit interest rate is negative, they have no intention to deposit money in the bank. At present, the three main risks faced by the banking industry include preventing platform loan risk, real estate credit risk and "shadow banking" risk. In the prevention and control of "shadow banking" risks, it is necessary to do a good job of cooperation between banks and credit companies from off-balance sheet to on-balance sheet in strict accordance with the timetable, strengthen investigation and research on "shadow banking" problems, and do a good job in tracking and analysis.
A considerable part of the "shadow banking" business is called "the shadow of the bank", and its benefits are obvious: it is flexible, full of innovative consciousness, and has a better understanding of local small and medium-sized enterprises, which can effectively solve the "information asymmetry" problem in traditional credit-the bad debt rate of some institutions interviewed by the reporter for many years and payout ratio is zero.
However, regulators are also aware of the risks of "shadow banking", especially at present, many companies "sell dog meat by hanging sheep's heads" and start usury business. In June this year, a "financial guarantee" fund black hole incident occurred in Xiamen, with a book loss of 3.7 billion yuan, which has sounded the alarm. The innovative tools of "shadow banking" and secret financing channels have greatly increased the motivation of capital flow, which has greatly reduced the effect of financial tightening policy on tightening monetary policy.
In fact, the regulatory authorities have begun to try to solve it. On October 2011110, the CBRC issued the Notice of China Banking Regulatory Commission on Further Regulating the Bank-Credit Cooperation Business, requiring commercial banks to transfer the bank-credit cooperation business from off-balance sheet to on-balance sheet before the end of the year, which was restricted by loan-to-deposit ratio. If it is not transferred to the table, the trust company shall withdraw venture capital according to the ratio of 10.5%; In May, Liu, Chairman of the China Banking Regulatory Commission, said at the meeting that it was necessary to focus on preventing and controlling platform loans, real estate credit and "shadow banking" risks.
However, it is difficult to control the "shadow banking" only by the CBRC, and many formats are managed by multiple heads. For example, pawnshops and financial leasing are under the control of the Ministry of Commerce, and financing guarantees are under the control of the Financial Office, the Ministry of Finance and even the SME Bureau.
According to the analysis of the central bank, the total amount of social financing covers 10, but it still cannot cover the real world funding channels. It does not include venture capital and private equity investment, nor does it include huge private lending.
"Unless financial reform is carried out, banks will have enough incentive to lend to small and medium-sized enterprises and diversify their loans, it will be difficult to reduce the importance and growth of the black market." Some experts say this. 20 12 10 the international monetary fund (IMF) issued a warning on China's credit risk. "Although the banking industry in China has maintained a low non-performing loan ratio, the market's concerns about its credit quality, especially small and micro loans, may seriously affect non-bank lending institutions." According to the GFSR report, at present, the book value (PB) of Asian, Middle Eastern and Latin American countries has declined seriously compared with the level of 20 10, among which China's banking industry has the highest decline and the PB is the lowest.
The IMF also warned investors to be alert to the credit risk, liquidity mismatch and moral hazard of non-bank institutions in China.
According to the GFSR report, China's "shadow banking" has expanded rapidly in recent years. Recently, the mainland economy has slowed down, and the overall credit has been suppressed, but the importance of non-bank credit has increased. This enables private enterprises to obtain more credit resources, but it also challenges the financial stability of the whole country.
According to IMF data, since 20 1 1, trust financing has increased greatly in China's financing structure, from less than 20% in the first quarter of 20 1 1 to about 30% in the second quarter of 20 12. Entrusted loans have also grown rapidly. In the third quarter of 20 1 1, this kind of loans accounted for 60% of the total national financing, but in the second quarter of 20 12, the above figure has gradually dropped to about 25%.
In China's shadow banking system, informal lenders are the most opaque, accounting for about 6% to 8% of the national GDP, mainly serving small and medium-sized enterprises. At present, these enterprises are facing high credit risk, which is reflected in the loan interest rate of more than 20%. Affected by the economic downturn in China, these informal lending institutions are facing a sharp rise in non-performing loans.
"Shadow banking in China is an area we are more worried about. In the past few years, China's shadow banking has grown rapidly through various loan instruments and intermediaries, which is indeed a risk. " According to the head of the International Monetary Fund, the total amount of loans provided through shadow banking accounts for 40% of China's GDP. At present, it is very important to strengthen the supervision of shadow banking. The emergence of shadow banking is the inevitable result of financial development and financial innovation. As a useful supplement to the traditional banking system, it has played an active role in serving the real economy and enriching residents' investment channels. An industry insider said that shadow banking risks are complex, hidden, fragile, sudden and contagious, and it is easy to induce systemic risks.
Side A: Talking about the color change of "shadow"
Because shadow banking usually obtains "subprime credit" that the banking system is unwilling or unable to issue, its risk control ability is weaker than that of the banking system, and the potential risks of shadow banking have also attracted much attention. Zuo Zeng, chief economist of Galaxy Securities, wrote that "the chaos in the shadow banking market is worrying". Liu Yuhui, director of the Financial Experimental Research Office of China Academy of Social Sciences, also warned that "shadow banking is a' heavy minefield' for credit risk in China."
B side: flying against the light
The rapid development of shadow banking has become a force to be reckoned with in China's financial system. Wang Zhaoxing, vice chairman of China Banking Regulatory Commission, once wrote that "the shadow banking system is an indispensable part of the whole financial system and an important supplement to the formal financial system".